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DANIEL S. GARNER and SHERRI JO
GARNER husband and wife; NOLA GARNER,
a widow and NOLA GARNER as trustee of the
NOLA GARNER LIVING TRUST, dated 7-29-07,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
BRAD POVEY and LEIZA POVEY,
husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants,
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JEFFREY J. NEIGUM and KATHLEEN A.
NEIGUM as trustees of the JEFFREY J.
NEIGUM and KATHLEEN A. NEIGUM
REVOCABLE TRUST, dated 9-17-04; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a foreign title insurer with an Idaho certificate
of authority; and FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
COMPANY, INC. an Idaho Corporation,
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837 South 500 West, Suite 200
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IN THE SIXTH .nJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garnet
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-08-342

v.
Judge Dunn

Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. ,
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, 8..<; Tmstees
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and KathIeenA
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First
American Title Insurance Company, a
Foreign Title hlsuter with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation.
Defendants.
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Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey ("Povey Defendants"), by and through undersigned
counsel, hereby me this Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Second
Amended Complaint.

INTRODUCTION
After a year of litigation in which the other party Defendants in this action did not assert
any cross claims against the Povey Defendants, Plaintiffs claim that they are attempting to
purchase those claims and if and when successful in that endeavor, may file claims that they are
as yet unable to fully articulate.
Plaintiffs, who no doubt see the writing on the wall with respect to the frivolous claims
they filed against the Povey Defendants, have filed this premature motion to amend in an attempt
to derail the Povey Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court should see the
Motion to Amend Second Amended Complaint ("Motion to Amend") for what it is and dismiss
it out of hand. In any event, the Motion to Amend does not articulate a cause of action upon
which relief could be granted and therefore, the Court should exercise its discretion to deny the
motion. In addition, because the Motion to Amend is an indefensible attempt by the Plaintiffs to
prolong this case and cause urmecessary expense to the Povey Defendants, the Povey Defendants
should be awarded their attorney fees in opposing this motion.

ARGUMENT
RuIe 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides for liberality with respect to
amendments to a complaint, but there are limits to a party's right to amend. If an amended
pJeading does not set out a valid claim, or if the opposing party would be prejudiced by the delay
in adding the new claim, or if the opposing party has a valid defense such as a statute of
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limitation, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file the
amended complaint. Black Canyon Raguetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l B~ 119 Idaho
171,804 P.2d 900 (1991); Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Fanners Ins. Co., 132 Id. 318, 971
P.2d 1142 (1998).
Plaintiffs admittedly cannot meet this standard, but instead ask the Court for "additional
time to investigate the claims and file an amended complaint pertaining to the assigned claims."
See, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint, p. 2. In other words,
the Plaintiffs want this Court to cause the Povey Defendants to incur additional fees while they
decide what. if any, additional claims they may want to file. Obviously, the Plaintiffs cite no
authority that would allow the trial court to impose such an unreasonable burden on the Povey
Defendants. After a year of litigation, if the parties are not now able to articulate their claims
against the Poveys, the Court is certainly within its discretion to not allow continued fishing by
the Plaintiffs to try to come up with a valid claim.
To the extent that the Plaintiffs have tried to articulate causes of action in the Motion to
Amend, the Court can see that those claims have no chance of survival and therefore it would be
in the interests of judicial economy to simply nip them in the bud before more unnecessary
attorney fees have been squandered.

I.

THERE CAN BE NO BREACH OF WARRANTY CLAIMS BY THE
OTHER DEFENDANTS.

Plaintiffs opine that there may be breach of warranty claims by Some of the parties to
whom the Povey Defendants conveyed property because the Povey Defendants warranted title
"'Without disclosing the existence ofllie original access road despite their knowledge ofiC' See,
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint, p. 3. This claim suffers the
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same defects as the Garner's direct claim against the Povey Defendants that they somehow had a
duty to protect in the deeds they used to convey the servient estate what the Garners themselves
never bothered to protect by language in any deed.

This entire dispute could never have

occurred had the Garners simply recorded a deed in which their supposed right of way is
described. It is simply ludicrol1s for them to compJain that the Povey Defendants failed to record
something that they themselves never bothered to record. And, to the extent that the right of way
exists absent any recording of it, then the purchasers had just as much knowledge as the Povey
Defendants since the "access road" is as visible on the ground today as it was when the Povey
Defendants bought the property. 1
II.

PLAINTIFF'S UNARTICULATED FRAUD CLAIM COULD NOT
STAND.

Plaintiffs admit that they do not have facts sufficient to particularly plead a fraud claim.
The Court has the facts before it to detennine that the bare bones facts asserted in the motion to
amend are not true. The supposed fraud claims pivot on Plaintiffs' erroneous assertion that the
Poveys "knew that the prospective purchasers of their property did not know of the easement."
See, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint, p. 3.

Such an

assertion is patently false and not supported by a stick of evidence. The access road that nms
past the Dean horne and continues to the canal crossing is visible upon the ground even today.
Under Idaho law, the purchaser of property is put on inquiry notice by the existence of such a
roadway.

Farrell v. Bro""TI,111 Idaho 1027, 1033, 729 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Idaho App.

1986)("[W]hatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence and
1 Of course, the access road now has a fence built across it, but since that fence was built by the purchasers long
after the Povey Defedants left the scene, it could not be relied upon by the purchasers in a claim against the Povey
Defendants.
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prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a reasonable investigation
would disc1ose.")(Internal citation omitted). That inquiry notice imputes to the purchaser all the
knowledge that a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed. Id. Because the Garners never
bothered to record their eac;ement., the purchasers are deemed to have had just as much
knowledge as the Poveys "With regard to this unrecorded easement.
CONCLUSION

As articulated in the motion for summary judgment pending before the Court, plaintiff's
claims against the Poveys should never have been brought Now Plaintiffs want to compound

the injury to the Poveys by delay allowing them to run up more fees for the Poveys while they
fish for facts that might possibly support these currently unsupportable claims. The Court should
not allow its processes to be used in such a manner and the motion to amend should be denied.
DATED THIS 29th day of September, 2009.
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, p.e

Blake S. Atkin
Attameyfor the Pavey Defimdants
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Gordon S. Thatcher
Thatcher, Beard.. St Clair, Gaffuey
116 S. Center
P.O. Box 216
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
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X

Fax:

Eric Olsen
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X

Fax:

Ryan McFarland
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x U.S. Mail_Hand delivery
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Blake S. Atkin
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X Fax:

Fax

Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e.
837 South 500 West, Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants

IN THE SIXTH .ruDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
Daniel S. Gamer and Shem-Jo Gamer,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and
Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Garner
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,

MOTION TO STRIKE THE
AFFIDAVITS OF HENRY POVEY AND
DANIEL S. GARNER

Plaintiffs,
Case No. CV-08-342

v.
Judge Dlmn
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C.
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September
17,2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and
Leiza Povey, husband and Vvife; First
American Title Insurance Company, a
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey respectfully move the Court for an order striking the

affidavits of Daniel S. Gamer and Henry Povey on the grounds that the statements made in the
affidavits would not be admissible at the trial of this matter and should therefore, under rule
56(e) be stricken, This motion is supported by the memorandum filed in support hereof.
th

Dated this 29 day of September, 2009.
ATKIN I,AW OFFICS, p.e

Blake S. Atkin
Attorney for the Pavey Defond£Ints
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P.O. Box 216
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

X Fax

Eric Olsen
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
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_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

X

Fax

Ryan McFarland
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley

_ ~ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

X

Fax

P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

U.S. Mail _X_Hand delivery

Blake S. Atkin
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY~ STATE OF IDAHO
Dame1 S. Garner and Shem-Jo Gamer,
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow and
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Gamer
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO STRIKE THE
AFFIDAVITS OF RON KENDALL, IVAN
JENSEN, TED RICE, LORRAINE RICE
AND JUDY PHILLIPS

v.

Case No. CV-08-342

Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C.
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigurn, as Trustees
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September
17,2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and

Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First
American Title Insurance Company, a
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation.
Defendants.
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Judge Dunn

Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submit
this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Ron Kendall,
Ivan Jensen, Ted Rice, Lorraine Rice, and Judy Phillips.
Plaintiffs have moved to strike the affidavits of Ron Kendall, Ivan Jensen, Ted Rice,
Lorraine Rice and Judy Phillips. The motion is not well founded. The affidavits comply with
Rule 56(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and should not be stricken.

I.

RON KENDALL'S AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT CONTAIN INADMISSIBLE
HEARSAY.

Plaintiffs complain of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Ron Kendall Affidavit ("Kendall
affidavit") which relate statements made by Gary Garner, the husband of Nola Garner and the
father of Daniel S. Gamer who unfortunately is now deceased. Plaintiffs'

o~jection

is that the

related conversations are "hearsay." First, the statements are not hearsay at all, and if they were
they would be admissible hearsay. The affidavit cannot be stricken.
A. GARY GARNER WAS THE AGENT OF NOLA GARNER AND

DANIEL S. GARNER WHEN HE MADE THE STATEMENTS.
All of the Garner property owned on the west side of Twin Lakes Canal is now, and for
many years has been operated as a single farming operation. In fact, it is well known in the
community that the Garners operate the property, whatever may be the state of the legal title, as
an integrated operation. See, June 3, 2009, Deposition of Nola Garner, pp. 70-71, 76-77,81-82,
90, attached hereto as Exhibit A; See, June 3, 2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Gamer, pp. 9-10,
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Before his death, Gary Gamer was the man in charge of that operation. And, most
importantly, it was Gary Garner who, while Dan was away at school, negotiated the purchase of
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the initial 40 acres from the McCullochs. See, June 3,2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp.
10-13, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
B. THE STATEMENTS AND ACTS OF AN AGENT OF A PARTY TO A
LAWSUIT ARE NOT HEARSAY.
Under Idaho Ru1es of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(I), "A statement is not hearsay if-- .... (2)
The statement is offered against a party and is ... (D) a statement by a party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency ...." Gary Garner's acts in procuring the
Rice right of way then telling officials of Twin Lakes Canal company that if they would allow
his family to install the crossing at the Rice right of way he would allow them to rip out the
crossing that is the subject of this lawsuit is admissible against the Garners in this case.

Ron

Kendall's testimony about those conversations is not hearsay and tlle affidavit needs to be
considered by the Court.
C. IF GARY GARNER~S STATEMENTS WERE HEARSAY, THEY FIT
THE STATEMENT AGAI~ST INTEREST EXCEPTION AND ARE
THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE.
Even if Gary Garner's statements could be considered hearsay, which they shou1d not be,
they would be admissible as statements against interest

A statement against interest is

admissible even though the declarant is unavailable. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(b)(3).
Unavailable includes when the 'witness is "unable to be present or to testifY at the hearing
because of death ...." Rule 804(a)(4), Idaho Rules of Evidence.
When Gary Garner told Ron Kendall that:
the right of way he was using at that time went past the Povey's home, that the
Poveys had little chlldren and that he thought it would be safer if he accessed his
property at the new crossing so that the gravel trucks and farm machinery would
not be going so close to the Povey's home" and that "if [Twin Lakes] would
allow the installation of the new crossing that he would agree that we could
3

remove what his family had been using as a crossing that is located to the north
and west of the Neigum property."
See, Affidavit of Ron Kendall at Paragraphs 1-2. That was a statement against interest and is
admissible even though, unfortunately, Gary Gamer has passed away and is no longer available.
The statement was made at a time when Gary Garner held legal titIe to some of the property that
is the subject of this lawsuit and when he was a manager of the common Gamer holclings on the
west side of the canal.

II.

THE IVAN JENSEN AFFIDAVIT CONTAINS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
A. JENSEN'S REFERENCE TO THE RICE RIGHT OF WAY IS NOT
VAGUE.

Regarding Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Affidavit of Ivan Jensen ("'Jensen affidavit"), in the
context of this litigation, references to <'the Rice right of way" cannot be considered vague. The
location of this "Rice right of way" is well known to the Plaintiffs, even if their lawyers feign
ignorance of its location. See, June 3,2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp. 16-18,40,222,
226-227, attached hereto as Exhibit B. See, June 2, 2009, Deposition of Nola Garner, pp. 17-]8,
attached hereto as Exhibit A. Jensen's reference to the installation of the Rice right of way "in
the early part of 1999," Jensen affidavit at Paragraph 2, further identifies the location as that of
the Rice right of way that Gary Garner purchased in 1999. Plaintiffs' lawyers refer to this "Rice
right of way" at least twice in their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment, and Daniel S. Garner refers to it in the affidavit he submitted. To argue that they do
not know what Ivan Jensen wa.<> referring to when he told about a conversation witIl Ted Rice,
Earl Ward, Ron Kendall and Gary Garner on the canal bank: near "what is now kno\vn as the
Rice right of way" is, at the very least, disingenuous.
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The discussion is not hearsay.

As pointed out above in connection ",ith the affidavit of

Ron Kendall, Gary Gamer's statements are not hearsay because they were made by the agent of
parties to this action, and in any event would not be hearsay because when made they were
statements against interest. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Jensen affidavit should not be stricken.

B. JENSEN'S REFERENCE TO TWIN LAKE'S OPPOSITION TO NEW
CROSSINGS IS NOT WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

In Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Jensen affidavit, Ivan Jensen sets out that at the time of the
conversation mentioned in Paragraph 2, he was employed by Twin Lakes and "in that capacity"
he met with Mr. Ron Kendall, the water master, Mr. Earl Ward, another Twin Lakes employee,
Mr. Ted Rice and Mr. Gary Garner. He further states that the purpose of the meeting was to

discuss the installation of the Rice crossing.
"[T]he actions of an agent are the actions of the corporation." Ostrander v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993). One may conclude
that an agent of Twin Lakes, sent by Twin Lakes to discuss a crossing installation, would be
armed with knowledge of the company's policies with regard to crossings. In any event, his
observations as an agent of Twin Lakes, about Twin Lakes being generally opposed to crossings
because of the inherent difficulty each added crossing adds to the cleaning of the canal, are,
under the Jaw of agency, observations of the Twin Lakes company because of his position as
their agent, and were further confirmed by the water master. See. Affidavit of Ron Kendall at
paragraph 1.
C. GARY GARNER'S STATEMENTS ARE NOT HEARSAY A."ND ARE
STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST.

Regarding Paragraphs 4, 6, and 7 of the Jensen affidavit, as shown above with regard to
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the affidavit of Ron Kendall, Gary Gamer's statements are not hearsay because they were made
by the agent of parties to this action, and in any event would not be hearsay because, when made,
they were statements against interest. There is nothing vague about Paragraph 6. Paragraphs 4,
6, and 7 should not be stricken.
III.

THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE TED RICE AFFIDAVlT ARE
ADMISSIBLE.

In Paragraph 2 of the Affidavit of Ted Rice ("Rice affidavit"), as with the Affidavit of
Ivan Jensen, Plaintiffs' feigned ignorance about the reference to. "the Rice right of way" does not
make the reference vague. Even though Mr. Rice does not state the date of the meeting along the
canal bank, he fixes it as a discussion about the installation of the right of way. It is an obvious
reference to the same ruscussion attended by Ivan Jensen and Ron Kendall.
Regarding Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the Rice affidavit, foundation is laid by a witness
telling how he knows somefujng. The foundation need not be detailed-it may not even be
believable-but for admissibility analysis it need only explain how the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter to which he is testifying. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 901(b)(2). Mr.
Rice lays the foundation for his familiarity with the various roadways in his first paragraph in
which he states that he has lived "adjacent to the property and the right of way ... for 82 years."
The Rice affidavit is very specific as to its content and it is sufficient foundation for him to state
that he has lived adjacent to the property for the past 82 years.

IV.

THE JUDY PHILLIPS AFFIDAVIT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATES THE
MINUTES OF TWIN LAKES CANAL COMPAl\ry,

The Affidavit of Judy Phillips makes no statements of fact. It simply authenticates, as a
business record kept in the nonnal course of business of Twin Lakes Canal Company, a record
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indicating that the Garners had approved removal of the bridge on the Garner property. If Ivan
Jensen and Ron Kendall accurately remembered the discussions they had 'with Gary Gamer, in
which he agreed to remove the Garner bridge, one would expect to find some mention of it in the
minutes of a Twin Lakes Canal Company board of directors meeting. As expected, such a record
is there. The Affidavit of Judy Phillips is admissible and necessary to establish the document as
an authentic business record and exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(6), Idaho Rules of
Evidence. There is no basis for striking the Affidavit of Judy Phillips, nor the attached business
record of Twin Lakes Canal Company.
th

Dated this 29 day of September, 2009

ATKIN LAW OFFICS, P.C

Blake S. Atkin
Attorney for the Povey Defondants

7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of September, 2009, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE

THE AFFIDAVITS OF RON KENDALL, IVAN JENSEN, TED RICE, LORRAINE RICE
AND JUDY PHILLIPS upon the follo-wing by the method of delivery designated:
Gordon S. Thatcher
Thatcher, Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney
116 S. Center
P.O. Box 216
Rexburg,Idaho 83440

_ X_ US. Mail_Hand delivery

X

Fax

Eric Olsen
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391

_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

X

Fax

Ryan McFarland
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

_ ~ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

U.S. Mail _X_Hand delivery

Blake S. Atkin
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X Fax
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Page 17/
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

Thars correct.
Q_ Okay. But that is anotherroad that
you could have used to access -I'm not saying
you wanted to, and we'll get to -whether you did or
not in a minute, but that is a road - someone
could have taken that road and it converged vvith
the north road and MRBROWN: Couldyouclari:£yforfue
witness what you mean when you say that is a road
)lUU could have used.
Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) Is that a road that you
could have used to access the Cox or Povey parcel
on the west side of the canal?
A We could have.
Q. Did you ever use it?
A I may have once.
Q. Okay_
A I really don't remember.
Q. Fair enough. And then 1he Rice
right-of-way did not exist at the-time you
purchased the Povey and the Cox parcels, correct?
A That is correct.
MR ATKIN: Hold on a second.
(Oifthe record..)
A

I
II

1 traded. who did that belong to before you traded
2 it to the Rices?
A. That belonged to J 3
4
Q. 'Who were the owners?
5
A. I :really don't know. Maybe the best
6 thing is to say I don't know, because I don't know
I 7 whether it -...vas all on our property or some of it
!
,j 8 on Danny's. I don't know where the boundary line
9 is there.
10
Q. Okay. We're there deeds that were
11 exchanged between the Garners and the Rices with
12 regards to that property?
13
A. May- I converse with my attorney?
114
Q. Sure.
15
MR- BROWN: I believe there's a deed that's
116 an exhibit to the complainL
TIlE WIlNESS: There's a warranty deed.
117
18 It's from Edward Rice - okay. Gary T. Gamer
19 and Nola S. Gamer to Edward Rice and Helen Rice.
20
Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) Okay. So does that
21 refresh your recolleCtion as to who the ovvners of
22 the 30-fuot parcel that you conveyed to the Rices
23 was?
I

I

I

24

A. I guess it \'\-'as ours.
Page 20

Page 18
1 or the southern most access road that exists now,
2 as I understand it you and yom husband purchased
3 that in about 1990?
4
A That is not correct
5
Q. Okay. Tell me how1hat came to be.
6
A It vvas trru:IetL it was not purchased.
7
Q. You traded a 30-foot strip ofyour
8 property that goes from that access road south to
9 the Rice's gravel pit; is that correct?
10
A It's along the west side of the gravel
11 pit.
12
Q. Okay_
13
A. Over to the fence.
14
Q. But it's - you traded a30-foot
15 access road to the Rices in exchange for this
16 30-foot right-of-way that's now called the Rice
17 right-of-way?
18
A No.
19
Q. Correct me where rm wrong.
20
A. We traded a 30-fuot strip of hillside
21 for a 30-foot right-of-way road.
22
Q. Okay. And the 30-foot right-of-way
23 road is the one that we've 24
A Named Rices_
25
Q_ Okay. And the 30-foot parcel that you
(208) 345-9611

1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

V
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. It's a lull
Q. And it's close to the boundary with
your son Danny?
A. Yes.
Q_ Let me ask you, -what was Danny's
involvement, if any, in the purchase or building
of what's now known as the Rice right-of-way? Was
he involved in that transaction?
A. He was not involved in the
transaction.
Q. Okay. And ifI understan~ at least
one of ilie purposes - let me ask it this way.
Was one ofthe purposes of building that
right-of-way to provide a better access fur trucks
hauling gravel out of the gravel pit that's up the
mountaln from that right-of-way?
A] don't know how to answer that
exactly. I don't know what Gary's purpose was.
Q_ All right Then Jet me ask this.
What, nany, was your involvement?
A. Anger.
Q. Explain that to me, please.
A I could not see why we needed to give
away something more valuable fur - the property
that we traded fur that easement to me was more

M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.

(208) 345-8800 (fux)

Page 71

Page 691
i

1 vvhat those negotiations were; is that correct?
1 Gary bought either of yours, correct?
2
A That's correct.
2
A. That is correct.
3
Q. Have you since leamed anything about
3
Q. And he owns a 40-acre parceL And rm
4 vvb.ai the negotiations were between Gary and Twin
4 .not sure, but he might O'WIJ. another 40 acres over
5 Lakes Canal for the Rice crossing?
5 on the vvest side?
6
A No, I haven't
6
A. Or 80.
7
Q. I apologize. We've covered a lot of
7
Q. So he ovvns 80 total?
8 this without me using my notes. Let me take a
8
A. I'm not sure, but I t:hlnk it's 80.
g minute.
. 9
Q. Okay. The complaint alleges that
10
Have you ever - \\'e talked about your
110 through an oral agreement those properties have
11 use of the northern road. Have you ever used the
111 been nm as a common - an integrated common
12 middle road before it converges with the northern
112 operation is the phrase in the amended complaint
13 road? Do you know VIIbat I'm mlking about?
113
A. His property or all of the property?
14
A No. fm lost.
I 14
Q. All.
15
Q. The middle road goes from the Westside
115
A. They've all been n.m together
16 Highway and eventually converges with the northern! 16 basically, yes.
17 road. On that leg of the middle road have you
117
Q. Okay. It says through an oral
18 ever used that?
118 agreement Was there an actual sit dovm. to work
19
A I have used it when Leiza and Brad
119 out a negotiated. oral agreement or was that just
20 lived where the Deans live.
120 kind ofthe arrangement that developed between you
21
Q. Okay. On one occasion or more than
121 and your son?
.
22 One occasion?
!22
A. lbe Garners never sit down and do
23
A More than one.
23 anything very organized.
24
Q. Okay. And what prompted you to use
124
Q. I take that to mean-25 that road:way?
A I don~ remember ever sitting: dawn and
Page 701
Page 72

i
125

1

A They asked me to.

1

! 1 having a conversation, but at some point there was
2
Q. Okay. Tell me about that. When did
I 2 an agreement
3 they ask you to do that?
II 3
Q. At least there was an understanding?
4
A I don't know.
4
A. Well, yeah.. Danny has my cows with
5
Q. Sometime when Btad and Leiza were
5 his cows.
6 living in the home that the Deans now live in?
6
Q. All right. Let me ask you about that.
7
A. Yes.
! 7 VIbat are the uses to vvhlch the property, any of
8
Q. And did they tell you why they wanted
I· 8 the property on the west side of Twin Lakes Canal,
9 you to use that road?
f 9 that is accessed by any of these three roads that
10
A I can't remember specifically why they
we've talked about, what uses has that property
11 said.
! 11 been put to? We Jrnowtbat there's a gravel pit
12
Q. Okay.
112 over there, and maybe three gravel pits over
13
AQ Do you want me to guess?
13 there.. There's been some bauling of some gravel?
14
. No. But do you think you know why?
I 14
A. Yes.
15
A I think it was because they have·
15
Q. Okay. What else has been done there?
16 little children too.
116
A. Grain bas been taken out. A.Ifalfa has
17
Q. Okay. And was that okay with you to
1.[ 187 than taken off. Used as pasture ground.
!
Q. When was the last time that any of the
18 use that road rather than the northern road?
19
A. Yes.
a mother and I want - I
j19 Garners raised
on any of that property?
20 don't Vv-ant people driving past my children..
j 20
A. I don't know. I get a subsidy check.
21
Q. Okay. Fair enough. Thecomplaint
21 I get a grain based check. whatever that's called.
22 talks about the two properties that you and Gary
I don't know.
23 bought on the west side of Twin Lakes Canal. And ! 23
Q. Let me ask: it this way. I kind of
24 it also talks about tbeproperty that Danny
i 24 assumed something I probably shouldn't have
25 bouglrt. I think Danny bought his before you and
I 25 assumed. Since buying the Cox or the Povey

I

!

110
I.

!

warn

rm

!
122
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22

23
24

.parcel, did you and your husband ever raise grain
on any of that property?
A I don't know.
Q. Do you know ifDanny ever raised grain
on any ofthat property since he bou""abt it?
A I don't know. I don't get involved
with what they're growing.
Q. All right. So when you say that grain
has been taken off the property, how do you know
that?
A. Because 1 get a grain pay check.
Q. Okay. So at some point somebody
raised some grain?
A. At Some place, yes.
Q. But thai; might have been the
McCuIlochs or the Poveys or the Coxes?
A I don't know. I know that Dennis
Ralphs always claimed that he hauled grain down
through there, but I really don't know.
Q. You don't know whether any of the
Garners have ever raised grain on any of that
property?
A I dontt know.
Q. How about alfhlfa. have the Garners

r

Ii 12
I

I 34
5
6
I 7
8
9
10
11
12

I

13
. 14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21

22
23
24

Q. They didn't want to go up the road? I
have cows, I know how they act
A. They're ornery. Sometimes more than
others.
Q. Typically did you haul the cows in a
vehicle?
A. Typically Danny hauls thellL
Q. Okay. Do you know how many cows he
runs up there?
A. 1 don't know.
Q. And what kind of vehicle does he use
to haul the cows up in?
A Most generally he uses a couple of
trailers behind a pickup.
Q. Okay. Have you ever seen him use a
semi trailer to haul cows up to that property?
A You mean one of those cattle divider
things?
Q. Yeah..
A No, I haven't
Q. You said that you run your cows with
his cows. How many cows do you own?
A I don't know.
been nnming mine
with him for a long time. :Mine are the ones that

rYe

.~~~mredru~ruw~~~UW~~~J~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.--
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1
2
3

4

5
6
7
8
9
10

A r don't know.
Q. You know it has been used fur pasture
because you told us you went up to look at the
cows and have fed them up there sometimes?
A Yes. it has been used for pasture.
It's been used for skeet shooting.
Q. Okay.
A. I think it's been used for a lot of
thi:ngs.
Q. Do you know how many cows have been
pastured up there?

Page 76
1 problem oiles, so I don't know how many I have
2 left.
3
Q. Do you ever receive any payment from
4 your son Danny with regard to the cattle that you
5 own?
6

A. Yeah, I do.

1
Q. All right But you don't know how
8 many you own?

9
A No. But I get a lot of beefSteaks.
10
Q. Okay. Who is in charge of managing
1I
11 the consolidated property, the common operation of
12
A ldon't.
12 those properties on the west side of Twin Lakes
13
Q. Have the cows been hauled up to that
13 Canal?
14 pasture in vehicles or were they herded up the
14
A. That we're referring to as the Pavey
15 road?
15 and Cox and Danny?
16
A Both.
16
Q. Yes.
17
Q. Okay. Do you recall herding cows up
17
A Danny is.
18 any of the roads to that pasture?
18
Q. Has he always managed it even before
119 your ~band died?
19
A. No, I haven't hauled any up. I helped
20 herd them over there a month ago maybe.
20
A. I think probably most of the time.
21
Q. You mean your cows wont stay off the
21
Q. Does he consult with you with regard
22 road?
22 to the management ofthat property?
23
A Ted Rice was very nice and said we
23
A. He tries.
24 could take the fence down and herd them through
24
Q. Okay. And before your husband died
25 his place.
25 did he consult with your husband about the
(208) 345-9611
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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Page 77
2

3
4
5
6

7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17

18
19
20

management of that property?
A r imagine they consulted.
Q. More than you do now?
A Gary and I w-en/. on twu missions. At
that time we were away there Vv'aS no consulting,
Danny just handled things. But that is something
that we do vrell. All of them probably got
together at different times and consulted about
what they were going to plant or whatever.
Q. Okay.
A. And Wayne is usually included. That's
an uncle.
Q. All right. So it's fu:ir to say that
your husband, before he died, would have - when
he \vasn't on a mission somewhere would have
consulted 'With Danny about fue operation of those
properties?
A. Yes. V&en they're standing around
they - we kind of run everything together.
you need grain, which is the best spot to put it

1
A I think in the house. Probably in the
2 kitchen.
3
Q. In your house?
4
A Yeah..
5
Q. And you were there and your husband
6
there and Danny vvas there. Was anyone else
7 there?
8
A Not that I recall
, 9
Q. Okay. What did your husband say
10 during that conversation?
111
A. I don't know.
Q. What did Danny say?
j13
A. I don't know what he said, but he was
j 14 very upset.
115
Q. Why was he upset?
! 16
A. Because he didn't think his dad was
ma1.d:ng a good decision.
118
Q. Do you recall any specifics of why he
19 thought his dad wasn't making a good decision?
120
A No.
Q.. And do you know - do you recall the
response that your husband had to any of Danny's

vvas

!
112

117

If!
121

Q. Okay.
A. Wayne and I have done that ail our
23 life and the kids have just been included.
/23 concerns?
24
Q. All right. If~ fair.to say 1hat the
124
A. He was very exasperated that Danny and
25 development aftre RICe ogbt.-of-way: wnnJd have
i 25 T coutdn~ see tbe.wisdom that be bad
Page 781
Page 80
21
22

122

1 is and would have been a benefit to Danny's
I/ 1
2 operation ofhis - ofthat property, right?
2
3
A. I don't know nit's it benefit. Danny
3
4
4 did not:teel that it was, I do not believe. I
5 don't know. I mean, I haven't talked to him.
5
6
Q. rn ask him about that.
6
7
A. So I don't lrnow.
7
a
Q. Let me get to the point Do you know
,I 8
9
9 'Whether Gary talked with Danny about the
10 development oftbe Rice right-of-way before he did 110
11 it?
111
12
A. Yes, I know he talked to Danny about
I' 12
13 that. That is the only disagreement I think he
,13
14 and his dad ever had.
14
15
Q. And how do you know about that
,15
16 discussion, or those discussions?
l 16
17
A. I was there.
18
Q. You were there?
18
19
A. was there.
19
20
Q. Okay. Was there one or more than one
f 20
21 conversation between your husband and Danny with
22 regard to the Rice right-of-way?
122
23
A. I don't know about that I was only
i 23
24 there for One.
/24
25
Q. Okay. Where were you?
. j 25

!

r

(208) 345-9611

117
!
!
121

Q. All right. Was this before the deal
had been done to develop the Rice right-of-way?
A I dontt remember.'
Q. Was it before you signed the docmnents
on the Rice right-oF-way, exhibit I?
A. I don't know nit was befure or
after.
Q. Okay. Let me ask you, if it was
before - iiit was after the deal was already
done, would there have been any reason fur the
conversation and the exasperation of your husband?
A. Yes. Sometimes 'We rehash what we've
already done.
Q. Okay_ So as you sit here you don't
know, in relationship to the deal, when it was
eli ussed?
Be A.
Q_ In wbatregard did Dannytbink that it
was an unwise, decision to put in the Rice
right-oF-way?
A r don't remember anything he said
about it so I don't really know wba1- well. I
don't know what he thought
Q. Was it because of the property that
was being traded for the Rice right-of-way?

No.
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Page 811
1.
A. It was probably the value.
2
Q. All right.
:3
A. But I don't know, because I don't
4 remember Danny saying anything specifically.
5
Q. All right. Did there come a point in
6 time \vhen Danny became happy or reconciled to the
7 idea of the Rice rigbt-of-\¥ay?
8
A I don't really know.
Q. Other than that do you remember
9
10 anything else about that conversation about the
11 development of the Rice right-of-way, other than
12 Danny and you not seeing the wisdom in it and your
13 husband being exasperated because you couldn't see
14 howwise it was?
15
A. The only thing I saw was that Danny
16 regrets being what be considers disrespectful to
17 his father.
18
Q. Anything else?
19
A. No.
20
Q. The complaint, as I say, alleges - we
21 talked about bow you fun this property as a common
22 operation.. That's pretty well known in the
23 community of Clifton, that the Garners and the
24 Smarts run alI of their properties in bmdem.
25
A
Togetber We discuss it and work

i

1
2
3
4
5
\ 6
I 7
1 8
9
I

1'10

Q. Sherri being Dan's wife?
A Yes.
Q. As I've gone through the second
amended complaint, one of the concerns that is
raised is that Brad and Leiza Povey didn't take
steps to protect legally you and your husband's
rightto use the right-of-way, the north
right-of-way. Is that correct?
A Ye.g, that's correct.
Q. Okay. Let me ask you this, the only

11 document recorded with the county recorder, and

12 you know what the county recorder is?
13
A. Yes.
14
Q. You understand that in order to
15 have - in order to protect your rights in real
16 estate you record documents with the county
17 recorder. co.rrect?
A That's correct
19
Q. Okay. And the only document that you
20 have with regard to the Povey property, the
21 property that you bought from the Poveys. and let
22 me make sure the record is clear. You bought thai
23 property, )'UU and your husband bought that
24 properly, not in a trust oranytbing else, just

/18
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A. Everything was pureha..~d out of the
1
2 trust. It was just Gary and I.
3
Q. Right And you and Gary bought the
4 property:from four Poveys, Brad and Leiza Povey
run their properties together, wouldn't they?
5 and?
:MR. MCFARLAND: Objection. Calls for
6
A. Henry and Millie Povey.
speculation.
7
Q. Okay. And there's a deed from aU
Q. (BY MR AIKIN) I mean, it's commonly
8 four Paveys.to Gary and Nola Gamer with regard to
known that that's bow you opernte, isn't it?
9 that property, right?
A. I think so.
10
A. Correct.
Q. Do you have any reason to believe
11
Q. And that deed is attached to the
that - let's take them one at a time. Do you
12 second amended complaint as one of the exhibits,
have any reason to believe that the Poveys knew,
13 right?
with regard to this property on the west side of
14
A. That's right.
Tv.in Lakes Canal. that Gaty and Nola Gamer and
15
Q. And that one deed is the only document
Danny and Sherri Gamer ran the property as an
t 16 that -was recorded -with the county recorder's
integrated common operation?
117
office with re1saro to that piece of property that
I
A I think: that the Poveys would know a
118 you and Gary bought from the four Poveys, correct?
little bit more than most. And they would also
°j19
A I believe it is the only one.
know that Danny is definitely his own individual.
20
Q. Okay. And in that deed there isn't
Q. All right. And why is it that the
any mention of a right-of-way fur any of these
Poveys would know a little bit more than most
22 three roadways orright-of-ways that we've talked
about the way that the Garners ran this as an
23 about?
/
integrated common operation?
A. That's correct It's an implied one.
I 24
A Brad is Sberrits uncle.
I 25 We bought off the people that owned the rest of

together. yes.
Q. And so the Poveys and Deans and the
Neigums. they would have understood that
relationship, that the Garners are a group that

(208) 345-9611
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I

I1

1 .to be, I j us! wonder if there are any other
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13

14
15
16

reasons?
A.. I can't come down with any more.
Q. Okay. Now, as a result of one of the ,
deeds that Brad Povey recorded, there now is
recorded with the county recorder a deed -which
describes a right-of-way fur Danny 'Garner to use
to access that property on the west side of Twin
Lakes Canal, right?
A. Yes, there is.
Q. And that description is that middle
road that is now referred to as the-Neigum
driveVtlay, correct?
A Correct.
Q. Okay. Before Brad recorded that deed,
there weren't any other deeds describing a
right-of-way for any of the Garners on the west

17
18 side of the canal" right?
19
A. I believe that's correct.
20
Q. Do you know of anything filed by Brad
21 or Leiza Povey with the co1lIl1:y recorder that tries
22 to deny that the Garners have a right-of-way
23 across what used to be the McCulloch property in
24 order to access their property on the west side of

I2
3

f

!4
1 5

I 6

,7
I8
I

9

I

10

11
12
13

A.. It does not say that, but it has been
interpreted as that.
Q. By whom?
A. I think by the Neigums.
Q. Okay. As you sit here, are you aware
of any docmnent that Brad or Leiza Povey caused to
be recorded? We talk about the Neigum deed and
your interpretation or the Neigums'
interpretation.. Let's skip that fur a minute.
Are you aware of any docmnent recorded that tries
to deny that Gary Gamer and Nola Gamer, or the
Nola t:rust, have a right-of-way across what u..o;;eci
to be the McCulloch property?
A. No, none..
Q. Okay. And even the one we've talked

14
15
16 about doesn't say they don't?
17
A No, it doesn't.
18
Q. Now, when the Deans bought their
19 property from the Poveys, and r don't know - were
20 you a\.V3re that the Poveys were selling the
21 property to the Deans?
22
A Probably somewhat. I was aware it was
23 up fur sale, but who was buying I didn't know.
24
Q. When the Deans bought that property,

?

Page 90

1
A I think that the deed you refer to,
2 and this is my poor legal opinion..
3
Q. I understand. you're not a lawyer and
4 I'm not asking you fur a legal opinion.
5 asking are YOll aware of any recorded deed?
6
A My understanding of the deed that was
7 recorded makes it so I have less of a right-{)f--way
8 than any other way. because it vvas specifically

rro

9 said that Danny had one and excludes us.
Q. Okay.
11
A Am I right? That's the way I read it
12
Q. Here's my question.. I understand that
13 that deed that Brad recorded specifically mentions
14 ~ Garner's access to the property on the west
15 side?
10

16
V
18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25

A.. Only Danny.
Q. Okay. But as we've established, all
of those properties have been run as a common
enterprise, right?
A Yes, they have been.
Q. Other than that, and I guess we can
look at that, but my question is that in that deed
is there anything that says Nola Gamer and Gary
Garner do not have a right-of..wayto cross any of
the formerly McCulloch property?

(20&) 345-9611
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1 goes right past the Dean home, 1hat road was
2 clearly visible on thegrol.lIld. wasn't it?
3
A. Very.
4
Q. And it was clearly visible all the way
5 to Twin Lakes Canal and the crossing at Twin Lakes
6 Canal?
7
A. Very.
8
Q. And so anybody buying that property at
9 that time would have seen that roadway?
10
A. (Wrtness nodded her head..)
1l
Q. Right?
12
A Yes.
13
Q. They would have seen that it -went up
14 the bill and to the crossing ofnvin Lakes Canal?
15
A Yes.
16
Q. And by that time the Poveys didn't own
17 any property other than the west side of Twin
18 Lakes Canal; is that correct?
19
A.. That's correct
20
Q. And the Game.rs did own property on
21 the west side of Twin Lakes Canal at the end of
22 that crossing that went across the canal, right?
23
A. Yes.
24
Q. And anybody could have gone to the
25 county recorder's office at that point in time and
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I

1 an attempt to unreasonably limit the buyer's free
1 . Gary and Nola Gamer bought from the four Poveys
I 2 access to his property.
2 that I mentioned?
I
j 3
Q. Okay. As far as I can tell, that is
3
A. Correct
4 the best description of the right-of-waytbat
4
Q_ And also provided access to a piece of
5 you're claiming in this lawsuit Do you know of
5 property thai you bought from the McCullochs?
6
A. Correct.
I 6 any better legal description,. any better
I 7 description oftbe right-of--way, than that one?
7
Q. And provided access to a property that
8
A. No. sir, I don't believe so.
8 Gary and Nola Gamer bought from the Coxes?
9
Q_ This is the only docmneut there is
9
A. Correct.
10 that describes the right-of-way?
10
Q. And Gary and Nola Garner are your
11
A I think that's it
11 mother and father?
12
12
Q. SO we're clear, this language that
A Correct.
13 you've just read out of this exhibit A, this
13
Q. And as I understand it from talking to
14 con1nlCt of sale, did not ever get incorporated
14 Nola yesterday, and from some of the allegations
15 into a deed with respect to the property, correct?
15 in the complaint; those three properties thai rve
16
16 descnDed have basically been run as one
A. Correct
Q_ Okay. At some point you completed the
17 consolidated fimn since you've owned fuem; is that 17
18 purchase pursuant to the contract of sale?
18 right?
19
19
A (Witness nodded his head.)
A. Can you c1ar:ilY that? You're talking
20
Q. You need to answer audibly.
20 the three properties - the piece I bought from
21
A
sorry. Pmsuant means after?
21 McCullochs was nm separately UIItil my parents
22
Q. Let me rephrase it At some point you
22 bought the other two, do I understand that right?
23 :finished paying for the property as descnDed in
23
Q. Yes.
24
24 theconhactof~e?
A. Correct

I

!

I

rm

Page 12

Page 10
1 continuous farm?
2
3

4

Q. Okay. Now, let me have you look at

What is marked as exhibit A to the second amended

5 complaint I'm not going to mark a new copy for
6 the deposition because it's already in the record.
7 Exhibit A to the second amended complai:nt, as I
8 understand it,. is the contract of purebase tbs.t
9 you had with the McOillocbs when you bought the
10 original 40 acres of gro~?
.
11
A Correct.
12
Q. Okay_ And in that contract there is a
13 description of a right-of-way. Do you see that?
14
A. Yes, sir, I do.
15
Q. Could you read it so we have it clear
16 on the record what vve're refurring to?
17
A. Together with the rights to all vvater
18 from all existing springs on said property, and a
19 right-of-way across seller adjacent property aJong
20 an existing roadway. The right to use said
21 roadway sball be limited to the times and in a
22 manner as not to interrere with the sellers
23 sprinkler pipe that may from time to time be
24 placed across the roadway. Likewise, seller shall
25 not place his sprinkler pipe across the roadway in
(208) 345-9611

Q. Okay. And at some point you were
2 given a deed by the McCullochs for the property?
3
A. Correct
1

A Correct

4
Q. But in 1ha.t deed it mdn't include
5 this language that we've just read describing the
6 right-of-Vlay?
7
A. The lawyer that did the sale said it
8 wasn't - that that was perfectly legal and
9 insisted on leaving it in there at closing.
10
Q. Okay.
11
A So, yes.
12
Q. I'm not arguing. The deed that you
13 received did not have that language in it?

14

A. No.
Q. Okay. Do I understand correctly-your mother told us yesterday that vvhen you were
buying this property that you had talked with the
seller, the McCullochs, and tried to get them to
agree to moving the right-of-way to a different
location.than what we've been 21' A. Than what is referred to there?

]5
16
17
18
19
20·

22
Q. Yeah.
23
A. I have no knowledge of that.
,. 24
Q. Did you ever have any discussions -with
25 the McCulIochs about where the right-of-way would

M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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Page 13!
1 cross?
2
A No" sir- I Vt1aS in college at the time
3 and most of it was done on weekends.
4
Q. Okay. Did your father or mother
5 assist you in negotiating the purchase of the
6 property?

1
2
3
4
5
6

7

7

8

A Yes.
Q. SO what your mother told us you may
9 not have been involved in because they were

. 8
9
! 10

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
l7
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
..25

I

helping you with it?
A. Yes.
Q. SO the best infunnation we have about
those negotiations would be what your mother told
us yesterday?
A. Correct.
Q. All right. Now, did you ever have any
discussions with the sellers about 1his language
in exhibit A that we just had you read?
A. Yes.
Q. What discussions did you have?
A. My dad pushed - my dad approached me
that the McCullocbs fult like they should get paid
extra money because we vvanted to extract gravel
down the right.-of-way. Ralph was there at the
time. Ralph McCullocb, at the time:that we agreecL
Page

III12
j

113
114
! 15

116

!17

118

property or the Daniel Garner property.
A. Okay.
Q. There are three roadways that at one
point or another could have been and have been
used to access that property. The first one is
what we've been referring to as the northern
roruhvay. That's the roadway that goes past what
is now the Dean home, very close proxllnity to the
Dean home, and goes up the hill to a bridge that
crosses Twin Lakes CanaL You're :familiar with
that road?
A. Yes.
Q. And if I refer to that as the norIhem
roadway, you'll know what I'm talking about?
A. I will now.
Q. Okay. And then the middle roadway has
sometimes been referred to as the Neigum driveway.
Are you fumiliar with that roadway?

: 19

A Yes.
Q. And that road starts on the Westside
!21 High-way,like the northern roadway does, about a
122 quarter of a mile south ofthe northern roadway_

i 20

,23 Is it not a quarter of a mile?
124
A. Shorter.
.! 25
Q Okay I.ess than a quarter nfa roUe
Page 16

141

.

!

1 to pay him that extra money.
2
Q. Okay. And so you did pay him extra
3 money?
4
A. Correct
5
Q. How much, do you recall?
6
A. 6,000.
7
Q. Any other discussions with the seUers
8 about the meaning of the language in exhibit A?

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

A Yes.
Q. What discussions did you have?
A. At the same time we discussed the pipe
being across the road and -what was meant by that.
And what he would do to facilitate access to the
property and to help. And ifthe pipes weren't
running he said that we could separate the main
line and go up.
Q. Now, let me see if I can get a feel
for where this pipeline crosses the road. r need
to back up a little bit There are three roads I just -want to identify the roads SO we know what
road we're talking about There are three roads
that at one point or another could be used to
access your property. And when I say your
property, unless I say differently. I mean any of
the properties, the Povey property, the Cox

(208) 345-9611

1
2
3
4
5
I6
i 7
!8
9
10

!
I
<Ii

111

112

i 13
114
.115
j 16
! 17

!18

j19

I 20

121

Anyway, some distance south of the northern
roadway. And it goes up and over and eventually
converges with the north roadway and then
continues on up the hill to the bridge that
crosses Twin Lakes Canal, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And I'm going to refer to that as the
middle roadway or Neigum driveway.

A. Okay.
Q. And the third access road is what
we've been referring to as the Rice right-of-way,
a road that your father and mother traded some
property fur in about 1990. It's a roadway that
goes on farther south from Westside Highway and up
and crosses Twin Lakes Canal at a different
crossing onto the property. Are you familiar with
that roarlway?
A. I don't believe tbere was any road
there in 1990.
Q. Okay_ When was that put in?
MR BROWN: If I can interject briefly, in
your characterization of the Rice roadway you
referred to it as a right-of-way,
l\1R. A TKJN: I understand. It's a deeded
roadway.

122
123
24
i 25
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1
MR. BROWN: There's actually a warranty
2 deed containing a legal description.. It is a
3 roadway, but for clarity I don't want an
4 implication that it's an easement or
5 right-of-way.
MR. ATKJN: I understand. It was a trade
6
7 of property. I appreciate that clarification.
8
Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) Apparently it was in
9 about 1998 that that was established, or do you
10 know when it was established?
11
A. I do not.
12
Q. At some point, and I think I've got an
13 exhibit here. Ok:ay. It looks like it was 1998
14 that the properties were exchanged. between your
15 parents and the Rices. Does that sound about
16 right?
17
A. If that's what the title says, yes.
18
Q. Exhibit I to the second amended
19 complaint is the deed by 'WIDell your parents
20 transferred a 30-acre strip to the Rices. And
21 then exln"bit .
-22
MR. BROWN: Just fur the record, 30 feet, I

23 believe.
24
MR. ATKIN: Yes. A 30-fuotwide strip to

.

'"

..

.
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1 pieces that the Deans own now?
2
Q. Correct. Or I believe that's correct.
3
A Yes, I'm fiuniliar then.
4
Q. Okay. And identified in exhibit Mis
5 segment A of the original access road. If I
6 understand it, this red line is a part of that
7 oorthem roadway that we've descn"bed?

8
9

10

11

Jl Conrect
Q. And that would continue on up the
mountain to the bridge across Twin Lakes Canal?
A. Correct
Q. And it's not shown on exhibit ~ but
currently the middle roadway goes basically along
the southern edge of the Viehweg property to the
point where it converges with the northern

12
13
14
15
16 roadway?
17
A. Correct.
18
Q. Okay. Now, on this exhibit M show me
19 v",here this main line crossed the roadway?
20
A. It's up here, not on the exhibit
121
Q. Okay. So it's up beyond this exhibit?
22
A. Correct.
23
Q. Beyond the convergence of the two
24 roads now?

Page 20

1 30-foot strip that is now referred to as the Rice
1
Q. Okay. Was it just one line that\vent
2 roadway_ Does that sound accurate?
2 across the road?
3
A. What's your question?
3
A. One portable main line.
4
Q. Are you familiar with that Rice
4
Q. One portable main line. And did it
5 roadway?
5 run in a north-south direction or how did it nm?
6
A. Yes.
6
A. My directions are poor? but rd say
7
Q. Okay. And ifI refer to it as the
7 north southerly. South to north.
8 Rice roadway you'll know what fm talking about?
8
Q. From the Westside Highway to the canal
9
A I do now.
9 is basically a westerly direction..
Q. Okay. Now,thepipelinesthatare
10
A The highway runs west?
10
11 described in exhibit A, are those sprinkler pipe
11
Q. No, the bigb\Vay runs north-south.
12 that "\iVere - portable sprinkler pipe that ::from
12
A So the main line would run
13 time to time were placed across the main line?
13 north-south, basically.
14
A. Portable main line.
14
Q. And its purpose was to - where did it
15
Q. A portable main line?
15 take water from and deliver it to?
16
A. Yes.
16
A It took 'Water from the Twin Lakes
17
Q. Okay_ And let me see ifI can find a
17 Canal and delivered Vvater to two fields.
18 map oftbat. Let's look at exhibit M that is
18
Q. TImt were south of the road?
19 attached to the second amended complaint. The
19
A That are v.rest ofthe canaL
20 some orientation, it descnbeS a Povey tract 2 and
20
Q. West ofthe canal?
21 a Povey tract I; a Viehweg .property tract 1 and a
21
A No, east of the canal. Yeah. east of
22 Viehweg property tract 2. Are you generally
22 the canal. And one was on the - north of the
23 fumiliar with the property enough to know what
23 right-of-way road and one south of the
24 this is referring to?
24 right-of-way road. That's why it crossed the
25
A Just to cIarl1Y. are these the two
I 25 road..
(208) 345-9611
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1
2

3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15

16

17
18
19

20

21
22
23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A No.
Q. Why not?
A Because I wasn't involved in hauling
gravel at that time.
Q. Okay.
A I didn't own a truck and I didn't - I
used 1he other road to access.
Q. Okay. So the gravel that was being
hauled, was that not out of your gravel pit?
A- rt Vias out of my pit. I loaded it and
sold it
Q. Okay. You loaded it and sold it, hut
people had to use their 0~'TI truck?
A Correct.
Q. All right Would you, ifyou had had
a gravel truck. have used that road?
A No.
MR. BROWN: rll ol:Yect that: it calls for
speculation.
MR. ATKIN: It does. I-was trying to
:figure out a way of as1cing it o1herwise.
Q. (BY MR.. ATKIN) So at the time you
didn't have any reason to object because you
didn't have any gravel trucks?
A Correct
Page 38

Q. You didn't tell your bro1her not to

use the new alternate road?
A. No.
Q. The roadway that's been referred to as
the Rice roadway came about as the result of an
exchange between your parents and Ted Rice; is
that right?
A. I believe so.
Q. Were you involved in any of those
negotiations?
A. No, sir.
Q. Were you involved in 1he creation of
the roadway on 1he Rice parcel?
A. No, sir.
Q. If you'll look at what is marlred as
exhibit B6 to the second amended compIamt, it
shows the 30-foot vvide access road acquired from
the Rices in red. Do you see that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you're :fumiliar with the property
enough to know that that's an accurate depiction?
A Yes, sir.
Q. And the property that was exchanged
for that roadway is a 3D-fuot wide strip that goes
from the west side ofTwin Lakes Canal 'Where the

(208) 345-9611

1 30-foot roadway ends, and it continues south to
2 what is the Rice gravel pit, correct?

3
4
5

6

7
8

9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Correct.
Okay. And do you have any
understanding as to what the Rices planned to do
with that 3D-foot wide strip of property?
A Extend the gravel pit. I don't know.
Q. You're not aware that 1he Rices wanted
to acquire that property so that they could access
their gravel pit through that direction?
A. No, rm not aware of that
Q. Okay. In order to cross Twin Lakes at the time your father and your mother did this
transaction to acquire the Rice roadway, there was
not a crossing of Twin Lakes Canal at the west
ends of that roadway, was there?
A No.
Q. Okay. And in order to cross Twin
Lakes Canal, your father would have had to
negotiate an agreement with the Twin Lakes Canal
Company to do that?
A. I don't know. I wasn't involved.
Q. Okay_ You had no involvement in the
discussions with the Twin Lakes Canal Company?
A It:was a done d~l befure I fulmd out
Page 40
A

Q.

Q. Are you aware that in order to get
Twin Lakes to agree to allow the crossing at the
Rice roildway. your futher had agreed with Twin
Lakes to allow 1hem to remove the crossing on what
is referred to as the northern roadway?
A. That came up once and he adamantly
carne down and we almost sued the canal company
over it.
Q. Okay. Tell me what you know about
that. Well, you were not involved in the original
negotiations thatresulted in the installation of
the crossing at 1he Rice right-of-way?
A. Correct
Q. You don't have any knowledge of that?
A. No knowledge.
Q. Okay. Tell me what you know about his
agreement or discussions with Twin Lakes Canal
about removing the CfOSsillg at the northern
roadway.
A. All I know is I was driving do~ the
highway one day and I looked up there and they
were tearing out the bridge. I turned around and
went back.
Q. When you say they, do you know who the
they were?
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1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11

12
13
14
15
16

17
1B
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

1
Q. I'd like to refer to the second
Q. \Vha1 do you mean when you say you
2
amended
complaint. Pve got a copy here. I don't
don't have adequate access? You have a right of
!
3
know
that
we need to introduce thls into the
access to your property, that section 34 property,
4
record
since
we've already referred to it multiple
today, don't you?
I
5
times
in
the
deposition.
It is, of course, part
MR BROV1.N: Are you referring to the fuet
6
of
the
court
record.
that there's a stipulation entered that allows
7
At the very begimring of this
him to use it during the pendency of the action?
i 8 deposition.. almost the first question, Mr. Atkin
MR. MCFARLAND: I'm asking ifhe
I 9 asked you about the verification and you testified
understands he has a right of access to his
that you bad read this second amended complaint
property right now.
! 11 and it was true to the best of your knowledge at
THE WITNESS: As I understand it now,
the time; is that right?
they're saying that I have no right-of-way
A Correct
through Neigum, Viehweg or Dean at any place, is i 13
114
Q. And you did read this before you
how I understand it.
Q. (BYMR..MCFARLAND) Well, we haven't 15 signed it, right?
A. Yes. Ifs been some time ago.
mentioned at all the Rice road, so maybe we should i 16
117
Q. Sure. Recognizing that time has
talk a moment about that You have the right of
118
elapsed"
you believed it was accurate at the time?
access to your property from the Westside Highvvay
119
A
Correct
via the Rice road? You have a Jegal right to
!
\20
Q.
Okay.
rm banding you Mr. Gamer,
cross the Rice road, to cross the Povey property,
j
21
.
that
second
amended
complaint I'm referring YOll
as we've referred to it, to get onto your
'22 to parilgraph 13. I'd like you to read the first
property. don't you?
I 23 full body ofthat paragraph. You don't need to
A. Because (}fthooe deeds that I found
. i 24 read the legal description, but read that into the
out about today. probably. But I can't get up
there jn the :winter
record and thtm just exphrin what property we're
Page 2221
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!

110

112
,

I

125

1
Q. So there may be some physical problems
2 to access?
3
A. Yea.h. That access is not available in
4 the winter.
5
Q. At least not after you drive across
6 after the first snow fall?
7
A. Correct
8
Q. And drawing from yaur testimony'
9 earlier, and your mother's testimony yesterday,
lO there may he some physical problems to your
11 access, but you have a legal right to go from the
12 Westside Highway to your property? Nobody can
13 legally stop you :from doing that ifyou're
14 physically able to do it?
15
A. That was news to me today. Like I
16 said, I didn't know those existed.
17
Q. Now that you've talked to your
18 attomey19
A. I have taIked to biro. I assume that
20 with that it's okay.
21
Q. Through the course of the deposition
22 today you've come to understand that you do have a
23 right - you have some ownership interest in the
24 Rice right-of-way?
25
A Correct.
(20&) 345-9611

I

1 talking about.
A.. By warranty deed fr(}m Edwanl Rice and
3 Helen S. Rice, the Rices, as grantors to Gaty T.
, 4 Gamer and Nola S. Gamers as grantees, Gary and
5 Nola. recorded on November 3nl1998. as
l 6 instrument number 204046, records ofFranklin
Ii 7 County, Idaho, the following described property
i 8 for use as an access road, including as the prime .
109 purpose to haul extnicted gravel in the non-winny
!
months, it was not usable in the wintry moDtbs.
111
Q. Is that paragraph referring to this
12 Rice road that we've talked about repeatedly
113 today?

I2
I

I

I
'

i
114
! 15

j16
! 17

!18
119

120
i 21
j22
t 23
124
I
i 25

A. Yes.
Q. That's my understanding too. I wanted
to confirm that I was right. I'd like now for you
to skip dovm. and read paragraph number 14.
A. Gary died on December 1st, 2005. The
property of Gary and Nola involved in this case
was distributed:from the estate of Gary with an
undivided 65 percent interest to Nola and Daniel
received 35 percent from the estate distribution
and by exchanges with his siblings.
Q. I'm going to stop you there. I should
have warned you I would do that. Those first few
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1
2
3

1 .lines of paragraph 14, that is stating that after
2 your father's death you received a 35 percent
3 interest in ali of the property referenced in this
4 lawsuit, is that what that is saying?
5
A No.
6
Q. What is that saying?
7
A That's saying that I received 35
8 percent - as I understand it, that I received a
9 35 percent interest in the property referenced in
this lawsuit, except the Rice road because it's a
11 lower percentage, as I understand from reading
12 those two deeds.
13
Q. Well, you're understanding comes from
14 the deed, but the complaint doesn't actually say
15 you have something less than 35 percent in the
16 Rice Road; is that right?
17
A rmlost
18
Q. Ifyou're not sure that's okay.
19
A. fm not sure.
20
MR. BROWN: Ifwe can go off the record
21 again I think I could point him in the right
22 direction to help more clearly answer the
23 question.
24
MR. MCFARLAND: Let's do that in a second..

Q. Or the Rice road?

A- Yes.
Q. Okay. Because you have a
4 proportionate interest in ownership to the Rice

s

I

6

7

II a9

10

110
11
112

/13

114
15
1
li6

17

road, you llave a legal right to use the Rice road?
A. I hope so.
Q. You believe that you have the legal
right to use the road?
A Yes.
Q. Is there anyone - given that we've
established iliat you have some ownership interest
in that road" is there anyone who has a legal
right to stop you from using that road?
A. I don't know how that works.. If
someone bas a higher percentage do they have
control? I mean Q. That's a :filir question.. Tbafs
something you can talk: to your lav.ryer about Has
anyone med to stop you from using the Rice road

18
19
20 at anytime?
21
A. No.

22
Q. Okay. You have in filet accessed your
2J section 34 property by crossing over the Rice road
24 and through the Povey property. have you not?
?
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Page 226
1 from.
2
Q. (BY MR. MCFARLAND) 1£1 told you, Mr.
3 Garner. that yesterday your mother testified that
4 you bad approximately a 44.796 percent interest in
5 the Cox property, the Povey property, and the Rice
6 road, would you have any reason to disagree or

7 disbelieve that?
8
A. I'll be right honest, we went to the
9 estate. And befure 'We went there I infonned my
10 parents that it was their property, or I mean my
11 mother, that it \VaS their property and they can do
12 what they wanted with it. Yes, I was there but I
13 didn't really listen to percentages and whatnot.
14 I felt like it '\\laS their's to give where they
15 wanted.
16
Q. SO you're not sure as you sit here
V today what percentage of property your mother
18 caused you to receive at any time?
19
A. Correct. I'mjust relying on whatever
j

20 the document says I have. I haven't seen any, you
21 know - I don't receive something that says this
22 is what you've got
23
Q. But you do agree that you have some
24 proportionate interest in the Rice right-of-way?

25

A. Yes.

(208) 345-9611

1

Q. This section 34 property here.

2

A No.

3
Q. You have in fact accessed your gravel
4 pit, the triangle area in section 27, by the Rice
5 road?

6
A. Yes.
7
Q. Okay. And you have a legal right to
8 go from your section 27 gravel pit to your section
9 34 property. do you not?
10
A. 1bere's not a road, but, yeah.
11
Q. VOU have the legal right and nobody
12 can stop you from going to your section 27
13 property to your section 34 property?
14
A Yes.
15
Q. SO you have access to your property.
16 It may not be the one that you want, but you have
17 legal access to your property, right? You have a
18 legal right to access your property via the Rice
19 road, right?
20
A I vvould say yes, but not adequate.
21
Q. Not one that - maybe not your choice
22 access, but you have a legal right?
23
A Yes..
24
Q. Okay. Did you talk to your mother
125 between the time she finished her deposition
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Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean. husband
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C.
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Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First
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Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
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Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey respectfully move the Court for an order striking the

affidavits of Daniel S. Garner and Henry Pavey on the grounds that the statements made in the
affidavits would not be admissible at the trial of this matter and should therefore. under rule
56(e) be stricken. This motion is supported by the

memor~dum

filed in support hereof.

th

Dated this 29 day of September, 2009.

ATKIN LAW OFFICS, p.e

Blake S. Atkin
Attorney for the Pavey Defendants
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X Fax

Eric Olsen
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Fax

X

Fax

Ryan McFarland
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
Daniel S. Gamer and Shem-Jo Gamer,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Gamer
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,
Plaintiffs,
v.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE THE
AFFIDAVITS OF HENRY POVEY AND
DANIEL S. GARNER
Case No. CV-08-342

Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon e.
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigurn, as Trustees
of the Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
Neigurn, husband and wife; Brad Pavey and
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First
American Title Insurance Company, a
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

Judge Dunn

Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submit
this memorandum in support of their Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel
S. Gamer.

INTRODUCTION
Witness testimony provided through affidavits is subject to the same competency
standards as witness testimony presented in trial.

KolIn v. Saint Luke's Regional Medical

Center, 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997). A person must be competent to be allowed to
offer testimony. It is elementary that a lay person may riot testify about a matter of which he has
no personal knowledge.

See, Rule 602 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

The competency

standard for affidavits is summarized in Rule 56(e) in which it states that "affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. See,
Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Affidavits may not be based on hearsay or contain any other matter that would not be
admissible at triaL State v. Shama Resources. Ltd., 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P. 2d 977, 981
(1995). In addition, "a non-moving party may not create an issue of fact for summary judgment
purposes by means of an affidavit contradicting that party's prior deposition testimony." Addisu
v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1138 n.6 (9 th Cir. 2000)(internaI citation omitted)(emphasis
added). The hvo affidavits submitted by the Plaintiffs in opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment do not meet these requirements and should therefore be stricken.

I.

THE AFF,IDA VIT OF HENRY POVEY HAS NO FOUNDATION.

Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of Henry Povey dated September 22, 2009, in which the
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only foundation laid is that he is over eighteen years of age and that approximately fifteen years
ago he participated in a joint fanning operation with his father Leonard Povey and brother Brad
Povey, during which time they farmed land adjacent to the access road to the Garner property
lying west of Twin Lakes canal.
1be affidavit, with only this foundation, then states that there are two photographs from
which he can identifY the access roadway "as it previously existed" and the area where the access
roadway used to be but has clearly been damaged or farmed over in some manner. The affidavit
does not answer the question "previous to what or when." Likewise, the affidavit does not
purport to identifY when the photographs were taken or what they depict.

Without this

information it is impossible to tell whether the knowledge of Henry Povey has any relevance to
the issues in this case. Surely action on something that occurred fifteen years ago has long since
been barred by the statute oflimitations.
II.

THE AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL S. GARNER LACKS FOUNDATION FOR
TIlE ASSERTIONS MADE THEREIN AND CONTAINS STATEMENTS
THAT ARE INADMISSIBLE IN TmS CASE.
A. DANIEL S. GARNER'S TESTIMONY ABOUT A TERM OF A
CONTRACT OF SALE THAT DID NOT SURVIVE THE DRAFTING
OF THE DEED IS INADMISSIBLE.

In Paragraph 3 of his affidavit, Daniel S. Gamer attempts to testifY about an easement he
claims to have purchased when he purchased a forty-acre parcel of real estate from Mr. and Mrs.
McCulloch. Curiously, the affidavit does not attach the documents supporting this important
assertion. The reason that the documents are not attached is because, while there may have been
negotiations for the purchase of an easement, the final deed transferring the property to Daniel S.
Garner does not contain any mention of an easement. See, Copy of May 22, 1987 Warranty
Deed, attached hereto as Exillbit A. Therefore, this claim of easement by purchase is barred by
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the doctrine of merger. Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 85, 967 Pold 284, 187 (1998)("When a
deed is delivered and accepted as perfonnance of the contract to convey, the contract is merged

in the deed. Though the tenns of the deed may vary from those contained in the contract, the
deed alone must be looked to to determine the rights of the parties.... \Vhere the right claimed
under the contract would vary, change, or alter the agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the

very subject-matter with which the deeq deals, a prior contract covering the same subject-matter
cannot be shown as against the provisions of the deed )(Emphasis in original)(intemal citations
omitted).

It is important for the Court to strictly apply the doctrine of merger in this case

because it does not appear that the failure to include any easement language in the deed was
inadvertent.
The Garners, when they were negotiating the purchase of the property from the
McCulloch's did not want the easement to pass in front of the house with small childrell, but
wanted it moved to a more suitable location:

Q.

Okay. You said that when you bought -- when Danny bought his parcel from

the McCullochs, that you and your husband, and I'm not sure I understood, but was it
Gary that gave him advice about paying some money for a right-of-way across the
McCulloch's property?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. And he told him to pay for a right-of-way across the property so that

you won't have future complaints about the use of the right-of-way?
A.

That's basically what I l.mderstood.

Q.

Okay. And you said that you had tried to get the McCullochs to move the

right-of way, do you recall that?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you have an idea of where you wanted them to move the right-of-way

to?
A.

It didn't matter where they moved it. We just couldn't imagine them wanting

us to go past their house.
Q.

Okay. So it wouldn't have mattered where?

A.

No.

See, June 2, 2009, Deposition of Nola Garner, pg. 215, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
The parties therefore did not include language in the deed that would describe the
easement as "along an existing roadway." See, Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment at page 7.
Furthermore, because the Garners' claim against the Poveys is that the Poveys interfered
with what they knew were the Garners rights in the easement, the merger doctrine would prevent
the Garners from being able to argue that the 'Poveys knew about a11 easement that is nowhere
mentioned in the deeds recorded by the Garners.
For all these reasons, the merger doctrine will prevent any mention of the contract of sale
and its language concerning an easement that never found its way into the deeds. Because this
evidence ""ill be inadmissible at trial, it should be stricken from the affidavit of Daniel S. Gamer
and not considered by this Court on the motion for summary judgment.
B. DANIEL S. GARNER'S ASSERTIONS ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE
OF THE POVEY'S CONCERNING HIS SUPPOSED EASEMENT IS
WITHOUT FOUNDATION.
In Paragraph 4 of his affidavit, Daniel S. Garner states that from 1990 until the
commencement of this

actio~

the Poveys have "known of my interest in the original access
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road." There is not one stick of foundation to support this assertion. Particularly in light of the
merger doctrine that will prevent Daniel S. Gamer from trying to prove at trial that he had a
purchased easement, there is no admissible evidence that the Poveys knew of Daniel S. Garner's
interest in the original access road. Therefore, Paragraph 4 must be stricken.
Likewise, Paragraph 5 is without foundation. In Paragraph 5, Daniel S. Gamer states that
for a period of time between 1990 and 1992, the Poveys accessed property they owned lying
west of the Twin Lakes Canal via the original access road. There is no affirmative

sho~IDg

in

the affidavit that Mr. Garner has personal knowledge of the way the Poveys accessed their
property. Paragraph 5 must be stricken.
C. DANIEL

S. GARNER'S ASSERTION THAT THE ORIGINAL
ACCESS ROAD IS 30 FEET WIDE LACKS FOUNDATION AND
CONFLICTS WITH IDS DEPOSITION TESTIMONY.

In Paragraphs 6 and 9 of his affidavit, Daniel S. Garner takes the position that the original
access road is thirty feed wide, but there is no fowldation to support tins assertion that is contrary
to his deposition testimony. It is clear from the deposition testimony that along most of its
length, the original access road is two tire tracks on the ground.
Q.

All right. Now the roadway, I've seen some pictures of it as it currently exists. It

appears to be a two-track road like a typical

farm road, with two tire tracks going down the road.

Is that how it was when you purchased the property?

A.

No.

Q.

How was it when you purchased tile property?

A

More of traveled.

Q.

More traveled?

A

Vh-huh.
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Q.

Describe it to me.

A.

Not two tracks. You got to remember that McCullochs ran a dairy and the milk

truck was picking up milk every other day, I assume.
Q.

Okay. So down closer to Westside Highway is--

A.

Up to the hay bam is "Was used. And cattle above that that he fed. Like I said, it

was a dairy operation with corrals.
Q.

SO up to the hay bam it wasn't a two-track road?

A.

Correct.

Q.

How about beyond that?

A.

Beyond that itwas a two-track road, like what you would see in the picture, or the

exhibit.
See, June 3,2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Gamer, pp. 24 - 25, attached hereto as Exhibit

c.
That hardly adds up to thirty feet. Moreover, when he was questioned about the widest
piece of machinery that he took up the road, Mr. Gamer testified that it was less than 20 feet
wide. See, June 3, 2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pg. 98, attached hereto as Exhibit C.
And, that would have to be the case, because the posts that Mr. Garner put in for the gate going
across the canal are only 19 feet, 7 inches in width. See, Affidavit of Brad Povey in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, attached hereto as Exhibit D.
The Court can take judicial notice that a gravel truck cannot exceed nine feet in width.
Furthennore, the assertion of the Plaintiffs is that the right to use the original access road arises
by purchase. Therefore, the detennination of the width of that access road would need to be
established by proof of the use to which the Garner's predecessor in title put to the property. The
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Poveys never used the access road in any way that required more than the twenty feet reserved to
Daniel Gamer in the replacement road. See, Affidavit of Bmd Povey in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, attached hereto as Exhibit D. Therefore, there is no foundation for Daniel
S. Gamer's claim that the original access road was thirty feet in width and Pamgraphs 6 and 9
must be stricken.

D. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PREVENTS PROOF OF A
PLOWING THAT OCCURRED IN THE EARLY NINETIES AND IN
SPRING 2005.
Plaintiffs, in their response to Summary Judgment, appear to be arguing that they are
entitled to damages for their "plowing" claim, making it some form of trespass claim. The
statute of limitations on a trespass claim is three years. Idaho Code § 5-218(2). The complaint
in this matter was filed on September 17, 2008. Therefore, the actions complained of would
have to have occurred after September 17, 2005, to be actionable. Obviously, a claim arising
from a plowing that occurred in the early nineties would be barred by the statute of limitations as
would such a claim that occurred in the spring of 2005, so that evidence on such a claim would
not be admissible. Moreover, in order to be actionable there would need to be some proof that
the plowing was done by the Poveys. There is none. This lack of evidence probably stems from
the fact that Gary Garner who was in charge of the Garner farming opemtion in that area did not

think it was a big enough deal to even say anything to the Poveys about it.
Q.

Okay. When did the plowing occur?

A.

Early nineties, late eighties.

Q.

Okay. While the Poveys still O\VIled the property?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And again, you didn't see the plowing occurring, but you got stuck in it as you
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tried to drive through it?
A.

Correct. It was done and I went up to access my property and got stuck.

Q.

Okay, do you know who did the plowing?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever talk to anyone about the ploVvipg on the road?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Who did you talk to?

A.

My father.

Q.

What did you say to your father?

A.

He came and pulled me out. He told me -- I wanted to go -- I was quite upset. He

calmed me down and told me not to worry about it. Once the field was planted it would be
accessible again. That was the end of it.
Q.

Okay. So did you talk to anyone else about it?

A.

No.

Q.

SO your father considered it not a big deal, wasn't that big of a deal, you shouldn't

get upset about it?
A.

I don't know what he considered sir.

Q.

Okay. Fair enough. He told you don't worry about it, the field will be planted

and once it's planted you'll be able to access the property again?
A.

That's what he told me.

See, June 3, 2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp. 62 - 63, attached hereto as Exhibit

C.
Paragraph 7 should be stricken.
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E. DANIEL S. GARNER'S STATEMENT THAT HE "NEVER" AGREED
TO ACQUIRE OR USE THE "RICE ROAD" IS CONTRARY TO HIS
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE
STRICKEN.
In Paragraph 11, Daniel S. Gamer states that he "never" agreed to acquire or use the
"Rice road." In fairness to Mr. Garner, it appears that he may have amended an original version
of his affidavit since the sentence as now written states that he "never" agreed "at the time it was
"negotiated and acquired." In ally event, in his deposition, Mr. Garner admitted that he is an
owner of the Rice Road and that he does use it to access his property west ofT'NID Lakes canal.

(BY MR. ATKIN) So, Daniel now knowing that you Ov\-TI an undivided interest in

Q.

the Rice roadway, does that change your view as to whether you have the legal right to use the
Rice roadway?
A.

It makes me feel a lot better.

Q.

You understand that being an undivided owner of a portion of that property, that

you have the right to use that roadway?

A.

Yes.

See. June 3, 2009, Deposition of Daniel S. Gamer, pg. 124, attached hereto as Exhibit C.

F. THERE IS NO FOUNDATION FOR THE ASSERTION THAT THE
RICE ROAD DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE, SAFE ACCESS TO
THE GARNERS' PROPERTY IN THE WINTER MONTHS.
In the second Paragraph 11 of Daniel S. Gamer's affidavit, in conclusory fashion, Mr.
Gamer states that "the Rice road does not provide adequate, safe access to the Garners' property
in the winter months." In order for a vvitness to make such a statement at trial it would be
necessary for him to explain the basis for that conclusion and how he knows it. The affidavit of
Daniel S. Garner is devoid of any such foundation; therefore, the second Paragraph 11 must be
stricken.
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G. DANIEL S. GARNER CANNOT PROVIDE THE AUTHENTICATION
FOR THE AERIAL PHOTOS ATTACHED TO HIS AFFIDAVIT.
Plaintiffs attempt to authenticate the aerial photos attached to his affidavit falls short of
the mark Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 902, requires authentication of a public document by a
certificate under seal. The documents attached to the Garner affidavit fail in that regard and
must therefore be stricken.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel S. Garner should be
stricken.
DATED tIus 29th day of September, 2009.
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, P.C

Blake S. Atkin
Attorneyfor the Povey Defondants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29 day of September, 2009, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE THE

AFFIDAVITS OF HENRY POVEY AND DANIEL S. GARNER upon the following by the
method of delivery designated:

Gordon S. Thatcher
Thatcher, Beard, S1. Clair, Gaffney
116 S. Center
P.O. Box216
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

Eric Olsen
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello. Idaho 83204-1391

_X.._ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

X Fax

Ryan McFarland
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

X Fax

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

u.s. Mail

Blake S. Atkin
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!i 1

Q."What is it?

2
A They said they would testify fur lL"3
Q. Who did?
4
A Hank and Melanie.
5
Q. Okay_ They told you that they -would
6 testify - okay_ I understand that might have
7 added to your reasons for not naming them as
8 parties. My question is, your breach of'Vvammty
9 claim against Brad and Leiza Povey 10
A. That's to the right-of-way.
11
Q. The beach of the warranty. When they
12 sold the property to you by warranty deed you're
13 claiming that they breached that warranty, right?
l4
A. (WitneSs nodded her bead.)
15
Q. I'm just trying to understand that.
16 What is your claim 1bat they breached the
17 wa:mmty? You said befure that Brad and Leiza
18 sold theproperty to the Deans, the Viehwegs and
19 the Neigums.. It's a simple question.
20
A Well21
Q. Does your breach of the warranty claim
22 arise out oftbe sale by Brad and Leiza to the
23 Deans, the Neigums and the Viehwegs?
24
A. I think it does. For me I no longer
25 have a right-of-way through there
Page
1
2
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4
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7
8
9
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25

i

I believe that's correct

rm

4 McCullochs, that you and your husband. and
not
5 sure I understood" but was it Gruy that gave biro
6 advice about paying some money fur a right-of-way
7 across the McCullochs' property?
! B

i

A

Yes..

9
Q. Okay. And he told him to pay for a
\ 10 right-of-way across the property so that you won't
111 have future complaints about the use of the
I

112

right-of-way?

i 13

A That's basically what I understood.
Q. Okay. And you said that you bad tried
is to get the McCullocbs to move the right-of-way, do
!I6 you recall that?

i 14

I

117

A Yes.
Q. And did you have an idea of v.here you
119 'Wanted them to move the right-of-way to?

! 18

120

A 'It didn't matter where they moved it.
We just couldn't imagine them wanting us to go
! past their house.
'
123
Q. Okay. So it wouldn't have mattered
124 -where?
l25
A No.

l 21

22

2141

Q. Okay. Let me ask you this. You don't
thinIc that Hank and Melanie did anything that
breached their warranty to you? That you bad
whatever rights you had to the property fuey sold
you; is that correct?
A I believe because they didn't - they
no longer owned it.
Q. Okay. So as of the time - you're not
claiming that any of the Foveys, Brad and Leiza or
Hank and Melanie, did anything to breach their
warnmty to you until after they sold the property
to yOU; is that correct?
A I don't think that they have done
anything deliberately to hurt, tbeyjustneglected
to take care. Does that answer the question?
Q. I think so. I'm just tying to
understand how they neglected. They neglected to
take care of your interests in the deeds that they
gave to the Deans and the Viehwegs and the
Neigums, is that 'What you're saying?
A That's righL
Q. And since Hank and Melanie weren't
parties to those deeds that went to the Deans, the
Neigums and the Viehwegs, you don't have any
breach of warranty claim against them?

:208) 345-9611

A

2
Q. Okay. You said that when you
3 bought when Danny bought his parcel from the

f

j
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6
7
8
I 9
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113

!14
i 15
\16
! 17
/18
119
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121

122

Q. It could have followed basically 1he
route ofwhat's DDWthe Neigum driveway and that .
would be okay?
.
A That would be okay.
Q. Okay. So basically what you're
talking about isn't necessarily the route ofilie
northern roadway, but some roadway through the
McCulloch property?
A Just some place, yes.
MR. ATKIN: Okay. That's all I've got
THE WITNESS: That wasn't bad at alL
.MR BROWN: I have a rew questions.
EXAMINATION
BYMRBROWN:
Q. Nola, I want to go back and c1a.rifY a
couple of parts on the record with respect to some
of the questions the attorneys have asked you
today.
Going back to some questions asked by
Mr. Atkin. he asked you questions about why the
Deans were upset I believe that you testified
that they were upset about the existence of a
right-of-way going in front of their home and they
didn't know about it until after they'd purchased
the property; is that right?

I 23
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I 25
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1 gravel and then from there on up it was a dirt

1
Q. And those were fields that \'Iere being
2 farmed by the McCullochs?
3
4

5
6

7
8

9

10
11
12

2 roadway?
A. No.
4
Q. Okay. What was the condition of the
5 road at the time that you purchased your property?
6
A It was a good gravel road up past 7 shortly past the hay bam that's there on the

A Correct.

3

Q. And later by the Poveys?
A Correct.
Q. And ifwe look at exhibit M again.
would the Viehweg tract 1 and Viehweg tract 2 be
part ofthose fields that were being watered using
that main line?
A I would assume.
Q. Okay. And then there were A There were other tracts.
Q. More fields that were also watered?

8
I 9

110

In

Neigum piece.
Q. Is the hay barn still there?
A Yes.
Q. Okay. So ifwe went out there we

112 could see where that is?

h3

A Y es.
13
!
iI 14
;L.
14
A Yes.
Q.o.1'>.ay.
i 15
A And then from there on up there was
15
Q. So when you brought your property from
116 gravel On the road but just not enough to support
16 the McCullochs and you talked to them about this
like a big tanker truck or a milk truck. But to
17 access road, you understood that they were fanning
18 on both sides of the road?
118 the bam it was able to support large vehicles.
19
A Correct.
! 19
Q. And 1hen from there on up it was more
20
Q. And that tills was an access road that
120 ofa typical funn dirt road?
21 went tmough an operational farm?
A With gravel spread, but not as thick.

117

121
123

22
23

A Yes.
I 22 Not as good as base.
Q. And that there would be the normal
Q. Okay. Now, was that gravel that had.
24 kind offimning activities with regard to the
124 been spread on the road - or I understand that
25 road, both sides of the road?
125 that area is kiDd ofa gravelly area anyway Was
Page 221
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A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And from time to time that
3 would interfere ~ith your ability to access the
4 property?
1
2

A. What would interfere?
Q. The pipeline?
7
k The pipeline, when it was pumping, was
8 running, it would interfere. Other than that it
5
6

9 wouldn't.

10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19

20

21
22

23
24
25

I! 2 nann-al
it gravel that had been
gravel?
1

I3

A. It was my understanding that the
4 McCullochs would every now and then spread a
i 5 little gravel with. a from-end loader.
I 6
Q. You never saw them do that?
.1

A. Just Scott McCulloch referred to it

,I,

7

j

8 once.
9
Q. And Scott is?

110

Q. Let me ask you this. Were there times
when the watering made the roadway wet?
III
k Wet!
112
Q. Yeah. Did they water 13
A • 1'\__
i 14
JJ<l.LllP, yes.
I
Q. Did that make the roadway difficult to
115
navigate? What effect did that have on the use of
116
the road?
.! 17
A. You could still navigate it., it was
118
just slippery.
119
Q. All right. Now, this roadway, the
i 20
northern roadway, at the time you bought the
property was it - as I understand it there was
j 22
gravel on the roadway from about Westside Highway t 23
up to some point, probably on exhibit M here it
124
would have passed the two Povey tracts. It was
! 25

(208) 345-9611

put there or was it just

i

121

A. Ralph and Thelma's hoy.
Q. All right. Now, the roadway, rve
seen some pictmes ofn as it currently exists.
It appears to be a two-track: roadIike a typical
farm road, with two tire tracks going down the
road. Is that how it was when you purchased the
property?
A No.
Q. How was it ""Den you purchased the
property?
A More of traveled.
Q. More traVeled?
A Uh-huh.
Q. Describe it to me.
A Not two tracks. You got to remember
that McCullochs ran a dairy and the milk truck was
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picking up milk every other day, I assume.
Q. Okay. So down closer to Westside

Higbwayis-

II 21

I

!

3

see that that gate there is not adequate and rYe
talked with my mother about it. It's been bit two
or three times.
Q. Okay.
A It's not on the hinges 3lljIDore.
Q. It was not me. rve not driven that
road.
A. m remember that.
Q. Again, rm not going to mark this as
an exhibit, but I have a copy if you need to look
at it of the second amended complaint in this
matter. At the tend of the second amended
complaint there is 'What's called a verification.
Do you wderstand what that is?
A. I believe that to be me signing to say
that what's in the complaint is accurate to the
best of my knowledge.

4
A Up to the hay bam is was used. And
i 5
cattle above that t:bat he fed Like I said, it
f
6
was a dairy operation with corrals.
7
Q. SO up to the hay bam it wasn't a
I 8
two-track road?
9
A Correct.
110
Q. How about beyond that'?
11
A Beyond that it was a two-track. road,
12
like what you would see in the picture, or the
13
exlu"biL
14
Q. Okay. And I understand that currently
15
1here is a gate at the end of the road where 16
jUst before it crosses Twin Lakes Canal?
17
A Correct.
is
Q. You installed that gate?
Q- Okay_
19
A. Yes, I did.
A Is thai what it is?
20
Q. When did you install that gate?
Q. That's fair enough. And that is your
21 signatt:rre on page 32 of the second amended
A Ob, how close do I need to be?
Q. 'The best of your recollection is all
22 complaint?
23
we can ask.
A. Correct
24
A Roughly two years after Neigums
Q. Did you read the second amended
pm:c.based
! 25 complaint hPjbre ¥OJ) signed ii'?
Page 26
Page
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I

1
Q. And what was your reason in installing
2 the gate?
3
A The gate that was across there had
4 been destroyed.
5
Q_ SO there had been a gate - was there
6 a gate >Vhen you bought the property?
7
A Yes.
8
Q. And it had been destroyed?
9
A. Yes.
10
Q. Do you know how it was destroyed?
11
A. It was barbed wire gate and had just
12 been13
Q. Deteriorating over the years?
14
A. Yeah.
15
Q_ \Vhe.p you installed 1he new gate - how
16 wide is the new gate you installed?
17
A ~ the new gates were two 12-£oot
18 gates that my mother purchased. They overlap a
19 little. My rough guess would be 20 to 21 :fuet.
20
Q. The gate that you replaced,. how wide
21 was it?
22
A. Ob, it would have been 25, 26 fueL
23
Q. It "WaS wider than the gate you
24 :replaced it with?
25
A. Correct Ifyou go up there you'll
(208) 345-9611
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A. Correct.
Q. And the information contained in the
second amended complaint was true and accurate to
the best of your knowledge?
A Correct.
Q. Now let me talk to you about this
middle road, that is also referred to as the
Neigum driveway. At the time you purchased the
property what was the condition of thai road? Was
it also a gravel road?
A. There was no road there.
Q. Okay.
A. It was a field.
Q. I've seen - at least there was a
roadway in that same area that went up into the
field and ultimately converged with the northern
roadway, although it may not have taken the same
course that the Neigum driveway now takes. Do you
recall that?
A. Can you show me on a picture?
Q. rm not sure I have a picture that
shows that. Let me ask you, based on your
recollection. do you recall there being a roadway
to the south of what A. At the time that I purchased it?
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A. Right.
1
Q. Okay. Now, there is an allegation in
2
the complaint in this matter that the Poveys at
3
SOme point plowed the roadway. You're familiar
4
with that allegation?
5
A Yes.
6
Q. What do you know about that? Did you
7
see the Poveys plowing the roadway?
8
A. Which time?
, 9
Q. Well, was there more than one time
\10
that the roadway was plowed?
i 11
A. Plowed, tilled.
! 12
Q. Well, maybe you can help me out The
1 13
allegation in the complaint is that the roadway
i 14
was plowed. Was the roadway ever plo'Wed?
\15
A. Yes, sir.
'I 16
Q. Do you know what a plow is?
i 17
A Yes, SlI.
.
!,118
Q. Okay. %at kind ofplow was used to
119
plow the road?
20
A. A three bottom.
!
Q. Anddidyouseetheroadvvaybeing
plowed?
123
A No.
24
Q How do yuu know it Vlf'aS plowed by a
; 25
Page 621I

i

!

1 three bottom plow?
2
A. I know what a plowed field looks like,
4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

Q. SO you saw the roadway after it bad
been plowed?
A. I got stuck in it" sir.
Q. You got stuck in it with what?
A. A green GMC pickup.
Q. Okay. When did the plovving occur?
A. Early nineties, late eighties.
Q. Okay. While the Poveys still owned
the property?
A. Correct
Q. And again, you didn't see the plowing
occurring, but you got stuck in it as you tried to
drive through it?
A. Correct. It was done and I went up to
access my property and got stuck.
Q. Okay. Do you know who did the

20 plo\.ving?
21
A No.
22
Q. Did you ever talk to anyone about the
23 plowing on the road?

24
25

21

122

A Yes.
Q. Who did you talk to?

(2(8) 345-9611

A My futher.
Q. \Vbat did you say to your father?
A He came and pulled me out. He told
me - I wanted to go -- I was quite upset He
calmed me doVlll and told me noi to worry about it.
Once 1he field was planted it ,vould be accessible
agai:rL That was the end of it..
Q. Okay. So did you talk: to anyone else
about it?
A. No.
Q. So your father considered it not a big
deal, wasn't that big of a deal, you shouldn't get
upset about it?
A I don't know what he considere~ sir.
Q. Okay. Fair enough. He told you don't
worry about it, the field will be planted and once
it's planted you'll be able to access the property
"C)
agarD.

A That's what he told me.
Q. Okay. I guess the field was
eventually planted?
A Yes.
Q. And after that you were able to access
your property again?
A Yes
Page 64

I

1
Q. Did you talk to anyone else about that
2 plowing incident?
3
A No.
4
Q. And the roadway was reestablished
5 after the planting occurred?
6
A Correct.
7
Q. Now, this plowing didn't occur along
8 the full length of the roadway?
I 9 . A. No.
110
Q. About how much of the roadway was
plowed?
! 1.2
A.Hi:nm, from the hay bam np.
113
Q. All the way up to the canal?
114
A. Yes.
115
Q. And as I lIDderstand it, at that 1ime
1 16 the ground on both sides oftb.e roadway was being
; 17 fanned?
j 18
A Correct.
19
Q. And when the field vvas planted do you
120 know what it was planted with?
A I don't. I went back to college, or
I

II
!

III

i
121

1 22 wherever I went
123
Q. So this was \Aririle you were still in
124 college?
I 25
A Early nineties, late eighties, yes,
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1.
2
3

Tilled it up.
Q. Okay. Did you plant anything in it?

A
A

We were going to and decided to plant

4 grass instead of grain.

Q. Okay. But you did plant grass?
6
A We did plant grass.
7
Q. Okay. So what kind of - fur
8 harvesting the hay you used a swather?

S

9
10

11
12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

A

11
I 2
I3

implements through?
A Correct.
Q. Any other implements that you used up
4 there that are - I guess you said the widest one
j 5 was the disk?
6
A. That vvould be the widest one.
7
Q. And it's a 20-:root offset, but you
8 don't know exactly how 'Wide that is?
9
A It would be less.
10
Q. Okay. By how much?
111
A I dou't know.
12
Q. Do you still own that implement?
13
A Yes.
14
Q. So we could inspect it and measure it
15 ifwe need to?
16
A. Yes.
17
Q. I'd request permission to be able to
18 dothat
19
MR.. BROWN: Okay.
20
Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) Now, what kind ofuses
21 have you put the road to? Let's talk about the
22 north road first. You've driven tractors up
23 theie?
24
A. Yes.

I
I
ii

I

Co~t.

Q. Whatkindofswatherdidyouhave?
A A Hesston.
Q. How wide was that swather?
A The cutting bar was 14.
Q. I think I knowtbat swather.
A You do know that swather.
Q. And then a baler?
A A baler.
Q. Is that a small baler or what kind of
baler was it?
A A small one.
Q. That's before you did ton bales?
A Correct
Q. And so width wise fue widest implement
you were using was the 14-footsvvatlrer?
Page 98

1

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
g

10
11
12

Q. \\!hat was wider than that?
A. The disk.
Q. Ob.. So when you plowed it up to plant
grass?
A. Correct.
Q. How wide was tba:I:?
A A 20-foot disk.
Q. Does it have wings on it?
A. No.
Q. It's 20 foot 'Without any wings?
A. It's what they classifY as a 20 foot
offSet.
Q. All right. So is it 20 .feet wide or

13
14 lessthan20feetwide?

A The way they run an o:ffSet is you turn
16 the~ SO it would be less.
17
Q. When you're pulling it down the road
18 to get to the field, how wide is it?
19
A. rve never measured it.
20
Q. What roadway did you use to access
21 your property using those implement.';?
22
A The northerly road.
23
Q. Thenorthroad?
24
A Yes.
25
Q. And it was wide enough to get those
15

(208) 345-9611
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1 the implements that we've described?
2
A. Yes.
3
Q_ Taken a backhoe up there and hauled
4 hay?

5

A

Yes.

6
Q. You've hauled cattle up the road in a
7 trailer hooked behind your pickup?
S
A. Yes.
9
Q. Did you ever haul any cattle up there
10 .in a semi trailer?
11
A Cattle. 110.
12
Q. Have you ever hauled anything in a
13 semi trailer.
14
A. Yes.
15
Q."What have you hauled?
16
A. Feed hunks.
17
Q. And you used the north road to do
18 that?
19
A. Yes.
20
Q. When did you do that?
21
A. After Neigums had purchased but before
22 they built
23
Q. Okay. Any other uses you've made of
24 the north road?
25
A. Yes.

M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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1 . didn't sign it
2
Q. Was there a place fur you to sign that
3 deed?

4
A Not on the deed. I don't believe. But
5 on the other paper there was.
6
Q. How do you know it was the Neigum
7 deed? Did you read the Neigum deed at that point?
8
A Yes.
9

Q. SO he showed you what - was this

10 before or after the deed had been executed?
11
A Now that I don't know.
12
Q. Had it been signed by Brad at that
13 point?
14
A I don't know. I didn't look.
15
Q. All right. How do you know it W3S the
16 Neigum deed?
17
A The fust part of it, of the deed,
18 said19
Q. -Named file Neigut1lB?
20
A Correct
21
Q. Did youknowtheNeigums at that point
22 intime?
23
A.. No. And then shortly after that Steve
24 Fuller called and told me that the paper 'WaS ready

II·

1 the deposition both my client and I represented
2 it was our belief that Daniel Garner does not
3 own - does not have an o\Vnership mterest in the
4 Rice road. rYe since had the opportunity to
5 review same deeds -which caused me to need to
6 correct the statement that we earlier made. It
7 does appear, based on the deeds, that Daniel does
8 have a small, less than five percent, fractional
9 interest in the Rice roadway as the result of
10 gift deeds that were given to him by the Nola
11 trust.
12
MR. ATKIN: Why don't we mark those deed..<;.,
13 uyou have copies.
14
MR BROWN: Thafs fine. And these were
15 provided to counsel as part of the supplement to
16 our discovery response..
17
MR. ATKIN: Are you okaywithmarldngthe
18 copy that you have there?
19
:MR. BROWN: That's fine, yes.
20
MR.. SMITH: For the record, can you read
21 the instrument number as well?
22
MR.. BROWN: Yes. The fust instrument
23 number is 238036. And that relates to the
24 comments I just made, it conveys a 2.449 percent

Page 122
1 it. We14 bis secretary called, I should say.
2 from his office.
3
Q. Okay. Any other conversations on the
4 subject of putting together in writing a
5 description of the right-of-way across what Wcl!?
6 then the Povey property?
7
A Not that I recall.
8
Q. Okay. While the Poveys owned the·
9 property VIas there ever a time when they tried to
10 interfere with your use of any ofthe roadways
11 going to your property?
12
A Other than the ones we've discussed?
13
Q. The plowing and the planting?

14

A

tJh...huh.

15
Q. Other than those two instances.,
16 there's nothing else?

17
A. Correct
18
Q. And even on those two events. nobody
19 ever told you that that was done to try to prevent
20 you from using the roadway, correct?
21
A Correct.
22
MR.. ATKIN: Let's take a:few minutes. I
23 might be finished.
24
(Recess.)
MR.. BROWN: For the record, previously in
25
(208) 345-9611
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1 the deed, which is the Rice roadway.
The second instrument is number
3 243758, likewise conveying a 2.449 percent
4 interest in parcel eight, wbich is the Rice
5 roadway.
6
MR. ATKlN: Let's mark those as exhibits 7
7 and 8.
8
(Exhibits 7 and 8 marked)
9
Q. (BY 1v1R. ATKIN) So, Daniel now knowing
10 that you own an undivided interest in the Rice
11 roadway, does that change your view as to whether
12 you have the legal right to use the Rice roadway?
13
A It makes me feel a lot better.
14
Q. You understand that being an undivided
15 owner of a portion of that property, that you have
16 the right to use that roadway?
17
A. Yes.
18
MR. ATKIN: Okay. That's all I bave.
19
MR. SMITI:I: Is anyone interested in having
20 lunch before we go on?
21
MR. MCFARLAND: I'm happy to woik through
22 if we're going to go with Mrs. Gamer still.
23
MR. ATKIN: Maybe we'll take a lunch break
24 as we trade witnesses while she's coming.
25

2

M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE. me.

(208) 345-8800 (fax)

Exhibit D

Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and
Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Gamer
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,
Plaintiffs,
v.

AFFIDAVIT OF BRAD POVEY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case No. CV -08-342
Judge Dunn

Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C.
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
N eigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First
American Title Insurance Company, a
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

)
SS:
)

Brad Povey, having been first duly sworn deposes and says:
1. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
2. On September 25, 2009, I went to the bridge where the right-of-way in question in
this case crosses the Twin Lakes Canal. I measured the posts for the gates that Daniel
Gamer testified that he installed on the Gamer side of the canal.

The distance

between the two posts is 19 feet 7 inches.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a photograph that I took of the posts on that day. The
photograph accurately reflects the location of the posts.
4. I also measured the distance between the grain bins on the south side of the old access
road and the line of the fence that used to border the access road on the north. That
distance is 22 feet.
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a photograph that I took on that day. The photograph
accurately reflects the grain bins and the line of the fence that existed along the north
of the road.
6. While we owned the property on the west side of Twin Lakes Canal we never used it
for any purpose that would have required more than a normal nine foot right of way.
DATED this.d!2 day of September, 2009.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this~ day of September, 2009.

-

&~h>~)

-

Notary P lie
My Commission expires: /tJ-/(/rl.:2.,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _

day of September, 2009, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of AFFIDA VIT OF BRAD POVEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon the following by the method of delivery designated:
Gordon S. Thatcher
Thatcher, Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney
116 S. Center
P.O. Box 216
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

U.S. Mail _Hand delivery

Fax

Eric Olsen
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391

U.S. Mail _Hand delivery

Fax

Ryan McFarland
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

U.S. Mail _Hand delivery

Fax

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

U.S. Mail _Hand delivery

Fax
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Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
Michael W. Brown, ISB No. 8017
343 E. 4th N. Suite 223
P.O. Box 216
Rexburg, ID 83440
Tel: (208) 359-5885
Fax: (208) 359-5888
jeff@beardstclair.com
mbrown@beardstclair.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Garner,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow;
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola
Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007,
Case No. CV-08-342
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife; Douglas K.. Viehweg and Sharon
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J.
Neigum and KatbleenA. Neigum, as
Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust,
dated September 17 2004; Jeffery J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey,
husband and wife; First American Title
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of
Authority; and First American Title
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,

REPLY TO POVEYS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants.

The plaintiffs (collectively the Garners), through counsel of record, Thatcher Beard St.
Clair Gaffney Attorneys, respectfully reply to the defendant Poveys' memorandum in opposition

Rl:J)iy to Povcys' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint - Page I
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to motion for leave to amend second amended complaint. This reply brief is supported by the
pleadings already filed in this action and the second affidavit of Michael W. Brown, filed
concurrently with this brief

INTRODUCTION
The focus of this litigation is on an easement that Garners claim over property formerly
owned by the defendants, the Poveys, and now owned by the defendants, the Deans, Neigums,
and Viehwegs. At the time the Garners moved to amend their second

am~nded

complaint, they

were in the process of finalizing a settlement agreement with the Deans, Neigums, and
Viehwegs. The Garners have now formally settled their claims against the Deans, Neigums,
Viehwegs, and both First American entities, and a stipulation for dismissal of those claims is
forthcoming. In connection with settlement of those claims, the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs
assigned all causes of action they have against the Poveys, including those asserted in their
motion to amend their second amended complaint. The court should grant the Garners' motion.

ARGUMENT
The Poveys ask this Court to exercise its discretion to deny the Garners' motion for leave
to amend their second amended complaint. Defs.' Brief at 2, 5. However, the Idaho Supreme
Court has clearly articulated the standard for granting leave to amend a complaint.
Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend "shall be freely given where justice so
requires"; this mandate is to be heeded. if the underlying facts or circumstances
relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of.relief, he ought to be
afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any
apparent or declared reason--such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on
the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.~-the leave sought should,
as the rules require, "be freely given." Of course, the grant or denial of an
opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright
refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is
not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent
Reply 10 Povcys' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint - Poge 2
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with the spirit of the Federal Rules.

Idaho Sch.for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. ofEduc., 128 Idaho 276, 284,912
P.2d 644, 652 (1996). The circumstances underlying the claims the Garners seek to assert justify
this Court's granting leave to the Garners to amend their complaint.

I. The Garners have not sought to create undue delay in bringing their assigned
claims.
Based on fuis standard applicable to motions for leave to amend a complaint, this Court
should grant the Garners' motion. The Garners negotiated with and gave consideration to the
Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs for their claims against the Poveys. The Garners are not guilty
of undue delay, bad faith, or some other dilatory motive because they only formally acquired
ownership of the causes of action they now seek to assert yesterday, October 1,2009. Second
Aff. Michael W. Brown ~ 7. It could not possibly be argued that the Garners sought to delay
asserting these claims.

II. The Garners have made a tolorablc claim for breath of warranty as owners of the
claims assigned by Neigums and Viehwegs.
The Poveys appear to argue they could not have breached the warranty they made when
conveying property to the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs because they never had a duty to
protect the Garners' easement in the conveying instrument. Defs.' Bnef at 4. Although the
Garners have argued the Poveys did have a duty to protect the Garners' easement elsewhere in
this litigation, the analysis is somewhat different with respect to the claims of the Neigums and
Viehwegs. Here, the question is not whether the Poveys owed a duty to the Garners, but
whether the Poveys owed a duty to the Neigums and Viehwegs. It is clear the Poveys did owe a
duty to convey title to the Neigums and Viehwegs free from encumbrances, for in the warranty
deeds in which the Poveys conveyed real property to those parties the Poveys expressly stated
Reply to Poveys' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Lea.ve to Amend Second Amended Complaint - Page 3
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that the properties were free of all encumbrances. Second Aff. Michael W. Brown ~~ 10 and 11.
"The general effect of a covenant of warranty is that the grantor agrees to compensate the grantee
for any loss which the grantee may sustam by reason of a failure of the title which the deed
purports to convey, or by reason ofan encumbrance on the title." Powell on Real Property §
81A.06[2)[d)[i] (citing R. Natelson, Modem Law of Deeds to Real Property § 12.7 (Little,
Brown 1992)). The Neigums, and Viehwegs sustained loss by reason of an encumbrance on the
titles they received from the Poveys. Each of those parties.was sued by the Garners, who
asserted their interest in their easement, which was an encumbrance on the titles given to the
Neigums, and the Viehwegs. Because the Garners have resolved their claims against the Deans,
Neigums, and Viehwegs, the court will not have occasion to rule on those claims. Nevertheless,
the fact that the Deans, Neigums, Viehwegs, and the title company settled the claims brought by
the Garners is instructive when considering whether the Garners' claimed easement was
meritorious in the first instance.
The Poveys appear to concede the possibility that the Garners' easement existed when the
Poveys conveyed to the Deans, Neigums. and Viehwegs. According to the Poveys, "To the
extent that the right of way exists absent any recording of it, then the purchasers (Deans,
Neigums, and Viehwegs) had just as much knowledge as the Povey Defendants since the 'access
road' is as visible on the ground today as it was when the Povey Defendants bought the
property." See Defs.' Brief at 4. This statement overlooks the fact that the Poveys had
significant independent knowledge of the Garners' interest in the right of way. This knowledge
was plainly exhibited when Brad Povey approached Daniel Garner and asked him to relinquish
his right in the right of way. Aff. Daniel S. Garner' 8.
Just as this Court found that the Garners had made a colorable claim as to breach of

Reply to Poveys' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint - Page 4
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warranty against the Poveys, the Garners, as the owners of the claims assigned by the Neigums,
and Viehwegs, have now shown the ability to make at least a colorable claim of breach of
warranty against the Poveys. In the interest of justice, the court should pennit the amendment of
the complaint so that the Garners, as owners of the claims assigned by the Neigums and
Viehwegs, may add their assigned claims of breach of warranty. See Second Aff. Michael W.
Brown ~ 13.

m. The Court should permit the Garners to amend their complaint to assert fraud if
the Garners discover facts supporting a fraud claim.

As indicated previously, the Garners have been in the process of negotiating settlement
with the Deans, Neigums, Viehwegs, and the title company Second Aff. Michael W. Brown ~ 4.
Although the parties have executed a settlement agreement,

~ese

defendants have not yet been

dismissed from the case. Second Aff. Michael W. Brown,. 6. Due to the fact that the Deans,
Neigums, and Viehwegs will be represented by counsel until their dismissal from this matter is
complete, counsel for the Garners has been unable to interview these defendants for purposes of
gathering factual infonnation that would further strengthen the fraud claim alluded to in the
Garners' motion for leave to amend their second amended complaint. Second Aff. Michael W.
Brown ~ 12. For these reasons, and in view of the requirement to plead fraud with particularity,
the Garners proposed third amended complaint does not include an allegation of fraud against the
Poveys. Nevertheless, the Garners reserve the right to amend their complaint to assert fraud, if,
upon interviewing the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs, facts supporting such a claim come to

light If such facts are discovered, this Court should permit the Garners to amend their complaint
to assert fraud.

Reply to Poveys' Memorandum in Oppo~;tion to Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint - Page 5
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should grant the Garners' motion to amend their
complaint as it is attached to the Second Affidavit of Michael W. Brown.
Date: October 2, 2009

~b6~

Michael W. Brown
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA

Reply to Povcys' Memornndum in Opposition 10 Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint - Page 6
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CERTRIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I 11ave my office in Rexburg,
Idaho, and on October 2,2009, I served a true and correct copy of Reply to Poveys'
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint upon
the following by the method of delivery designated:

Eric Olsen
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
Fax: (208) 232-6109

Ig U.S. Mail Ig Hand-delivered £acsimile

Ryan McFarland
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Fax: (208) 342-3829

III U.S. Mail

Ii:llHand-delivered

~acSimile

Blake S. Atkin
837 South 500 West
Suite 200
Bountiful, UT 84010
Fax: (801) 533-0380

IQj U.S. Mail I!dJ Hand-delivered

~Simile

Franklin County Courthouse
39W. Oneida
Preston, ID 83263
Fax: (208) 852-2926

III U.S. Mail

~and-de1ivered

IQJ Facsimile

Judge Stephen S. Dunn
Bannock County Courthouse
624E. CenterIP.O. Box 4126
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (208) 236-7012

ICll U.S. Mail lEJJ Hand-delivered ~acsimile

~M~

Michael W. Brown
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffuey, Attorneys
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Reply to Poveys' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint - Pnge 7
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1effrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
Michael W. Brown, ISB No. 8017
343 E. 4th N. Suite 223
P.O. Box 216
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Fax: (208) 359-5888
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner,
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow;
and Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola
Garner Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,
Case No. CV-08-342

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey 1.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as
Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and
KathleenA. Neigum Revocable Trust,
dated September 172004; Jeffery J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey,
husband and wife; First American Title
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of
Authority; and First American Title
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation.

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL W.
BROWN

Defendants.

Second Affidavit of Michael W. Brown

~

Page 1
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STATE OF IDAHO
55.

County of Madison

I, Michael W. Brown, having first been sworn, depose and state:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen, am competent to testify and do so from personal

knowledge.
2.

I am an attorney at Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA, counsel of record for

Plaintiffs, Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, husband and wife, Nola Garner, a widow; and
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007.
3.

On April 30, 2009, co-counsel Jeffrey Brunson and I met with Eric L. Olsen,

counsel for Deans, Viehwegs and Neigums to explore the possibility of reaching settlement of
our clients' claims.
4.

Since that time, we have sought to settle the matter between Garners and

Defendants Deans, Viehwegs, Neigums and First American Title Insurance Company with due
diligence.
5.

On October 1,2009, I received notice from counsel for the Deans, Neigums, and

Viehwegs and counsel for the First American Title Company entities in this action that those
defendants had executed a settlement agreement with the Garners.
6.

A stipulation to dismiss the claims against the parties identified in ~5 above has

been circulated to and signed by counsel for those defendants. I am awaiting the original signed
pages of the stipulation. Upon receipt of those pages, I intend to file the same with this Court.
7.

On October 1,2009, I received via e-mail from counsel for the Deans, Neigums,

and Viehwegs scanned images ofan Assignment. of Causes of Action. Copies of these executed
instruments are attached as Exhibit A.
Second Affidavit of Michael W. Brown - Page 2
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The Assignment of Causes of Action contains a scriviner's error. It identifies

Instrument No. 208652. That Instrument No. should instead be 231826. My knowledge of this
error is based on my preparation of that instrument and on my discussions with counsel for the
Viehwegs.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a correct copy ofInstrument Number 207408,

which is a Warranty Deed from Brad & Leiza Povey to defendants, Hal J Dean and Marlene T.
Dean. As part of the settlement agreement between the parties, all right, title and interest in the
causes of actions of Deans against Poveys associated with this property in this cause of action
were assigned to the Garners.
10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a correct copy of Instrument Number 212784,

which is a Corrected Warranty Deed from Brad & Leiza Povey to defendants, Jeffery J. Neigum
and Kathellen A. Neigum. As part of the settlement agreement between the parties, all right, title
and interest in the causes of actions ofNeibums against Poveys associated with this property in
this cause of action were assigned to the Garners.
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a correct copy of Instrument Number 231836,

which is a Warranty Deed from Brad & Leiza Povey to defendants, Douglas K. Viehweg and
Sharon C. Viehweg. As part of the settlement agreement between the parties, all right, title and
interest in the causes of actions ofViehwegs against Poveys associated with this property in this
cause of action were assigned to the Garners.
12.

Because the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs will be represented by counsel in this

matter until the stipulation for dismissal is filed, I have been unable to interview them to obtain
all factual information relevant to the claims they assigned to the Garners.

Second Affidavit of Michael W. Brown - Page 3
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Attached hereto as Exhibit E is the proposed Third Amended Complaint which

13.

includes breach of warranty claims assigned to the Garners by the Neigums and Viehwegs.

Dated: October 2,2009.

~MBr.---

Michael W. Brown
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for Plantiffs

Subscribed and sworn to before me on October 2.2009.

~~,

Notary Public for State ofIdaho
Residing at Rigby
My Commission Expires: 7-27-2013
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I have my office in Rexburg,
Idaho, and on October 2, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF

MICHAEL W. BROWN upon the following by the method of delivery designated:
Eric Olsen
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
Fax: (208) 232-6109
Ryan McFarland
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Fax: (208) 342-3829
Blake S. Atkin
837 South 500 West
Suite 200
Bountiful, ur 84010
Fax: (801) 533-0380
Franklin County Courthouse
39 W. Oneida
Preston, ID 83263
Fax: (208) 852-2926
Judge Stephen S. Dunn
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center/P.O. Box 4126
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (208) 236-7012

lbD U.S. Mail IbIJ Hand-delivered ~acsimile

/Qj U.S. Mail /Qj Hand-delivered

~acsimile

IOJ U.S. Mail IbIJ Hand-delivered ~acsimile

IQJ U.S. Mail

~and-delivered

Ig Facsimile

IDJ U.S. Mail C Hand-delivered ~acsimile

Michael W. Brown
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney, Attorneys
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Second Affidavit of Michael W. Brown - Page 5
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Assignment of Causes of Action

For valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Hal J. Dean and
Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife~ Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and
wife; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigmn, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1. Neigurn and
Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable
Trust, dated September 17th 2004 (collectively "Assignor") hereby transfer and assign to Daniel
S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer, husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow; a:l1d Nola Gamer as
Trustee of the Nola Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007, (collectively HAssignee") all of
Assignor's right, title, and interest in and to all causes of action (determined and undetermined)
agaiIlSt Brad Povey and Lezia Pavey, husband and wife, (poveys) including, but not limited to,
all causes of action arising from all transactions and events associated with. the Poveys'
conveyance to Assignor (or eny member of that class) of real property idelltified in Instrument
Nos. 207408,208652, and 2127&4 ofllie records of Franklin County, Idaho.
This assignment is intended to convey to Assignee all of Assignor's right, title. and interest in the
assigned causes of action. Additionally. Assignee acquires the full power to prosecute,
compromise, settle, reassign, and give a release in full settlement of the causes of action.
Assignor agrees to take all reasonably necessary actions to assist Assignee in its prosecution of
the assigned causes of action.
This Assignment shall be binding on and shall inure to the benefit of the respective heirs,
devisees, legatees, executors, admiuistrators~ trustees, successors, and assigns of the parties to
this Assignment
This Assignment shall be governed by and cOlistrued ill accordance with the laws of the state of
Idaho.
Date: September Z~ ,2009.

t:U:s Id

Hal 1. Dean

--

~-x.~
Mar ene T. Dean
Douglas K. Viehweg

Sharon C. Viehweg

Assignment of Causes of Ac

EXHIBIT
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Assignment of Causes of Action

For valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Hal J. Dean and
Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and
wife; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife~ Jeffrey J. Neigum and
Kathleen A. Neigum. as Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable
Trust, dated September 171h 2004 (collectively "Assignor") hereby transfer and assign to Daniel
S. Garner and Sherri-lo Gamer, husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow; and Nola Gamer as
Trustee of the Nola Garner Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, (collectively ~'Assignee") all of
Assignor's right, title, and interest in and to all causes of action (determined and undetermined)
against Brad Povey and Leria Povey, husband and wife, (Poveys) including, but not limited to,
aU causes of action arising from all transactions and events associated with the Poveys'
conveyance to Assignor (or any member of that class) of real property identified in Instrument
Nos. 207408, 208652, and 212784 of the records of Franklin County, Idaho.
This assignment is intended to convey to Assignee all of Assignor's right, title, and interest in the
assigned causes of action. Additionally, Assignee acquires the full power to prosecute,
compromise, settle, reassign, and give a release in full settlement of the causes of action.
Assignor agrees to take all reasonably necessary actions to assist Assignee in its prosecutiori of
the assigned causes of action.
This Assignment shall be binding on and shall inure to the benefit of the respective heirs.
devisees, legatees, executors, administrators, trustees, successors, and assigns of the parties to
this Assignment.
This Assignment shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the state of
Idaho.
Datc: September ~, 2009.

HaIJ. Dean

Sharon C. Viehweg

Assignment of Causes of Action - Page 1
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Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Living Trust

.'

; I.

"'.

""'I!l

c/:>::Jtut2c JJ /,.L,

,-

:c:~-, "L-0 J

Kathleen A. Neigum, Trustl(e

Acknowledgment

Assignment of Causes of Action - Pa.ge 2
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STATE OF IDAHO
SS.

County of

Fru.V\ tl r~

rM,();,rJ..r;. ~n-fud,

On September, 2009, befure
all Idaho notary public, persooally
appeared Hal J. Dean and Marlene¥. Dean, hus and and wife, knO'WIl or identified to me to be
the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that
they executed the same. In witness, I have set my hand and affixed my official seal the day al1d
year in this certificate first above written.

~

IO··22-Z.0/~

Acknowledgment

STATE OF IDAHO
S8.

Cotmty of

On September, 2009, before me,
, an Idaho notary public, personally
appeared Douglas K.. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and 'wife, known or identified
to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged
to me that they executed the same. In witness, I have set my hand and affixed my official seal
the day and year in this certificate flrst above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at

My Commission expires:
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STATE OF IDAHO
ss.
County of
On September, 2009, before me,
t an Idaho notary public, personally
appeared Hal ]. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife, known or identified to me to be
the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that
they executed the same. In witness, I have set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and
year in this certificate first above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
My Commission expires:

Acknowledgment
STATE OF nil fH I

~a.(\<;,~ ~

,();JP

ss.

pu-) J

County of Je)h.n ~~

~ri.'c~otary!:5

I

On September, 2009, before me, R.±nCilA Adede./, an
public, personaUy
appeared Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife, known or identified
to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged
to me that they executed the same. In witness, J have set my hand and affixed my official seal
the day and year in this certificate fll'st above written.

~~

Notary Publi~a.nss ~
Residing at: 0..; er1a.ntl PMkMy Commission expires: '1-17 ./o?

~

NOTARV PUBLIC· State (If Kansas

PATRICIAJ. ACKERlEY
My Appl expIres

q-IJ ., I '3
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Atknowledgment

STATE OF IDAHO
SS.

County of

F~Y"\ "'-Lv-:~'g~

On September~ 2009, before me, ~ +bOyjcYo an Idaho notary public, personally
appeared Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen . Neigum, husband and wife, knovvn or identified to
me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within inst:rum.ent, and acknowledged to
me that they executed the same. In witness, I have set my hand and a..ffixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate first above ,vritten.

Notary Publi
0
Residing at: Y"C::~::A'C5Yl
My Commission expires:

:r:d.o..no

<of (<.0, a<::Jl '-J

MARY HINRICHS
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Trustee Acknowledgment
STATE OF IDAHO
County of

Fro..\'\~

ss.

On this~day of September, 2009, before me,f\..!a.Y\H ±bn'('\ili, a Notary Public in
and for said State, personally appeared Jeffery J. Neigum an Kathleen A. Neigum, known to me
to be persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument as the Trustees of the Jeffrey
J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Living Trust, and acknowledged to me that they executed
the same as such Trustees.

MARY HINRICHS
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO
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Aecorded at the requ9at of

WARRANTY DEED'

'F\ts.t I\ .... ,,.\c.~ ... i~\t.. c..

For value Received BIa:l L Pr:Nr!f and ~ PflJf!I husbend iIIld wife

Hereinafter called 1he rnn1cf. hereby g~. bargains, sells erd ~ unlll

1<.: 15

-10m. ,6.UG 301999 ---p.m.

Hal J. Dean ard MatIene T. Daan huSband and wile,
wt105'e sdtfre5s is: 60S SaIttl MBIn St. Cfilla1. Id 63ZZ8

Herelnattar called h! GranI.De. 1he foIla.Wlg dasa1bed ptamI!;es s/!ua1ed In F'1Mkli'I Count!. 10. ID-wI!:
TO'MIShlp 14 Sooll\, Range 3S East or fie Boise MeIidIan. FIl.V\~ Colr1t!. IdaIlo
Section 27: Beginning eta poi1t946.2S feel West IiII1C1 Soutt 0"C6 East419.10feetfn:m!he Nor1heasta:mer-of1he SE114 of5llk!Sedicn
'D. and I\II'Ining IhtlnCa East 185 feet, Il'ICII'a
10 Iha West Gne of HigI'wvay righldway; 1henc:e Sou!h 11'11' Eastalcng thi!I west ~t of
way line 01 HIgtT.vay 150.5 fee!. mcntcrless.to1h6 SouIh line of an ~ rightofw"y:1hence West 195 fee!. morecriess.lDa pclnt 164.5
feet Soutt of ~ POINT OF BEGINNING; Iherce Na1h 164.5 feei b Ihe POINT O~ BEGINNING.

01-.

SUBJECT TO all ~ts.lIghtofYr.tjS. mwnanIs, msVlc:IIons, reservatlcnJ.uppli:::3ble building and ~ ~ and use
regulallc:ns and restndons of reccrU. and payment of aa:nJing pesent yes Ialces Inl assessments as agTe(!!CS to ~ paIIles atx7.oo.

TO HAVE ANOTO HOL01he said premIses.lMtllhelr~ untolhe &aid G!antI!e and to rho GrMIee's hen and
Nd Iha S<Ii:f Grantcrdoes I"'eIeby l'XlII9nant to ard 1MtIlh8 sakj Gm(lIee.1t1atht Grana" !he cwnernfee simple ofS<li;i
penises; !hat said prM1Ises are free fn:m all ena.rnI:Irances 1!lCepla.rrent)en tDle5.lEMes. end assessments, and ~ U. s.. Palent
reseMltIons. ~ easement!J d record, end easements llisible upon Iha~. ard!hat GtantorYdlwarr:antand dl!fend Iho same
assIgnlI~.

fn:melldafmg~.

Dated: ~'ZJ. 1999

~~

6rcdL Pt:foJet

i(

w;

SfATEOFIOAHO
)
COUNTY OF FRANKUN )

On ~is 2'" day of AuguS, 1999, before mG. a NoIaIy Public In and for SQJd Slate. personalIy~ 6RAO L POVEY ERf
LSZA POVEY, kni:1Ml1O me III be the pasons v.flO5a names !lie 5U~ k) Ihev.ill1il i'IsIn.JrnelIt. and ~
to me 1hat!hey executed 1he S<me. In 1M1ness~ I have eetmy hand fIJ'ld al'ftxod my oIIIc:iaI seallha day ard year

intm~Iitst~wrten.

~

~~~~:£/~j--~~~~----
Notarytlblie ~

Residing at: Swan Lake, Id
Comm. expires: 5/25/2000
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~CaOtl;Scd 0.' \h~ ~t1Utst of
FIRST AMERICAN
..
. _n .........TITLE
_.....__
~--

-t:!.t'i'l.

~

APR n.5 2001 ~,::,zo~.r.t

CORRECTED WARRANTY DEEli), E i 1I:~n' ~:";f:,'!;."
_

...1/
FOR VALUE RECEIVED

..

'-

J.

::::(','

.~._.

_

:. ~."

........ ~

-ie"":"
FRANKl/f! ';Q')t.-lTy' IDt !.:r:-:""""'.•'

BRAD L. POVEY and LEIZA POVEY, husband and wife,

do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto
JEFFERY J. NEIGUM

and KATHLEEN A. NEJ:GtrM, husband and

wife,

whose current address is: 202 Pony Ct., Pope Valley, CA 94567,
the Grantees, the following described premises in Franklin County,
Idaho to wit:

SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A"
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances

unto the Grantee, his heirs and assigns forever.
And the said
Grantors do hereby covenant to and with the said Grantees, that
they are the owners in fee simple of said premises; that they are
free from all encumbrances and that they will warrant and defend
the Same from all lawful claims whatsoever.

8t&v-lt Aj #:21; I

DATED:

J

'

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

County of Franklin

)

th1s.iz£.:~~ay

~

on
of
, 2001. before me, the undersigned a Notary
Public in and for said State, personally appeared BRAD L. POVEY and LZIZA POVEY,
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument and
acknowledged to me that chey executed the same.

¢~~I~~\
It}

~

~.....

~

E

+0."
..
". ,0
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~\~v
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""',,, .,..

~

o~

0;

:z:~

e~~
.....

STA.~
,,'\'\\\"

~~~
NOTARY PUBLIC for State of Idaho
Residing at: Preston. Idah.~_ _!!I~I!I!~_'
Comm. Exp.:

EXHIBIT

2/19/05
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Recorded at the request of

~V~ R • \2'\oIl'.I. \~r-

.'

~a.in.
'NOV 0 1- 2~05
p.m. ~: 00
.
,

WARRANTY DEED

v. eu.)~tr LAR~'~ECORDER
By &::q.. 14:
Ii! ~ Deputy

::

t:./ '

FRANKLIN Co.UNTY. I AHO

FOR VALUE RECEIVED

BRAD L. POVEY and 'LEIZA POVEY; Grantors,
do hereby ~rant, bargain. '~ell an~ convey 'unto

bOUGLAS K. VIE..mEG and SHARON C. VIEHWEG.; whose current address Is: .
5601 West. 15Sll! street, Overland Park, KS!1sas 66223,
.' J
Grantees, theli" intersst In the following descrIbed premlses In· Franklin County; Idaho to wit.:

!

-

.

seE AlTACHED"EXHJBIT
"An
.
..
.~

'~

.: .

,"

..:

,.

.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances·unto.the Grantees,
their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantors do hereby covenant to and with the
said GrantEJes, that they are the owner:s in fee simple of said premises; that they are free
from all encumbrances and that they will: 'wananfarid defend the same from. all lawful
claims whatsoever. . - . . ','
'.
.
-'
.' .
.

DATED:

STATE OF IDAHO

j

County of Franklin

).ss.
) .

On this 4'" day of October. 2005, before me, the undersigned, a Nota~ Public In and for
said State, pe~onally appeared BRAD L. POVSY ~nd LEIZA PqVEY known or-IdentIfied to me to
be the persons whose' names are subscribed to .the withIn Instrument and' acknowledged to me
that they executed the same.
., '.
.
.
.

1

1

,

STEVEN A. "FULLER
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF fDAHO

.- . . . . 'J7 ,

•

1..... ......,.....i'""Ir'I!~_"""
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EXHIBIT"Aft
•

'". 1.: .

~

,PARCEL' 1~~;

A

PARCEL OF LAND BEING A PORTION OF THAT LARGER
PARCE;L OF LAND PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED AT INSTRUMENT NO. 196512 IN
, ',,' . '
THE iQFFICE:9F THE FRANKLIN COUNTY CLERK AND RECORDER, LYING
ENTJRELY WITHIN'THE SOUTHEAst ONE-QUARTER OF SECTION 27,
> ,',: ';, TqWN~MJP ~4SP.l[fH, RANGE3QEAST,~NT-IiE~I1)jOFCLIFTON, FRANKLIN
',,1.>' ,. : '9.Q~J'~n\)O'~H9t~D' BEING MORE PARTICULARLY AS. FOLLOWS:

'-' 'fuMMENCING A~ tHE NE CORNER OF SAID SE 1l4; "OF,lSaGTJ,QN:27, AS.

FILED FOR RECORD AT INSTRUMENT NO. 208970 IN 'THE~sAltrt!AA'NKL.INl
COUNTY RECORDS; THENCE WEST A DJSTANC~ OF 780.74 FEJ:T; THENCE'
S 00a06'OO" E A DISTANCE OF 419.10 FEET TO A PO'tNT ON THE WESTERLY
R'GHT-OF~WAYL1NE OFTHEWESTSIDE HIGHWAY,A PUBLIC ROAD; THENCE
S 89°40.38" W A DISTANCE OF 354.54 FEET TO THE POINT Of aEGINNING;
THENCES'04°48'00· EA DISTANCE OF 178.36 FEET; THENCE N 88°02'30. W
A DISTANCE OF 154.44 FEET; THENCE N04C140'OO·WA DISTANCE OF 170.00
FEET; tHENCE N 88°52'10" E ALONG AN EXISTING FENCE LtNEADISTANCE
OF 15S:2g:FEET TO THE POIN! OF BEGINNI~G; CONTAINING Q.61 ACRE.

PARCEL 2: A PARCEL OF lAND BEING A PORTION OF THAT LARGER
PARCEL OF LAND PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED AT INSTRUMENT NO. 196512 IN
THE OFFICE OF THe FRANKLIN COUNTY CLERK AND RECORDER, LYING
ENTIRELY WITHIN THE SOUTHEAST ONE..QUARTER OF SECTION 27.
TOWNSHIP'14S019T~GeS8€AS-T?IN--THe:ClT-Y OF CLIFTON. FRANKLIN
C'OU~TY, -'~AHO, AND BEING MOR!?' P,ARTICULARlY AS FOLLOW~:

COMMENCING AT THE NE CORNER OF SAID SE 114 OF SECTION 27. AS
FILED FOR RECORD AT INSTRUMENT NO. 208970 IN THE SAID 'FRANKLIN
COUNTY RECORDS; THENCE WESt A DISTANCE OF 780.74 FEET: THENCe
S Oooos'oon E A DISTANCE OF 419.10 FEET TO A POINT ON THE WESTERLY
RlGHT-OF·WAY LINE OFTHEWESTSIDE HIGHWAY, A PUBLIC RQAD; THENCE
S 11 °20'30" EALONG SAID WESTERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE A DISTANCE OF
150.50 FEET TO THE POINT QF BE~INNINc.a: THENCE CONTINUING S
1'1 °02'30"·E ALONG SAID~WESr.F;RLyo RIGHT..OF-WAY LINE A DISTANCE OF
167.00 FEET; THENCE S 84~11JOO" W A DISTANCE OF 293.84 FEET; T-HEN,CE
N 57 045'00" W A, DISTANCE OF 3-12.25 FEET;, THENCE S' 88°02'30n '. E A
DISTANCE OF 154.44 FEET; THENeE,N 85°01'10" e A DISTANCE OF 370.61
FEET TO THE POINt OF aeGINNrNG;j:;ONTAlNlNG 1.56 ACRES. A~t? BEING
SUBJECT TO A 10 FOOT UTILIlY EASEMENT PARALLEL AND ADJACENT TO
THE NORTH BOUNDARY'OF SAID DESCRIBED PARCEL.
' ","
i.",
''\

,

",

,

SUBJECr'TO AN'~ASEMENT 1Q'F;E~~fIN,WIDTH FO~'A BURLED ,IRRIGATION
"'PIPEL'IN&tAND·,A RIGHT .OF, ACGE;SS THERETO 'FOR -MAINT~ANCE A~D ,,",',
REPAIR, BEGINNING ALONG"THE EAst':BOUNDARY'OF,~-THE~!:ABO\&':, '..
PREMISES AND RUNNING' IN A NORTHWESTERLY O'JREOT'ON" TO '-THJ5:", '
PROPERTY l YINGNORTH 0F THE
ABove DESCRIBED PREMISES.
,
"

:,<

"

'-

•

.

. •

.

• ' ..... ~

.:...

"

.,.

.t,.

;'.

' .'
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TOGETHER WfTH2;SHARES OFTf.fE CAPitAL STOCK OF TWIN lAKES CANAL.

....."'/IAO 0\ "-IV
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Title:
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Scale: 1 inch = 125 feet

#
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IDate: 12-07-2005

JFite: VlEH\V.EGD231836 #3lSS.des

-fl'zact 1: 0.613 AJns:. 266S'2 Sq Fe CIosum ~ l4S.2443wO.Ol Feet:' Pmaisian =,V1l2140: Paimctc.t'- 6$6 Feet
+Tract 2: 1.565 Acres: 68171 Sq Feet: Closuro'" n18.S347e 0.88 Feet: PIociaion -111480: Perimeter = l29SFeet
Net Art:zE= 2..178.A.m:ee: 948S4 Sq Feet
........ ...
.. OOl-.'NB"SB;ll~1~~~'-t"'~\I'''''f''~;:·-;· . 008aN88.S210B lSl.29
OJ5a0S84:.llW 293.84Ol6-NS7.4.SW 31US
009'=@0+
oo:borIN9lJW780·'l4
003=iS.0i6B 419.10
01'7=!S88.02:30E 154M
. 0l00elNB"SE.27.14S,.3m
0I)4c:;iS&9A03SW 3s4.S4
OlBciN&S.OllOB 370.61
Ol1=1N9oW'nI>.74
OO.te0S4..48B 178.36
01>1S.06B 419;10·
()()6=tt'~0230W JS4.44
0)3-I811.203OB 150;50
014:&$1 L023OE)6'l
007mN4AOW 170

--------, .. -- .
'
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.
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Gordon S. Thatcher, ISB No. 880
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
Michael W. Brown, ISB No. 8017
THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY Attorneys
116 S. Center St.
P.O.Box216
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Tel: (208) 359-5881
Fax: (208) 359-5888
gthatcher@beardstclair.com
jeff@beardstclair.com
mbrown@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer,
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow;
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola
Garner Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,
Case No. CV-08-342
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J.

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as
Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust,
dated September 17th 2004; Jeffery 1.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey,
husband and wife; First American Title
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of
Authority; and First American Title
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

Third Amended Co
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FOUNDATIONAL FACTS
COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS

1. On May 22, 1987, Plaintiff DANIEL S. GARNER ("Daniel") as Buyer entered into a
written Contract of Sale with Ralph R. McCulloch and Thelma W. McCulloch, husband and wife
("McCullochs") as Sellers to purchase the following described real property, ("40 Acres"), in
Franklin County, Idaho:
NE~NWI,4

of Sec. 34, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer.

Along with other real property not involved in this action. A copy of the Contract of Sale which
was recorded on July 8, 1987, as Instrwnent # 175876, records of Franklin County, Idaho, is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
2. The Contract of Sale (Exhibit "A") included a right-of-way along an existing roadway
that ran from the 40 Acres across McCullochs' adjacent property to the Westside Highway, also
known as Highway D-l. That Contract of Sale also provided for conveyance of an additional
parcel from McCu110chs to Daniel in Sec. 27 adjacent to the 40 Acres as described in ~ 9 hereof
3. At the time of the Contract of Sale the 40 Acres would have been totally landlocked
and without any legal access, but for the existing roadway included as a right-of-way in the sale.
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B-1" is a Google™ satellite photograph taken in 2004. It
illustrates features of the area at the time it was taken. The focal point of the illustration is
between the label "Sec. 27" and the label "Sec. 34" and is the cornmon point of the SouthQuarter-Comer of Sec. 27 and the North-Quarter-Comer of Sec. 34, Tvvp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E.,
Boise Mer., in Franklin County~ IdalIO. The squares illustrate the approximate location of 40 acre
tracts coinciding with the United States official survey of the parts of the area shown. The
following additional Exhibits, based on Exhibit "B-1," are marked to show features at particular
Third Amended Complaint - Page 2
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times relevant to this case:
A. Exhibit "B-2" illustrates these features as existing on May 22, 1987:
[1] Westside Highway is marked in orange.
[2] Twin Lakes Canal is marked in blue.
[3] The "First Phase" of the "Original Access Road" is marked in

red.
[4] The "40 Acres" in Sec. 34 acquired by Daniel is marked in

fuschia.
[5] Additional property in Sec. 27 acquired by Daniel pursuant to the

Contract of Sale is also marked in fuchsia.
[6] The "Second Phase" of the "Original Access Road" is marked in

light blue.
[7] Property retained by McCullochs is marked in yellow.
B. Exhibit "B-3" illustrates the property purported to be acquired by Poveys from

McCullochs on May 23, 1990 as alleged in ~ 10 hereof, marked in yellow.
C. Exhibit "B-4" illustrates the property conveyed by Poveys to Gary T. Gamer
("Gary") and Nola S. Gamer ("Nola") on June 17, 1992, as alleged in ~ 11 hereof,
marked in blue.
D. Exhl"bit B-5 illustrates an additional 40 Acres acquired from the Cox Trust, by

Gary and Nola on August 20, 1997, as alleged in ~ 12 hereof, which is marked in green.

Also marked in yellow is the revised "Second Phase" of the "Original Access Road"
adapted to include the part crossing the Cox property.

Third Amended Complaint - Page 3
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E. Exhibit "B-6" illustrates a 30 foot wide access from the Westside Highway
acquired from Rices on November 3,1998, as alleged in,-13 hereo±: marked in fuschia,
and a 30 foot wide strip exchanged to Rices for that access as alleged in ~ 13 hereo±:
marked in green.

F. Exhibit "B-7" illustrates properties conveyed by Defendant Poveys to Deans
(August and December 1999), explained in ~ 16 marked with yellow; to Neigums (April
5,2001) explained in ~ 17, marked in blue; and to Viehwegs (November 1, 2005),
explained in ~ 20, marked with red.
5. All of the property over which the origina] right-of-way existed was at the time of the
Contract of Sale (May 22, 1987) owned by McCullochs.
6. At the time of the Contract of Sale (May 22, 1987), attached hereto as Exhibit "A,"
McCu110chs had been farming the 40 Acres and their remaining property over which the right-ofway ran, including pasture for cattle, some irrigated crops, operation of a dairy farm, and some
dry-fann hay ground. Some of the McCulloch property over which the right-of-way ran
included gravel pits (and potentia] gravel pits) as the subject of present and future extracting of
gravel, and removal of gravel over the right-of-way.
7. The existing roadway constituted the right-of-way after the purchase by Daniel on
May 22, 1987 and was used by Daniel continually thereafter; and was also used by McCullochs
for their remaining properties so long as they retained those properties.
8. Pursuant to the Contract of Sale, McCullochs conveyed the 40 Acres, with
appurtenances, to Daniel by Warranty Deed dated May 22,1987 and recorded on May 28, 1987
as Instrument # 175555, records of Franklin County, Idaho. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit
"C." The Warranty Deed conveyed the property ''with their appurtenances unto the Grantee, his

Third Amended Complaint - Page 4

~\

20/ 49

10-02-09;04:29PM;

#: 211 49

heirs and assigns, forever." This means the right-of-way for the existing roadway was included
in the conveyance and subject to the covenant of McCullochs "that they will warrant and defend
the same from all lawful claims whatsoever."
9. By Warranty Deed dated May 22, 1987 and recorded on July 8, 1987 as Instrument #
175877, records of Franklin County, Idaho, copy attached hereto as Exhibit "D," McCullochs
conveyed an additional parcel to Daniel, legally described as follows:
Part ofNW~SE~ of Sec. 27, 1\vp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer., described as
follows:
Beginning at the Southwest comer and running thence Northeasterly to the
bottom ofthe gulley on the North side oftlle old gravel pit; thence
Southeasterly to the Southeast comer; thence West to the point of
beginning.
The wording of the Warranty Deed implied this was in Sec. 34, but from the express description
it is clear it was in Sec. 27 as above described. This property was included as paragraph 18 in an

addendum on the Contract of Sale, Exhibit "A" hereto. It has continually been used by Daniel as
an integral addition to the 40 Acres, and from the date of the Contract of Sale (May 22. 1987)
Daniel has accessed it by the right-of-way. The Warranty Deed included "the premises with their
appurtenances." The existing roadway comprising the right-of-way was included in the covenant
by McCulloch ''to warrant and defend the same from

a111a~

claims whatsoever."

10. By Warranty Deed, dated May 23, 1990 and recorded June 4, 1990 as Instrument
#181769. records of Franklin County, Idaho, McCullochs purported to convey ~o Defendants
Brad L. Pavey and Leiza Povey, and Henry Nels Povey and Melanie Povey ("Poveys") all of the
property of McCulloch, served by the right-of-way, except the 40 Acres of Daniel (and
wrongfully included the property conveyed to Daniel by Exhibit "D", ~ 9 hereof). A copy of the

Third Amended Complaint - Page 5
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Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "E." The part of the property included in this suit
that was conveyed to Poveys is described as follows:
Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer., Franklin County, Idaho:
Sec. 27:

WYlSEY-!; SEY-!SW'4;ALSO, Commencing at a point 1323.25 feet West
and 419.10 feet South OD06' East of the Northeast corner ofSE~ of Sec.
27, and running thence Soo06' East 900.9 feet; thence East 770.819 feet;
thence North II D11' West 918.53 feet; thence West 594.98
feet to the point of beginning.

The Warranty Deed conveyed appurtenances. so the rights ofMcCu1lochs to use the right-of-way
to access the property conveyed were transferred to Poveys in the conveyance. Poveys
commenced and continued to use the right-of-way to access their acquired property West of the
Twin Lakes Canal and were fully aware Daniel continued to use the right-of-way to access his

property West of the Twin Lakes Canal.
11. By Warranty Deed recorded on September 16. 1992 as Instrument #186592, records
of Franklin County, Idaho, copy attached as Exhibit "F," Poveys conveyed to GaryT. Gamer
("Gary") and Nola S. Gamer ("Nola"), husband and wife, a part of the property acquired from
McCulloch by Exhibit 'IE," which part was all of the McCulloch property West of the Twin
Lakes Canal, which is described as follows:
Beginning at the SW comer of the SE~SW'4 ofSeo. 27, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E.,
Boise Mer., and running thence East to the Southeast comer of the SW~SE~ of
Sec. 27; thence North to the Northeast comer of the SW!4SE!4 of Sec. 27; thence
East to the East side of the Twin Lakes Canal; thence Northwesterly along the
East edge of the Twin Lakes Canal to a point on the East-West centerline of Sec.
27; thence West to the centerpoint of Sec. 27; thence South to the Southeast
Corner of the NE!4SWJ;.j of Sec. 27; thence West to the Northwest comer of the
SE~SW~ of Sec. 27; thence South to the point ofbeginning. (This legal
description is depicted on a GoogleTtd satellite image, attached hereto as Exhibit
"B-4".)

The Warranty Deed conveyed agpurtenances, so the rights ofPoveys to use the right-ofThird Amended Complaint - Page 6
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way to access the property conveyed were transferred to Gary and Nola in the conveyance. Such
rights were thereafter used by Gary and Nola. Nola and Gary received a policy of title insurance
from Defendant First American Title Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority, in connection with the purchase, which policy insured them against loss
or damage sustained by him by reason of: "3. lack of a right of access to and from the land." The
only access to the Povey property was from the Westside Highway by the Original Access Road
extending up to the Povey property. See Exhibit "B-4," attached hereto.
12. By Trustee's Deed, recorded on August 20, 1997, as Instrument #199886, records of
Franklin County, Idaho, with the Trustees of the Alvord 1. Cox Family Trust ("Cox Trust") as
Grantors, and Gary T. Gamer and Nola Smart Gamer [also known as Nola S. Gamer] ("Gary and
Nola"), Grantees, the following 40 acre tract in Franklin County, Idaho:
NE~SW~

of Sec. 27, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E, Boise Mer.

together with appurtenances was conveyed. Acopy of the Trustee's Deed is attached hereto as
Exhibit "0., and this 40 acre tract is depicted on a Google™ sateUite image, attached hereto as
Exhibit "B-S." By oral agreement between Daniel and Gary and Nola the acquired 40 Acres was
integrated into the common operation with Gary and Nola's property described in ~ 11 and with
Daniel's property described in ~ 8 and ~ 9, hereof; and the Second Phase of the "Original Access
Road" was adapted to include a preferred partial route crossing the Cox property. (See Exhibit
"B-5"). Nola and Gary received a policy of title insurance from Defendant First American Title
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho Certificate ofAuthority, in connection
with the purchase, which policy insured them against loss or damage sustained by him by reason
of: "3. lack of a right of access to and from the land." The onIy access to the Cox property was

from the Westside Highway by the Original Access Road extending up to the Cox property. See
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Exhibit "B-5," attached hereto.
13. By Warranty Deed from Edward Rice and Helen S. Rice ("Rices") as Grantors to
Gary T. Garner and Nola S. Garner as Grantees ("Gary and Nola"), recorded on November 3,
1998 as Instrument #204036, records of Franklin County, Idaho, the following described
property for use as an access road, including as the prime purpose to haul extracted gravel in the
non-wintry months (it was not usable in wintry months); was conveyed to Gary and Nola:
Beginning at the Northwest comer of the SEy.{SE~ of Sec. 27, Twp. 14 S., Rge.
38 E., Boise Mer., and running thence East along the existing fence line 718 feet
more or less to Hwy. D-I; thence South 30 feet; thence West 718 feet, more or
less; thence North 30 feet to the point of beginning.
A copy of the Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "H." In exchange by Warranty Deed
from Gary and Nola to Rices, recorded on November 3, 1998, as Instrument #204035, the
following described property was conveyed by Gary and Nola to Rices:
Beginning at the Northeast Comer of the SW~SE~ of Sec. 27, Twp. 14 S., Rge.
38 E., Boise Mer., and thence South 30 feet to the true point of beginning; thence
S 718 feet along the existing fence line; thence West 30 feet; thence North 718
feet, thence East 30 feet to the point of beginning.

A copy of the Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "I." See Exhibit "B-6."

By reason of the two Deeds the one 30 foot wide strip for a special limited access road
was added to the Gary and Nola property and the other 30 foot wide strip was removed from the
Gary and Nola property.

14. Gary died on December 1, 2005. The property of Gary and Nola involved in this
case was distributed from the Estate of Gary with an undivided 65% interest distributed to Nola,
and Daniel received 35% from the estate distribution and by exchanges with his siblings. Nola
has gift deeded 9.796% interest to Daniel so that he now has a 44.796 % interest and Nola has
retained a 55.204% interest. Nola had conveyed by Grant Deed her then (July 25, 2007)
Third Amended Complaint - Page 8
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60.102% interest to herself as Sole Trustee, or her successors in Trust, under the NOLA
GARNER LIVING TRUST. dated July 19,2007 ("Nola Trust'). A copy of the Registration of
Trust is attached hereto as Exhibit "1." Nola has since withdrawn 4.898% interest from the Nola
Trust and gifted it to Daniel, leaving the present percentage ownership as 44.796% with Daniel
and 55.204% interest in the Nola Trust. The Nola Trust is revocable by Nola. Nola was one of
the insured in a policy of title insurance issued in the Povey purchase and in a policy of title
insurance issued in the Cox purchase, which policies have been breached by Defendant First
American Title Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of
Authority. So complete relief can be obtained Nola, individually is a party Plaintiff to this suit to
pursue the claims on the policies.
15. Each Personal Representative's Deed, each Grant Deed (Furthering Exchange), each
Gift Deed, and the Grant Deed to the Nola Trust, conveyed the property described in ~ 11, ~12
and '113 (less the 30 foot strip exchanged away), together with all appurtenances pertaining
thereto, so the rights of Gary and Nola to use the "Original Access Road" as adapted by
acquisition of the Cox property (~ 12 hereof) are owned by Daniel, with an undivided interest of
44.796%, and by the Nola Trust with a 55.204% interest. Such use of the right-of-way would
also be in common with Daniel (and with any applicable rights ofSherri-l0 Garner his wife), as
to all interests of Daniel, as to property of Daniel described in ~8 and ~9 hereof.
16. Povey Defendants conveyed to Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife
("Deans") by separate Warranty Deeds recorded respectively on August 30, 1999 as Instrument #
207408 and on December 30, 1999, as Instrument # 208652, records of Franklin County, Idaho,
two parcels comprising part of the properties Poveys acquired from McCullochs. Copies of the
two Warranty Deeds are attached hereto as Exhibits ''K,'' and "L" respectively. Attached hereto

Third Amended Complaint - Page 9

25/ 49

10-02-09;04:29PM;

#

as Exhibit "M" is an approximate illustration of the descriptions of the two parcels.
In both Deeds Deans were on notice of an "existing right-of-way" along the South

boundary, and in the first Deed they expressly took subject to "easements of record and
easements visible upon the premises." Segment "A" of the First Phase of the Original right-ofway was at the time of the Deeds visible upon the premises and the adjoining properties.
17. A Corrected Warranty Deed from Povey Defendants to Jeffrey J. Neigum and
Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife, ("Neigums"), recorded on April 5, 2001, as Instrument #
212784, records of Franklin County, Idaho, is attached hereto as Exhibit "N." The complex legal
description included all of the McCullochs' property conveyed to Poveys, Exhibit "E", explained

in ~ 10 hereof, except:
A. The property previously conveyed to Gary and Nola in 1992, Exhibit "F"
hereto, explained in, 11 hereof, and illustrated in Exhibit B-4 hereto.
B. The property previously conveyed to Deans in 1999! Exhibits "K" and "L,"
explained in 1116 hereof.
Attached hereto as Exhibit "0" is a Google™ satellite image produced taken on June 16,
2004. The property received by the Neigums is depicted on this image.
18. The Corrected Warranty Deed from Povey Defendants to Neigums on April 5, 2001,
Exhibit "N," described in 1117 hereof, contained a reservation of a roadway for the benefit of
Daniel in this language:
"... together with an easement for a roadway 20 feet in width lying adjacent to
and along the South and West side of the above-described Courses 1) and 2) to be used by the
Grantees, Daniel Garner and the Grantors, their heirs, successors or assigns for general ingress
and egress purposes. Said easement shall continue in a westerly direction to a bridge located on
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the Twin Lakes Canal accessing the Daniel Gamer premises" (emphasis added).
The first sentence of the quoted provision describes. what is a possible "replacement
access road" to what we refer to as Segment "A" of the First Phase of the Original Access Road.
The second and last sentence of the quoted provision describes a route identical (except it should
be 30-feet not 20-feet in width) as Segment "B" of the First Phase of the "Original Access
Road." It starts at the end of Segment "A" and continues to the bridge over the Twin Lakes
Canal.
19. Because Daniel (with his wife) and the Nola Trust, and Nola with rights under the
Trust, own all of the property West of the bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal, which has been
served by the Original Access Road as adapted with the Cox property (~ 12 hereofiUustrated in
Exhibit B-S), the only concerns in this case should be [a] the width oftlie First Phase (30 feet or
20 feet); [bJ and whether the original Segment "A" (see '121 hereof) or the alternate Segment

"A," such as described in the first sentence of the quoted provision and as further explained in ~

22 hereof, should apply.
20. Povey Defendants conveyed the remainder of their property acquired from
McCullochs

(~

10 hereof) to Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, ("Viehwegs") by

Warranty Deed recorded on November 1, 2005, as Instrument # 231836, records of Franklin
County, Idaho, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "P." The complex deed description
of the property conveyed by Poveys to Viehwegs is illustrated by a diagram generated by deed
plotting software, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "Q," which shows Tract 1 and
Tract 2 described in the Warranty Deed.

21. Segment "A" of the First Phase of the Original Access Road generally follows the
courses and distances ofthe Northerly boundary of Tract 2 of the Viehweg property as shown on
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Exhibit "Q." It also generally follows the courses and distances of the Southerly boundaries of
the Dean properties as illustrated on Exhibit "M," based on the Warranty Deeds attached as
Exhibits uK" and "L," and explained in ~ 16 hereof. Some of Segment "A" of the First Phase of
the Original Access Road may be Northerly of the Southerly boundaries of the Dean properties;
some or all may be South of the Northerly boundaries of Tract 2 of the Viehweg property; and
some may be North of the South boundary of Tract 1 of the Viehweg property.
If the original Segment "A" of the First Phase is confirmed as part of the right-of-way, a
survey should be authorized by the Court to detennine the correct legal description including the
Norther]y and Southerly boundaries of Segment "A" in relation to the Dean properties and the
Viehweg properties.
22. An alternative Segment "A" of the First Phase of the right-of-way is that alleged in

111110, 11, and 12 of ANSWER of Defendants Dean, Viehweg, and Neigum, dated November 11,
2008, herein, with part characterized therein as the "Neigum Driveway", and it may be referred
to herein as "Replacement Access Road". The Northerly boundary thereof is the same as the
Southerly and Westerly boundary of Tract 2 of the Viehweg properties, Exhibits "P" and "Q"
explained in " 20 hereof. This is the same Northerly Boundary of the alternate First Segment of
the right-of-way for access to the property of Daniel described in the quotation in 1118 hereof.
23. Defendant First American Title Insurance Company, a foreign corporation that is a
Title Insurer as alleged in 1148 hereof ("First American Title Insurance") issued to Plaintiff
Daniel S. Gamer ("Daniel") a Policy of Title Insurance, ("Policy") on May 28, 1987, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "R." As applicable to this case, the Policy insured Daniel
against loss or damage sustained by him by reason of:
"3. lack of a right of access to and from the land."
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The land involved in this suit as to that Policy is: NE~NW~ of Sec. 34, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E.,
Boise Mer., Franklin County, Idaho. It is herein called "40 Acres."
24. From May 22, 1987 the Roadway constituting the right-of-way benefited
McCu1lochs by providing access as to their remaining property west of the Twin Lakes Canal, as

well as benefiting Daniel as to his 40 Acres described in ~ I hereof and as to his additional parcel
described in ~ 9 hereof. Thereafter Daniel (and his wife), NoJa, and the NoJa Trust succeeded to
all of the remaining property ofMcCullochs West of the Twin Lakes Canal and thus succeeded to
the use of the right-of-way as to such properties. Such properties benefited by the right-of-way
in Franklin County, Idaho are described as follows:

In name of Daniel (100%), '18 and ~ 9 hereof:
Tract 1:

NE}{NW~

Tract 2:

Part of the NE~SW}{ of Sec. 27, Twp., 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer.,
described as follows:

of Sec. 34, Twp. 14 S. Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer.

Beginning at the Southwest comer, and running thence
Northeasterly to the bottom of the galley on the North Side of the
old gravel pit; thence Southeasterly to the Southeast comer; thence
West point of beginning.

In name of Daniel (44.796%), and in name of Nola Trust (55.204%) [with Nola
individually having the right to revoke the Nola Trust and be the prime beneficiary
thereof]:
Beginning at the SW comer of the SE}{SW~ of Sec. 27, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E.,
Boise Mer., and running thence East to the Southeast comer of the SW~SE}{ of
Sec. 27; thence North to the Northeast comer of the SW~SE!4 of Sec. 27; thence
East to the East side of the Twin Lakes Canal; thence Northwesterly along the
East edge of the Twin Lakes Cahal to a point on the East-West centerline of Sec.
27; thence West to the centerpoint of Sec. 27; thence South to the Southeast
Comer of the NE~SW}{ of Sec. 27; thence"West to the Northwest comer of the
SE~SW!4 of Sec. 27; thence South to the point of beginning.
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Saving and excepting therefrom property exchanged to Rices, ~ 13 hereof:
Beginning at the Northeast Comer of the SW!4SE'l4 of Sec. 27, Twp. 14
S., Rge. 38 E.• Boise Mer., and thence South 30 feet to the true point of
beginning; thence S 718 feet along the existing fence line; thence West 30
feet; thence North 718 feet, thence East 30 feet to the point of beginning.

Also, less the rights of Daniel to Tract 2 of the property described above.
If approved by the Court also including the 40 Acres acquired from the Cox
Trust, Exhibit "0," ~ 12 hereof, illustrated in Exhibit "B-5/' described as follows:
NE!4SW!4 of Sec. 27, 1\vp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer.
25. Defendants First American Title Insurance Company; First American Title
Company, Inc. (by its predecessor, Preston Land Title Company, prior to a merger); Poveys,
Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs have been and are in complicity in seeking to deprive Daniel
and his wife, the Nola Trust, and Nola, of thejr rights of access to and from their properties
described in ~ 24 hereof.
The pivotal action was by Viehwegs constructing ofa fence across Segment "A" of the
First Phase of the Original Access Road, on May 28, 2008, at about the place where the roadway
reached the Westerly boundary of the Viehwegs' property.
The actions of those Defendants threatens to permanently deprive Daniel, his wife. Nola
and the Nola Trust, and their heirs, successors and assigns, of their long established, effective
and critical rights of access across Segment "A" of the First Phase of the Original Access Road
as described in ~ 21 hereof.
26. Defendants Deans, Neigums and Viehwegs have been and are in complicity in
depriving Daniel, and his wife, and the Nola Trust of any effective alternate rights of access
across those Defendants properties, such as the so called "Replacement Access Road", described
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in ~ 22 hereof, to and from Plaintiffs' properties described in ~ 24 hereof.
The pivotal action has been the opposition in the "Answer" of Defendants Dean, Viehweg
and Neigum, dated November 11, 2008, filed herein, which opposed Daniel, his wife, and the
Nola Tnlst having any access whatsoever across their properties to and from Plaintiffs' properties
described on ~ 24 hereof; and in a Stipulation entered by those Defendants with Plaintiffs on
December 15, 2008 wherein those Defendants reserved the right to oppose in this litigation any
rights of Plaintiffs for access across their properties.

FIRST COUNT: POVEYS
Took Title Subject to Right-of~Way
Breach of Warranty and Interference
Damages and Attorney Fees
27. Plaintiffs replead by reference" 1 through 26 of the Foundational Facts Common to

All Claims.
28. Poveys received from McCullochs a Warranty Deed recorded on June 4, 1990 as
Instrument # 181769 (See,r 10 hereof, Exhibit "E" and Exhibit "B-3"). This deed described
property on both sides of the Twin Lakes Canal.
29. The Warranty Deed did not expressly provide the property conveyed was subject to a
road right-of-way in Daniel for access to his 40 Acres acquired from McCullochs on May 22,
1987, nor that it was subject to rights of Daniel in additional property described

in,

9 hereof.

30. Poveys were not qualified as bona fide purchasers for value to extinguish the right-

of-way of Daniel, by taking the Warranty Deed frot? McCu110chs, because the chain of title to
the property purported to be acquired by Poveys contained earlier recorded instruments
establishing the right-of-way. These instruments include the Contract of Sale, see Exhibit "A".
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recorded on July 8, 1987 as Instrument # 175876, which described Daniel's right-of-way on
adjacent property of McCullochs (which is the very property acquired by Poveys); and the
Warranty Deed, Exhibit "e", conveying the 40 Acres with app~enances to Daniel recorded on
May 28, 1987 as Instrument # 175555.
31. Poveys were also not qualified to be bona fide purchasers of the property included in

the Warranty Deed to them on June 4, 1990 because part of the property in Sec. 27 included in

the Deed had previously been conveyed by Warranty Deed, with appurtenances, to Daniel by
Warranty Deed recorded on July 8, 1987 as Instrument # 175877. See ~ 9 hereof, Exhibit "10,"
and Exhibit "B_2," part [5].
32. Poveys were not qualified to be bona fide purchasers for value to extinguish the

right-of-way of Daniel, for the further reason they were on notice of the existence of the
established road and the continual use of it by Daniel for access to his otherwise landlocked 40
Acres.
33. It was wrongful for Defendant Poveys to purport to convey property to Deans by
Warranty Deeds recorded on August 30, 1999 a& Instrument # 207408 and on December 30, 1999
as Instrument # 208652 without excepting the right-of-way in Daniel.
34. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Henry Nels Povey and Melanie Povey,
husband and wife, ("Henry and Melanie") have deeded to Defendants Brad L. Povey and Leiza
Povey, husband and wife, any interest that Henry and Melanie had in the property conveyed to
the four Poveys by McCullochs, less the property conveyed by the four Poveys to Gary and Nola
by Warranty Deed recorded on September 16, 1992, as Instrument # 186592; and that Henry and
Melanie will acknowledge the four Poveys had acquired the property subject to the right-of-way
of Daniel while the Poveys had the right to use the right-of-way to access their property we.st of
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Twin Lakes Canal. Henry and Melanie should acknowledge Daniel, his wife, Gary and Nola,
and the Nola Trust have used and have had the right to use of the right-of-way to access their
property west of the Twin Lakes Canal as described in '1 24 hereof.
Because of expected cooperation of Henry and Melanie for Daniel and his wife and Nola
and the Nola Trust to preserve their access rights, Daniel and wife and Nola and the Nola Trust
do not include Henry and Melanie as Defendants and do not claim damages against them.
35. The Poveys' conveyance to Gary Gamer and Nola Gamer, descn'bed above in ~ 11;
was made by Warranty Deed, which warranty deed contains the following language:
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises. with their appurtenances unto the
said Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantors do hereby
covenant to and with the said Grantees that they [are] the owners in fee simple of
said premises; that they are free from all incumbrances and that they will warrant
and defend the samefrom all lawful claims whatsoever (emphasis added).
36. The wrongful actions of Brad L. Povey and Leiza Povey, husband and wife, include
plowing over Segment "A" of the Original Access Road to facilitate sale of their property;
wrongfully conveying property without confinning the right-of-way now held by Daniel, his
wife, Nola and the Nola Trust; warranting against the right-of-way; and by actions herein seeking
to have Daniel, his wife, Nola and the Nola Trust lose all fully effective access rights. By
performing these wrongful actions, the Poveys breached the warranty contained in the Warranty

,r

Deed described in 11 hereof. These actions have damaged Daniel and his wife, Nola and the
Nola Trust in compelling them to pursue this action to preserve their access rights. This is to
their estimated damage of $1 00,000.00. Furthermore, if this wrongful conduct proximately
contn'butes to the loss of effective access rights, Daniel and his wife, Nola and the Nola Trust
should be awarded an added judgment of damages against Brad L. Poveyand Leiza Povey as
jointly and severally liable in the amount determined by the Court. The estimated amount of
such additional damages is $500,000.00.
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37. Plaintiffs have been required to retain THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY
Attorneys, to bring and pursue this action to preserve their right-of-way and to recover damages

against Defendants Brad Povey and Leiza Povey for their wrongful conduct in seeking to
extinguish the right-of-way, and have agreed to pay reasonable attorney fees for those services.
The purchase of the real estate by Gary and Nola from Povey Defendants was a commercial
transaction under Idaho Code Sec. 12-120 (3) so Plaintiffs, as successors to Gary and Nola,
should be entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees from Defendants Brad Povey and
Lezia Povey.
SECOND COUNT: DEANS, NEIGUMS AND VIEHWEGS
Took Title Subject to Right-of-Way
Quiet Title to Right-of-Way

38. Plaintiffs replead by reference ~ 1 through ~ 37 hereof.

39. Deans and Viehwegs each took title from Povey Defendants long after the recording
on July 8, 1987 as Instrument # 175876 of the Contract of Sale (Exhibit "A") which conveyed to
Daniel the 40 Acres "TOGETHER WITH .... a right-of-way across Seller's adjacent property
along an existing roadway."
40. Deans, Neigurns and Viehwegs do not qualifY as bona fide purchasers for value

because:
A. Each of their chains of title extended back to McCullochs ownership and use

of tl'le 40 Acres and ownership and use of all of the adjacent property in Sec. 27 extending
to the Westside Highway. An existing roadway ran from the 40 Acres across the adjacent
McCulloch property to the Westside Highway.
B. The 40 Acres was then landlocked with no access except across the eXisting
roadway.
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C. The roadway extending across the respective properties of Dean, Neigums and
Viehwegs was clearly visible upon the premises when they acquired their respective
properties.
D. When Deans, Neigums and Viehwegs acquired their respective properties, it
was clearly visible upon the adjacent property that the existing roadway ran to a bridge
across the Twin Lakes Canal and extended beyond the Canal to the property west of the
Canal.
E. Any reasonable purchaser, at the time Deans, Neigums and Viehwegs acquired
their respective property, would have inquired whether someone claimed a right to a
right-of-way to access property west of Twin Lakes Canal. Inquiry would have led them
to Daniel. as well as his parents, Gary and Nola, who are long-time residents of the area,
and they would have found the claims to the right-of-way.
41. Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree, quieting title to the right-of-way, 30-feet in width,
extending from Westside Highway to the bridge on the Twin Lakes Canal on a route to be
surveyed under direction of the Court.
42. There are alternate legal foundations establishing the rights of Daniel and his wife
and the Nola Trust to a decree quieting title to a right-of-way across property of Deans, Viehwegs '
and Neigums:
A. An express easement founded in the language of the Contract of Sale of May
22, 1987, from McCullochs to Daniel. Daniel continues to be owner as to the original
properties benefited by the access roadway. Daniel, his wife, Nola and the Nola Trust
have since duly succeeded to the other properties West of the Twin Lakes Canal which
benefited in common with Daniel for access to the Westside Highway from the bridge
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over the Twin Lakes Canal.
B. An implied easement arising from the division by McCullochs of their total
properties in Sec. 27 and adjoining Sec. 34, accessed from the Westside Highway, with
the access road in regular use to connect the property conveyed to Daniel and the
property retained by McCullochs West and East of the Twin Lakes Canal with the
Westside Highway. Except for the right-of-way the 40 Acres was land-locked without
access; thus the right-of-way was necessary.
C. A reaffinnation of an implied easement arising from the division by Poveys of
McCullochs' property in Sec. 27, acquired by them, between all such property West of
the Twin Lakes Canal conveyed to Gary and Nola, with all their retained property East of
the Twin Lake Canal; with the property connected by the 10ng-standing'regular1y used
roadway between the Westside Highway and the bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal.
D. Alternatively a right-of-way acquired by Daniel and his wife, Nola and the
Nola Trust, and their predecessors by prescription. This begins with Daniel on May 22,
1987, acquiring, if not by express easement at least under color of title, a right-of-way to
benefit properties acquired by him from McCullochs by providing access to the Westside
Highway; and continues under color of title as a right-of-way to benefit aU properties of
Poveys West of the 1\vin Lakes Canal, acquired by Gary and Nola by Warranty Deed
dated June 17, 1992, benefiting their properties by providing access to the Westside
Highway. The additional elements to establish prescriptive easements are as follows:
[1] Daniel's use of the roadway to access the property acquired by him on
May 22, 1987 has been open and notorious; under claim of right; was adverse to
any possible claim of any regular owner denying the right; was done with the
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actual or implied knowledge of all 'successive owners of the property over which
the roadway ran; and was continuous and uninterrupted from May 22, 1987 until
May 28, 2008, when the road was blocked. (A period of more than 21 years.)
The prescriptive right was established for the required period of five (5) years or
more, under Idaho Code § 5-203, (effective uptil July 1, 2006. when it was
changed to twenty (20) years or more). On June 30, 2006 the uninterrupted use
had been for more than nineteen (19) years and the prescriptive right established.
[2] Use of the roadway as to the properties acquired by Gary and Nola
and now owned by Daniel and his wife and the Nola Trust, and Nola, acquired by
Warranty Deed dated June 18, 1992 from Poveys, has been open and notorious;
under claim of right; was adverse to any possible claim of a reputed owner
denying the right; was done with the actual or imputed knowledge of all
successive owners of the property over which the roadway ran; and was continued
and uninterrupted from June 18, 1992 until May 28, 2008, a period of over fifteen
(15) years, The prescriptive right was established for the required period of five
(5) years or more, under Idaho Code § 5-203, (until July 1. 2006 when it was
changed to twenty years). On June 30, 2006 the uninterrupted use had been for
more than fourteen (14) years and the prescriptive right established.
43. By Warranty Deed recorded on October 4, 2004, as Instrument # 227649, records of
Franklin County, Idaho, copy attached hereto as Exhibit "S", Defendants Jeffery J. Neigum and
Kathleen A. Neigum conveyed their properties involved in this action to Defendants Jeffery J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of the Jeffery I. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum
Revocable Trust, dated September 17, 2004. All rights alleged or claimed herein against Jeffery
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J. Neigurn and Kathleen A. Neigum, or referring to "Neigums," shall be construed to apply to
them individually and as Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigurn Revocable
Trust, dated September 17,2004.
44. Plaintiffs have been required to retain THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY

Attorneys to bring and pursue this action to quiet title to their right-of-way or to obtain an
adequate replacement access to their properties and have agreed to pay reasonable attorney fees
for those services. Defendants Dean, Neigum and Viehweg have been unreasonable and without
proper legal and factual foundation in blocking the right-of-way on May 28, 2008, and in seeking
to extinguish any effective year-around right-of-way across their properties and to prevent
Daniel, his wife, Nola and the Nola Trust from having effective access to their properties. By
reason thereof and Idaho Code § 12-121 and Rule 54(e), I.R.Cv.P., the court should award
Plaintiffs Judgment against Defendants Dean, Neigum, and Viehweg for their reasonable
attorney fees in obtaining a decree quieting title to the right-of-way or to an adequate
replacement right-of-way for access to their properties.
THIRD COUNT: DEANS, NEIGUMS, AND VIEHWEGS
Confirm Adequate Replacement Access
As a Partial Alternative Remedy

45. Plaintiffs replead by reference, 1 through' 44 hereof.
46. Daniel and wife and the Nola Trust, and Nola, are agreeable upon acceptable tenus
to accept a "Replacement Access Road" for a right-of-way running from the Westside Highway
to the bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal, to provide access to their properties described in ~ 24
hereof, on the following tenns and conditions:
A. The right-of-way should be 30 feet in width and should follow the general
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route described in ~ 22 hereof, with the actual route to be surveyed as approved by the
Court.

B. The use of the right-of-way up to the bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal shall
be a private road but shall be used in common by Daniel and his wife and the Nola Trust
and Nol~ and their successors and assigns; and by Neigums and their successors and
assigns. Maintenance shall be allocated according to the respective uses of the owners
and users of the right-of-way.
C. Daniel and his wife and the Nola Trust~ and Nola, should be granted a money
judgment against Defendants Dean, N eigum and Viehweg for their attorneys fees and
costs in responding to the opposition of Defendants Dean, Neigurn and Viehweg, to
Plaintiffs having any access to their properties, depending on the opposition, as alleged in

'144 hereof.
D. Upon final Court confirmation of the rights to a "Replacement Access Road"
in Daniel his wife and the Nola Trust, and Nola, their heirs, successors and assigns, and
their collection of any judgment for attorney fees and costs against Defendants Dean,
Neigum and Viehweg, for which they are adjudged responsible, respectively, Daniel, his
wife and the Nola Trust, and Nol~ shall relinquish and disclaim any rights to the First
Segment of the Original Access Road.
47. Daniel and his wife and the Nola Trust, and Nola, their heirs, successors and assigns,
shall have complete control over the right-of-way from the bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal
extending to the West; and they shall have the duty of maintenance; and the same shall not be a
public road nor shall Franklin County have any duty of maintenance thereof.
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FOURTH COUNT: FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
Breach of Contract to Assure Access
Money Judgment for Damages
48. Plaintiffs replead by reference ~ 1 through '147.

49. Defendant First American Title Insurance Company ("First American Title
Insurance") at all times material to this action was a "foreign insurer" under Idaho Code § 41333, engaged as a title insurer in the State ofIdaho under Idaho Code § 41-2704~ pursuant to a
"certificate of authority" required under Idaho Code § 41-2705 to be issued by the Director of the
Department of Insurance, and amenable to service of process in this action upon the Director as
provided in Idaho Code § 41-333.
50. First American Title Insurance has breached its contracts contained in Policy of Title

Insurance ("Policy"), issued on May 28, 1987 with Daniel, as insured, described in ~ 23 hereof:
and contained in Exhibit "R" hereof, as to insuring Daniel against loss or damages sustained by
him by reason of:
"3. lack of a right of access to and from the land."
The land at issue is "40 Acres" in Franklin County. Idaho. described as follows:
NE~NW~

of Sec. 34, Twp. 14 S., Rge. 38 E., Boise Mer.

51. First American Title Insurance had and has an "implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing" in honoring its contractual duties to Daniel.
52. Preston Land Title Company, which co-signed the Policy of Title Insurance, acted as

an authorized agent for First American Title, as to all matters at issue in this case, under Idaho
Code § 41-2708, under rules and regulations of the Department ofInsurance and under other
applicable law. On December 26,2003, Preston Land Title Company merged into what is now
First American Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. Defendant First American Title
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Insurance is chargeable in this case with information that was known or should have been known
by Preston Land Title Company, and its successor coxporation, and is bound as principal by all
actions of Preston Land Title Company, and its successor coxporation, as agent for Defendant
First American Title Insurance, as to all matters relevant to this action.
53. On May 28, 1987 when the Policy issued, Daniel had "a right of access to and from
the land" over an existing roadway extending from the 40 Acres over adjacent land of Ralph R.
McCulloch and Thelma W. McCulloch, husband and wife, ("McCullochs") to the Westside
Highway. McCullochs sold the 40 Acres to Daniel in the title insured transaction, "TOGETHER
WITH ... a right-of-way across Seller's adjacent property along an existing roadway." See
Contract of Sale, Exhibit "A," described in ~, 1, 2 and 3 hereof; and Warranty Deed conveying
the 40 Acres "with their appurtenances" to Daniel, Exhibit "C," ·described in

,8

hereof; and with

the right-of-way and land features illustrated in Exhibit "B-2" described in, 4.A hereof. The 40
Acres was then totally "landlocked" without any legal access except for the right-of-way
included in the sale.
54. First American Title Insurance had a duty under the Policy to defend Daniel's rightof-way. It constituted the only right of access to an otherwise landlocked 40 Aces. Rather, First
American Title Insurance has been complicit with others in seeking to destroy the right-of-way.
55. The pivotal wrongful action by First American Title Insurance is documented by a
letter to Daniel from Phil E. De Angeli, State Counsel-Idaho, for First American Title Insurance,
dated March 14,2008, copy attached as Exhibit "T." These facts exist and are revealed or
implied in the letter:
A. First American Title Insurance was on March 14,2008 representing Viehwegs

in seeking to invalidate Daniel's right-of-way or have him abandon it for the benefit of its

Third Amended Complaint - Page 25

49

10-02-09;04:29PM;

"# 421 49

then client, Viehwegs.
B. First American Title Insurance represented Viehwegs as their client for
compensation prior to November 1, 2005 when Viehwegs acquired their property from
Povey Defendants. See ~ 20 hereof and Exhibit "P" and Exhibit "Q."
C. First American Title Insurance investigated the state of the property before the
property was conveyed and insured good title to the property in Viehwegs.
D. The implication is First American Title Insurance did not except the right-ofway of Daniel, his wife, and Gary and Nola, in its Policy issued to Viehwegs, and thus
would be liable to Viehwegs if the right-of-way is found valid.
E. First American Title Insurance knew prior to November 1, 2005, or would
have known had it conducted the investigation it later conducted, that Daniel claimed an
ingress and egress easement along the North boundary of the Viehweg property; and that
Daniel's claimed easement was described in the Contract of Sale recorded on July 8,
1987 (Exhibit "A," '1'[ 1,2, and 3 hereof and Exhibit ·'B-2").

F. In investigating the "state of the property" First American Title Insurance, or
its agent, saw or should have seen the visible roadway extending from the Westside
Highway along the edge of the Viehweg property and extended to the bridge over the
Twin Lakes Canal and beyond.
56. The March 14, 2008 letter from First American Title Insurance, Exhibit "T", also
discloses legal premises underlying the issuance of the Policy to Viehwegs on November 1,
200S, that though represented as controlling to defeat the Plaintiffs' right-of-way were at best
questionable in this case and at worst, spurious.

A. First American Title opines that because the Warranty Deed to Daniel did not
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expressly describe the right-of-way, the Contract of Sale merged into the Deed and the
right-of-way was thereby extinguished. This is contrary on two grounds to a decision of
the Idaho Supreme Court in West v. Bowen, 127 Idaho 128,898, P.2d 59 (1995) on very
similar controlling facts. The Contract of Sale here was a conveyance and because it was
recorded prior to the recording of the Warranty Deed to Viehwegs, the title ofViehwegs
is subject to the right-of-way. Moreover. the Warranty Deed to Daniel expressly included
"appurtenances" and did not need to describe the right-of-way under Idaho Code § 55603 and controlling Idaho case law, to prevent it being extinguished by a claimed merger.
B. First American Title Insurance opines that the language purporting to grant the
right-of-way had only "an extremely vague reference to an access easement over the
property, no particular area of the easement is identified." To the contrary the grant of the
right-of-way was based upon the "existing roadway." Settled law approves the grant of an
easement over an "existing road," such as done here. An example is Conley v.
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265,985 P.2d 1127 (1999). At trial the location of the road, with

the width can be determined as the basis for a specific description of the right-of-way..
C. hnplied in the position of First American' Title Insurance is that it could and
can properly represent Viehwegs, and apparently Poveys, Deans and Neigums in seeking
to destroy the right-of-way of Daniel which it had insured. That very representation raises
another strong reason why the Court should not permit destruction of Plaintiffs' right-ofway. Because Defendant First American Title Insurance, directly or through its agent
Preston Land Title Company or its successor First American Title Company, Inc., knew
or should have known of the recorded right-of-way to Daniel or the existing roadway
suggesting a right-of-way, before Poveys, Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs took title to
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their properties, each should be bound by the actual or imputed knowledge of their
representative, and thus each took title subject to the right~of-way.
57. Daniel responded to the First American Title Insurance letter of March 14, 2008, with
his letter of March 24, 2008, copy attached hereto as Exhibit ''U.'' First American Title
Insurance should have taken this as an objection to its seeking to destroy Daniel's right-of-way,
contrary to its policy duties, and should have processed it as a claim for breach of the Policy,
Daniel also referred to other policies.
58. The failure of First Atnerican Title Insurance to defend Daniel's right of access to and
from the land and its conduct seeking to destroy.that right is in plain breach of the Policy
contract and are in serious breach of the "implied covenant af good faith and fair dealing" in
honoring the contract with Daniel.
59. Daniel has been damaged by the breaches of First American Title Insurance far in
excess of the Policy limits of$54,000. Daniel should be awarded a judgment for $54,000 against
First American Title Insurance. It is believed that First American Title Insurance is also in breach
of a policy of title insurance issued to Gary and Nola as to the Povey purchase on September 16,
1992, ~ 11 hereof, and as to the Cox purchase on August 20, 1997, ~ 13 hereof. First Atnerican
Title Insurance has by its conduct also breached tllose policies so Gary and Nola should be .
awarded damages sustained by them up to the full amount of the policy limits of each policy.
60.

Daniel S. Garner has been required to retain THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR

GAFFNEY Attorneys to protect and defend his right of access to his 40 Acres insured in the
Policy to Daniel and to recover damages from First American Title Insurance for breach of its
duties under the Policy, and is obligated to pay the reasonable attorney fees and costs for their
services. By virtue of the Policy of Title Insurance First American Title Insurance is obligated to
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pay Daniel for those fees and costs in addition to the $54,000.000 amount of insurance, and
judgment should be awarded Daniel against First American Title for such sums. On like grounds
judgment should be awarded Daniel, Nola, and Nola Trust, as successors to Gary and Nola, for
their attomey fees and costs pursuing damages for breach of the policies of title insurance in the
Povey and Cox transactions.

FIFTH COUNT: DEANS, NEIGUMS AND VIEHWEGS
Access During Pendency of Action
Protection Against Transfers
61. Plaintiffs replead by reference ~ 1 through ~ 60.
62. On December 15,2008, Plaintiffs Daniel and Sheni-Jo Garner, husband and wife,
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007, by Jeffrey D.
Brunson, one of their attorneys; and Defendants Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and
wife, Jeffery J. Neigurn and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife, and Douglas V. Viehweg
and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife, by Scott Smith, one of their attorneys, entered into a
written STIPULATION FOR USE OF REPLACEMENT ACCESS ROAD DURING
PENDENCY OF ACTION, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "V." This, with
approval of the Court, should have provided the appropriate interim relief to the parties durlng
the pendency of the action.
63. However, after the Stipulation was entered, and Neigum defendants had knowledge it
was entered, they threatened Daniel as he hauled hay on the Replacement Access Road to his
many head of cattle being fed on Plaintiffs' property described in 124 hereof. The nature of the
threats was such that Daniel feared for his own life and safety and feared for the life and safety
of his cattle. He removed the cattle to other property not involved in this suit. Daniel has been
damaged by such misconduct ofN ei gum s in an amount to be established at trial.
64. As further protection against transfers to any purported bona fide purchasers for
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value, Plaintiffs have filed and recorded a Notice of Pendency of Action, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "W". This applies as to the original Verified Complaint and shall also
apply to this Amended Complaint once it is filed with approval of the Court.
SIXTH COUNT: POVEYS
Claims of Breach of Warranty Assigned to Garners by Neigums and Viehwegs.

65. Plaintiffs replead by reference ~ 1 through 11 64.
66. On October 1, 2009, the Garners acquired by assignment all causes of action owned
by the Neigums and Viehwegs in connection with their acquisition ofrcal property from the
Poveys.
67. The Garners now own those claims and may assert them against the Poveys.
68. The Poveys sold real property to the Neigums and the Viehwegs. The sales of these
properties are represented by two warranty deeds, which are attached to this complaint as
Exhibits N and P.
69. In those warranty deeds, the Poveys warranted that they were "the owners in fee
simple of said premises; that they are free from all encumbrances and that they will warrant and
defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever." See Exhibits Nand P, attached hereto.
70. The premises conveyed were not free from encumbrances. They were subject to
easement interests of one or more of the Garners.
71. The existence of these encumbrances led to loss and damages sustained by the
Neigums and Viehwegs, including, but not limited to costs associated with defending a lawsuit
brought by the Garners and the difference in the value of the real property with and without an
easement encumbering it. The Garners gave consideration for these claims and may now assert
these damages to full extent that the Neigums and Viehwegs could have asserted them. The full
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extent of these damages will be proven at trial.
72. The Garners are entitled to their reasonable attoI11ey fees pursuant to Idaho Code §
12-120) § 12-121) or any other relevant statute, rule of civil procedure, or provision.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Daniel S. Garner and Shem-Jo Garner, husband and wife, Nola
Garner and Nola Garner, as Trustee of the Nola Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007, pray
for Judgment and relief against Defendants as follows:
1. Against Defendants Brad C. Povey and Lezia Povey, husband and wife, for damages
for wrongful conveyance, wrongful interference with easement, breach of warranty, and for
otherwise acting to seek to extinguish and destroy the "original access road" which is the road
right-of-way now owned by Plaintiffs to access their properties in Sec. 34 and in Sec. 27 West of
the Twin Lakes Canal over a pre-existing private road in Sec. 27, East of the Twin Lakes Canal,
extending to the Westside Highway. The damages would be up to $100,000.00 for what is
required to preserve the right-of-way against the conveyances and other actions of Defendants. If
their wrongful conveyance and other actions destroy Plaintiffs' right-of-way and any adequate
replacement right-of-way, then damages are sought against them for up to $500,000.00 for loss
of all adequate access to their property. Plaintiff should also recover against those Defendants
their attorney fees and costs.
2. Against Defendants Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife; Jeffery J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife, individually and as Trustees of the Jeffery

J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigurn Living Trust, dated September 17,2004; and Douglas V.
Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife, for a decree quieting title in Plaintiffs to the
"original access road", which is a road right-of-way 30 feet in width running from the Westside
Highway over property of Defendants to a bridge over the Twin Lakes Canal. This shall enable
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travel from there to the property of Plaintiffs described in ~ 24 hereof. The 30-feet wide
easement is needed to accommodate vehicles and machinery that frequently must travel the
roadway and to enable snowbanks within the easement from snow removal from the traveled
portion during the common snow seasons. The "Defining Line" should be the Northerly
boundary with the traveled and visible roadway being about equidistant between the Defining
Line and the Southern boundary of the 30-feet wide easement. Also against such Defendants for
attorney fees and costs.
3. In the alternative on the Third Count against Defendants, Hal J. Dean and Marlene T.
Dean, husband and wife; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife,
individually and as Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Living Trust,
dated September 17,2004; and Douglas V. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife,
for a decree quieting title in Plaintiffs for the benefit of their property described in ~ 24 to a
Replacement Access Road for Segment "A" of the Original Access Road. It must be a true and
full replacement for Segment "A" of the Original Access Road consistent with the prayer for
relief as to the Original Access Road. The presently traveled portion of Segment "A" of the
Replacement Access Road must be broadened to accommodate a fully usable and travelable
portion comparable to Segment HA" of the Original Access Road prior to it being blocked. Also
against such Defendants for attorney fees and costs.
4. Against First American Title Insurance Company on the Fourth Count for
$54,000.000 damages for breach of the Policy of Title Insurance policy issued to Daniel and for
damages for breach of the policies of title insurance in the Povey and Cox purchases for up to the
policy limits on each policy, and for attorney fees and costs.
5. Interim relief should be confirmed for continuous road access by Plaintiffs to and from
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the properties described in ~ 24, by the alternate road access, pursuant to "Stipulation for Use of
Replacement Access Road During Pendency of action", dated December 15, 2008, during the
pendency of this action and until further Order of the Court. Neigum Defendants should be
sanctioned for threats against Daniel in violation of the Stipulation and should be assessed
damages in an amount to be detennined by the Court.
6. For damages, to be proven at trial, caused by the Poveys' breach of warranty with
respect to properties conveyed by the Poveys to the Neigums and Viehwegs.
7. For such other and further relief as is deemed proper by the Court.
PLAINTIFFS HEREBY DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL
ISSUES PROPERLY TRIABLE BY A JURY

Dated the __ day of October, 2009.

Jeffry D. Brunson
Michael W. Brown
of THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.c.
837 South 500 West, Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and
Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Gamer
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Case No. CV-08-342

v.
Judge Dunn
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C.
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September
17,2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First
American Title Insurance Company, a
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey ("Poveys"), by and through undersigned counsel,
hereby submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

ARGUMENT
I.

POVEYS HAVE NEVER DENIED THE GARNER'S RIGHT TO USE
WHATEVER ROAD THEY DESIRED TO ACCESS THEIR PROPERTY.

Without any citation to the record, the Garners make the outrageous assertion that
"Poveys interfered with the Garners' right-of-way over the original access road by seeking to
terminate it, apparently to facilitate the sale of one or more of their properties lying east of the
Twin Lakes CanaL"

See, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment of Defendants Brad Povey and Leiza Povey ("Memo in Opp to MSJ"), p. 11.
There is simply no evidence of any interference, let alone interference "apparently to
facilitate the sale of one or more of their properties .... " Memo in Opp to MSJ, p. 11. The
Garners posit both an interference by filing deeds with the County Recorder and physical
interference with the right of way. The problem is there is no evidence of either.
A. The Poveys have never filed any document denigrating the Garners' right
of access.
Plaintiffs first argue that the Poveys tried to terminate the Garners access through deeds
that they filed. This is indeed ironic. The Poveys are the only parties who recorded any deeds
that mention the Garner right of access. The McCullochs, who conveyed the land to the Poveys
did not mention in the deed that the property was encumbered by any easement. Likewise, the
Garners accepted a deed from the McCullochs that does not mention any easement. I Thus, when

I Vaguely, the Plaintiffs make reference to an easement Daniel S. Gamer attempted to purchase when he purchased
a forty-acre parcel of real estate from Mr. and Mrs. McCulloch. While there may have been negotiations for the
purchase of an easement, the final deed transferring the property to Daniel S. Gamer does not contain any mention
of an easement. See, Copy of May 22, 1987 Warranty Deed, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Therefore, this claim of
easement by purchase is barred by the doctrine of merger. Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 85,967 P.2d 284, 187
(l998)("When a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of the contract to convey, the contract is merged in
the deed. Though the terms of the deed may vary from those contained in the contract, the deed alone must be
looked to to determine the rights of the parties .... Where the right claimed under the contract would vary, change, or
alter the agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the very subject-matter with which the deed deals, a prior
contract covering the same subject-matter cannot be shown as against the provisions of the deed.)(Emphasis in
original)(intemal citations omitted). See also, Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 152 P. 3d

the Poveys arrived on the scene there was no recorded easement. The Poveys conveyed one
parcel of property to the Deans in which they mention the "existing right of way." This is the
first evidence of the Garner right of way in any recorded deed. This reference was on the record
when all the other deeds were filed by the Poveys so that none of the other purchasers could
claim ignorance about the easement.

And while the Poveys, who are not lawyers, did not

describe the easement by metes and bounds, at least after they were done the easement was
mentioned in the real estate records which, before, had been devoid of mention of this right of
way.2 How the Garners can claim that the filing of the deeds by the Poveys somehow interfered
or tried to terminate the Garner right of way is mind boggling.
In trying to make sense of what is a nonsensical argument, the Garners engage in rank
speculation. By not mentioning in the deeds a right of way that had not been mentioned in the
deeds in their own chain of title, the Poveys are accused of some sort of fraud: "they likely
induced the Viehwegs to purchase the property and subsequently seek to deny Daniel's easement
over the original access road ., .. ,,3 Again, this rank speculation is not supported by any
reference to the record.

There is thus no evidence to prevent summary judgment based on any

filing by the Poveys.
B. The Poveys never physically interfered with the Garner's right of access.

575 (2007).
2 In another interesting twist of logic, the Garners posit that when the Poveys recorded a deed that did not mention
the Gamer right of way, even though it had been mentioned in earlier deeds, "The recording of this deed had the
effect of denying the Garners' interest in both the original access road and the replacement access road." Memo in
Opp to MSJ, p. IS. If that were the law, then of course, when the Garners recorded their own deeds that fail to
mention their right of access, they, in effect, were admitting that they had no right of way. Why then did they bring
this action?
3 Not only is this speculation that has no place in a summary judgment motion, but the law would preclude even the
Viehwegs from making such an assertion. Reliance must be reasonable. Because the access roadway is and always
has been visible on the ground, the Veihwegs would be on inquiry notice about the roadway. Farrell v. Brown, III
Idaho 1027, 1033, 729 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Idaho App. 1986)("[W]hatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a
man of ordinary prudence and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a reasonable
investigation would disclose")(internal citation omitted). With that notice, the Viehwegs could not have argued that
because the deed did not mention the access road, they reasonably concluded it did not exist.

Next, the Garners allege that the Poveys interfered with and tried to tenninate the access
road by physically plowing the road. But there is no evidence that the Poveys did the plowing
and not a shred of evidence that, if they knew it was happening, they had done it to try to
obliterate the road. In that regard Nola Garner had to admit:
Q.

Is there anything that you saw or witnessed or heard that would cause you to

believe that if Brad Povey planted grain on this roadway, it was anything other than a typical
fanner accidentally, or maybe not caring, and planting grain on the roadway?
A.

Ask me that question again.

Q.

I'm just asking, isn't it possible that this was just typical fanning going on and not

an intentional effort on Brad Povey's part to try and obscure the roadway?
A.

There's a possibility.

Q.

And do you have any evidence that would suggest other than that?

A.

Not -- no.

See, June 2, 2009 Deposition of Nola Garner, pp. 105 - 106, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Similarly in this regard Daniel Gamer testified:
Q. Okay. I kind of take it that you wouldn't have fanned it that way?
A. No.

Q. Other than that, is there anything that leads you to believe that that planting -- that
disturbance and planting was done to obliterate the roadway?
A. Just that it was done in close proximity to the selling to Viehweg.

Q. Okay. Anything else?
A. No.

Q. You haven't heard anybody -- nobody has ever told you that that's why it was done?
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A. No.
Q. You never asked anybody why the planting was done there?
A. No.

See, June 3, 2009 Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, p. 89, attached hereto as Exhibit C.
Plaintiffs claim that an inference can be drawn from the plowing alone that it was done
with the intent to obliterate the Gamer's rights in the road. Plaintiffs overlook the law. On
summary judgment a party is entitled to only the "reasonable" inferences to be drawn from the
facts.
"While this Court will draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party, the non-moving party cannot re~t upon mere speculation. The nonmoving
party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material
fact exists to withstand summary judgment. A mere scintilla of evidence or only
slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact."
Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205, 211 (2008)(intemal citations
omitted).
There simply is no evidence to support a reasonable inference that the Poveys, if they
knew about the plowing, intended anything by it except to plant crops. The Garners did not
consider either incident of "interference" to be serious enough to even mention it to the Poveys.
See, June 3, 2009 Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp. 61-63, 84-91, attached hereto as Exhibit C.
Plaintiffs try in their memorandum to make the point that one incident of plowing
preceded the sale to the Viehwegs, and suggest that that additional fact makes a reasonable
inference that the plowing was intended to obliterate the roadway. There are two problems with
this argument. First plaintiffs are not sure that the plowing occurred in proximity with the sale to
the Viehwegs. Daniel Garner testified:
Q. "You say it was in close proximity to the sale ofthe property to the Viehwegs?

A.

I'm not sure, but I believe so.

See, June 3, 2009 Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, p. 89, attached hereto as Exhibit C.
Even if there were more than supposition about the timing, the problem with that theory
is that this was not the first time the roadway was plowed-indeed, this time the ground was only
disturbed, whereas the other time, unrelated in time to any sale of the property-it was actually
plowed with a three bottom plow. See, June 3, 2009 Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp. 61-63,
attached hereto as Exhibit C.
There can be little doubt from the record that what occurred was typical farming over a
dirt farm road, and not some attempt to deny the Garners the use of the road. If it were not so,
surely the Garners would have at least questioned the practice.

Likewise, because it had

occurred at least once when there was no sale of ground pending, it is obviously something of a
regular farming practice. No reasonable inference can be taken from the mere fact that the
roadway was disturbed and planted in conjunction with the fields on either side that it was done
for any purpose other than to plant crops.
Thus, there is no evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the
Poveys did the plowing in the first place, let alone evidence that if they had done it, they
intended something nefarious by so doing. When no evidence exists to support a plaintiff s
claims, the claims should not have been brought, and summary judgment is appropriate.

II.

THE GARNERS' TRESPASS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS.

The Garners are apparently also pursuing a claim of trespass against the Poveys for the
plowing of the roadway, even though the trespass never seemed serious enough for the Garners
to even complain about the practice. It is doubtful that an interference or trespass claim could be
maintained at all under those circumstances, and if it could, the damages would necessarily be de

minimis. Because the law cmmot be encumbered with trifles, summary judgment would be
appropriate on this claim as well. Crosby v. Rowand Machinery Co., 111 Idaho 939, 944, 729
P.2d 414, 419 (Idaho App. 1986)("Ordinarily, we would not concern ourselves with such a
modest amount. In view of the limited time and

resourc~s

of our judicial system, we adhere to

the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles)"). But, in
any event, the claims would be barred by the statute of limitations. Causes of action for trespass
to real property interests are governed by the three year statute of limitations in Idaho Code,
section 5-218. The original complaint in this matter was filed on September 17,2008. Since the
last incidence of plowing occurred in the "spring of 2005," the claims are barred by the statute of
limitations.

III.

UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE GARNERS CANNOT CLAIM
ANY PARTICULAR ROADWAY BASED ON THE APPURTENANCE
LANGUAGE OF THE DEED.

Because there is no recorded easement, Plaintiffs lawyers have creatively tried to create
for their clients a right of access by reference to "appurtenances" in the conveying deed to Nola
and Gary Garner. We know that this is creative lawyering rather than any legitimate expectation
of the parties because neither Nola Garner nor Daniel Garner could even pronounce the word and
had no idea what an appurtenance was. See, June 3, 2009 Deposition of Daniel S. Garner, pp.
244 - 246, attached hereto as Exhibit C; see also, June 2, 2009 Deposition of Nola Gamer, pp.
223 - 226, attached hereto as Exhibit B. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' assertion, in their response to
the Poveys' Motion for Summary Judgment, that the original access is clearly fixed, Memo in
Opp to MSJ, p. 9, does not comport with the record.
The Garners never wanted their access to follow "the existing roadway." The Garners
sought from the beginning to change the course of the access roadway so that trucks and farm
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equipment would not be driven past the house with small children.
Q.

Okay. And you said that you had tried to get the McCullochs to move the

right-of way, do you recall that?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you have an idea of where you wanted them to move the right-of-way

to?
A.

It didn't matter where they moved it. We just couldn't imagine them wanting

us to go past their house.
Q.

Okay. So it wouldn't have mattered where?

A.

No.

See, June 2, 2009, Deposition of Nola Garner, p. 215, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Gary Garner even went so far as relinquishing any right to cross the canal pursuant to the
original access road in exchange for a crossing at the Rice right-of-way. See, Affidavits of Ron
Kendall, Ivan Jensen, and Judy Phillips. In that regard, Nola testified:
Q:

Just tell me what you remember in substance of what was said?

A:

That Gary wanted to move it to get out of the childrens' way.

Q:

To move what?

A:

The right-of-way. Get the gravel trucks going down the south - using the Rice

easement to eliminate them from going past Marlene's [Dean's].
See, June 2, 2009, Deposition of Nola Garner, p. 27, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Under these circumstances, the most that the Garners could hope for out of the vague
reference to "appurtenances" would be "reasonable access". Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho
522, 817 P.2d 188 (1991).

And, since "it didn't matter where they moved it," the Bethel rule

that Brad Povey could move it to a suitable .location so long as it was reasonable appears to
apply. As to the suitability of the route chosen by Brad, the Garners even allege in their Second
Amended Complaint that the replacement access road which Brad Povey described by metes and
bounds in the Neigum deed is a reasonable access. See, Second Amended Complaint,

IV.

~~
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THE POVEYS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES.

In their verified complaint, the Garners allege that this case arises out of a commercial
transaction, and therefore they are entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12120. Indeed, as the last section of the Garners' opposition to summary judgment makes clear,
the Garners are still pursuing claims of breach of a warranty in the deed by which the Garners
purchased the property from the Poveys. Furthermore, the Garners assert that all the arguments
made apply to their claims under the warranty deed. See, Memo in Opp to MSJ, p. 18. Clearly
then the Poveys are entitled to recover all the fees they have expended defending the Garners'
claims under Idaho Code § 12-120.
Further, as is apparent from a perusal of the evidence supplied in support of this motion,
except for some creative lawyering, there is nothing to support these claims against the Poveys.
There is no evidence and that is painfully clear in the record. These claims should never have
been brought and should have been dismissed long ago. Idaho Code § 12-121. Plaintiffs appear
to be arguing that because they survived a motion to dismiss, they cannot be held responsible
under § 12-121. First of all, § 12-121 applies both to when a case was brought frivolously or

Daniel Garner tries to distance himself from this conclusion by falsely asserting that the original access was thirty
feet wide. Not only is there no foundation for such an assertion, see Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike
the Affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel S. Garner, but it is false and known by Daniel Gamer to be false. Daniel
testified in his deposition that he installed a gate on the Gamer side of the canal. See, June 3, 2009, Deposition of
Daniel S. Gamer, p. 25, attached hereto as Exhibit c. The posts for that gate measure 19 feet 7 inches. See,
September 29,2009, Affidavit of Brad Povey in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
4

,~
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was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Rule 54(e), Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. (emphasis added). Secondly, it would not be the Court's fault that it did not nip this
suit in the bud on a motion to dismiss when the Plaintiffs were arguing that they had facts which
could have supported the claim. When it turns out that the Plaintiffs actually had no such facts,
the Court is not precluded from then imposing the sanction of § 12-121 for the plaintiff having
led the Court down the primrose path. It would be unfair for the Poveys, who did nothing to
interfere with or terminate the Garner right of way, who tried earnestly to extricate themselves
from the fray, yet who then were still required by the Plaintiffs to defend this suit, to be left
holding the bag for an ill fated lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Motion for Summary Judgment, the supporting
memorandum as well as this reply memorandum, the Povey Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted, and the Court should order the Garners to reimburse them for the
reasonable attorney fees this case has cost.
Dated this 1st day of October, 2009.
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, P.C

Blake S. Atkin
Attorney for the Pavey Defendants

~~10

..

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that he caused to be served a true and correct copy of REPL Y

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon the
following by the method of delivery designated:

Gordon S. Thatcher
. _X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery
Thatcher, Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney
116 S. Center
P.O. Box 216
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Facsimile: (208) 359-5888

X

Fax

_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery
Eric Olsen
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Facsimile: (208) 232-6109

X

Fax

Ryan McFarland
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829

_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

_Z

Overnight FedEx_Hand delivery

Fax

Judge Stephen S. Dunn
624 E. Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201

_ X_ Overnight FedEx_Hand delivery

Fax

Dated this 1st day of October, 2009.

Blake S. Atkin
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1
A. Well, and I kind of remember the other
2 one, but I had -- ifl hadn't of had him tell me I
3 don't know if! would have remembered.
4
Q. Okay. And do you recall anything else
5 that was said in either of those conversations by
6 your son Lynn?
7
A. Yes, but it wasn't about that.
8
Q. Okay.
9
A It wasn't about any of the properties.
10
Q. SO it wasn't about anything involved
11 in this litigation?
12
A. No.
13
Q. What did you say to him during either
14 ofthose conversations?
15
A. I asked him why his dad told him that
16
Q. Anything else?
17
A. I can't think of anything pertaining
18 to that otherwise.
19
Q. How did he respond to that? Did he
20 tell you why his dad had told him that?
21
A. I don't know exactly how it was said,
22 but it was in regards to the safety of Marlene's
23 children.
Q. And who is Marlene?
24

Page :
something about your husband - let me start over.

I',

2 Tell me what Brad Povey told you about what he hl

I 3 discussed with your husband with regard to the

I 4 Rice right-of-way.
756

II!

I
8
I

9

,'10
11.

! 12

!13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

A. It was at the city community building
in Clifton and you were there.
Q. Tell me what you recalL I was there,
but we need it on the record.
A Just that he had talked to -- I'm not
recalling it very well.
Q. Just tell me what you remember in
substance of what was said?
A. That Gary wanted to move it to get out
of the childrens' way.
Q. To move what?
A. The right-of-way. Get the gravel
trucks going down the south -- using the Rice
easement to eliminate them from going past
Marlene's.
Q. Fair enough. Do you recall anything
else of that conversation with Brad Povey?
A. Not the direct conversation. I
couldn't quote -- well, as you can see, I can't
quote anything.

5

Page 2f.

Page 26
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. SO the substance of it was a concern
about the safety of the Dean children?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And hearing that from your son
Lynn, was that the first time you had heard that
as a concern that your husband had had?
A. Yes.
:MR. MCFARLAND: You may have already
addressed this, but when we say Lynn are we
talking about Daniel Garner?
MR. ATKIN: No. Lynn Gamer is another
son.
MR. MCFARLAND: Okay. Thank you.
MR. ATKIN: I knew who she was talking
about, but I'm glad we have it clear on the
record.
Q. (BY l\.1R. ATKIN) Have you toldme all
that you can remember about your conversations
with your son Lynn about why your husband wanted
to establish the Rice right-of-way?
A. I think so.
Q. Okay. Now tell me about your
conversations with Brad Pavey. You said that Brad
had also mentioned something similar to you, or
had mentioned to you your husband's concerns or

(208) 345-961l

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
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13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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I

25

you've told -- have you told me all of the
substance that you can remember of a conversation?
A. . Do I have to tell him everything I
remember?
:MR.. ATK1N: l'Ulet your counsel tell you,
but you do.
TIffi WITNESS: I got mad at him because he
said things that I didn't think was correct.
Q. (BY:MR. ATKlN) Tell me the things that
he said that you do not think were correct.
A. I do a goodjob of forgetting things
like that That's how I eIljoy my neighbors.
Q. Ifyou can recall, tell me what you
got upset about.
A. I can't really recall now.
Q. Okay. Other than that semi public
conversation with Brad Povey, have you ever had
any other conversations with him on that subject?
A. I have had other conversations with
Brad, but I don't believe that the Rice
right-of-way was ever in it.
Q. Okay. Have you ever had any
conversations with Brad Povey about any of the
right-of-ways or the roadways?
A. I have.
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1 . The gravel is real strong down towards the
, 1
2 Westside Highway, but then you can see the gravel
2
3 tlUnning out as you get further up the road. Do
3
4 you see that?
i 4
5
A. I think: it's because it's been farmed
I5
6 that it's thinning out there.
6
7
Q. Well, and I'm just asking -- didn't
a you tell me earlier that the gravel was best down
I 8·
9 by the Westside Highway and then after the grain
! 9
10 bin -10
11
A. And by the barn where the milk is
11
12 picked up. It would be the same all the way down. I' 1132
13
Q. But beyond that point, up past the
14 grain bin 14
15
A. But up in this part it would be less.
15
16
Q. Right. More like a typical two-lane
16
17 farm road, correct?
17
18
A. Yeah.
18
19
Q. Okay. And you have seen, haven't you,
19
20 where farmers drill ground and they don't shut the
20
21 grain drill off as they go across the road and
21
22 actually plant crops in the road?
22
23
A. I have seen that done.
23
24
Q. Is there anything that you saw or
24
25 wjtnessed or beard tbat would cause you to believe
25
Page 106

i

I
I

I]

1 that if Brad Povey planted grain on this roadway,
2 it was anything other than a typical fanner

3 accidentally, or maybe not caring, and planting
4 grain on the roadway?
5
A Ask me that question again.
6
Q. I'm just asking, isn't it possible
7 that this was just typical farming going on and
a not an intentional effort on Brad Povey's part to
9 try to obscure the roadway?
10
A. There's a possibility.
11
Q. And do you have any evidence that
12 would suggest other than that?
13
A. Not -- no.
14
Q. Now, it's true, too, isn't it, that
15 after you -- after a farmer has drilled a country
16 road that way, if you continue to use the road it
17 isn't long before the roadway is completely
18 reestablished?
19
A. No, that is not true.
20
Q. Haven't you seen where driving across
21 the roadway after it's been planted causes the new
22 plants to be killed and the roadway is
23 reestablished?
24
A. But you lose the gravel. You lose
25 your road base.
(208) 345-9611

Q. All right. But the roadway itself,
being able to see the roadway, is reestablished by
driving across it again?
A. You would see the trail, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. -But it doesn't look as much like a
road.
Q. Let me ask you, after you saw one of
Walt Povey's boys doing this, disturbing the
ground and then planting grain on the roadway, did
you ever drive across that portion of the roadway
again?
A. Yes.
Q. How often?
A. Me?
Q. Yeah.
A. I went through the grain patch once
and felt vel)' guilty. I probably went twice. I
don't go up there vety often.
Q. All right And why did you feel

guilty?
A. Well, it was a beautiful stand of
grain.
Q. "When youdrove through that grain
patch, tbe once or twice that you did, did anyone
Page 108

1 . protest about you driving through the grain patch?
2
A. No.
3
MR MCFARLAND: This is grain on the road?
4
Q. (BYMR. ATKIN) I assume so. You were
5 driving on what had been the driveway through
6 grain?
7
A. I don't like to get stuck. And I just
8 got a new knee so I haven't liked to walk for
9 quite a while.
10
Q. But you were driving through the part
11 where the road had gone?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. Okay. And nobody complained about you
14 doing that?
15
A. No, no one.
16
Q. SO there was a portion of the road
17 where this disturbance occurred and some grain had
18 been planted. And then was there another portion
19 of the road past that that continued on up to the
20 canal and across the canal?
21
A. Yes.
Q. SO the portion that you were driving
22
23 was between where the tillage or the disturbance
24 started and the disturbance ended, is that fair to
125 say?
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2
3

4
5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. \Vbat is it?
A They said they would testify for us.
Q. wno did?
A Hank and Melanie.
Q. Okay. They told you that they would
testifY -- okay. I understand that might have
added to your reasons for not naming them as
parties. My question is, your breach of warranty
claim against Brad and Leiza Povey A. That's to the right-of-way.
Q. The beach of the warranty. When they
sold the property to you by warranty deed you're
claiming that they breached that warranty, right?
A. (Witness nodded her head.)
Q. I'mjust trying to understand that.
What is your claim that they breached the
warranty? You said before that Brad and Leiza
sold the property to the Deans, the Viehwegs and
the Neigums. It's a simple question.
A. WeIlQ. Does your breach of the warranty claim
arise out ofthe sale by Brad and Leiza to the
Deans, the Neigums and the Viehwegs?
A. I think it does. For me I no longer
have a right=Df-way through there

11

A. I believe that's correct.

2
Q. Okay. You said that when you
3 bought -- when Danny bought his parcel from the
"I 4 McCullochs, that you and your husband, and I'm not

sure T understood, but was it Gary that gave him
advice about paying some money for a right-of-way
across the McCullochs' property?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Aud he told him to pay for a
right-of-way across the property so that you won't
have future complaints about the use of the
right-of-way?
A. That's basically what I understood.
Q. Okay. Aud you said that you had tried
to get the McCuliochs to move the right-of-way, do
you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. Aud did you have an idea of where you
wanted them to move the right-of-way to?
A. It didn't matter ¥!here they moved it.
We just couldn't imagine them wanting us to go
past their house.
"
Q. Okay_ So it wouldn't have mattered
where?
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Q. Okay. Let me ask you this. You don't
think. that Hank and Melanie did anything that

breached their warranty to you? That you had
whatever rights you had to the property they sold
you; is that correct?
A I believe because they didn't -- they
no longer owned it
Q. Okay. So as of the time -- you're not
claiming that any of the Poveys, Brad and Leiza or
Hank and Melanie, did anything to breach their
warranty to you until after they sold the property
?
to you; .IS tath
correct.
A I don't think that they have done
anything deliberately to hurt, they just neglected
to take care. Does that answer the question?
Q. I think so. I'm just tying to
understand how they neglected. They neglected to
take care of your interests in the deeds that they
gave to the Deans and the Viehwegs and the
Neigums, is that what you're saying?
A. That's right.
Q. Aud since Hank and Melanie weren't
23 parties to those deeds that went to the Deans, the
24 Neigums and the Viehwegs, you don't have any
25 breach of warranty claim against them?
:208) 345-9611
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Q. It could have followed basically the
route of what's now the Neigum driveway and that
would be okay?
.
A That would be okay.
Q. Okay. So basically what you're
talking about isn't necessarily the route ofthe
northern roadway, but some roadway through the
McCulloch property?
A Just some place, yes.
MR. ATKIN: Okay. That's all I've got
THE WITNESS: That wasn't bad at alL
MR. B R OWN: I ha.l";
.
ve a Lew questIOns.
EXAMINATION
BY MR. BROWN:
Q. Nola, I want to go back and clarifY a
couple of parts on the record with respect to some
of the questions the attorneys have asked you
today_
Going back to some questions asked by
Mr. Atkin, he asked yo~ questions about :vhy the
Deans were upset. I belIeve that you testIfied
that they were upset about the existence of a
right-of-way going in front oftheir home and they
didn't know about it until after they'd purchased
the property; is that right?
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1 was going up to the Pavey property, I used the
2 north one.
3
Q. Okay. Nola, you understand that there
4 has been a stipulation entered that permits the
5 plaintiffs in tbis lawsuit to access the property
6 via the middle roadway during the pendency of the
7 lawsuit?
8
A. I do understand that.
9
Q. And there was some discussion about
10 how Danny felt that he didn't truly have the
11 ability to access in that fashion, but I don't
12 want to talk about that. "What I do want to ask,
13 was there -- I'll start the question over.
14
!vIr. Atkin asked you some questions
15 about whether the northern or middle roadways
16 would be useless if they did not allow you to
17 cross the canal. Do you remember the questions
18 that he asked about that?
19
A. Yes.
20
Q. Has there ever been a time since you
21 acquired an interest in any of these properties
22 west of the Twin Lakes Canal when you have not
23 been able to cross the canal via the northern
24 roadway?
25
A When the canal company employees

Page 223

1
Q. Okay. Nola, Mr. Atkin asked you about
2 the deed whereby Daniel acquired his interest from
,3 the McCullochs. He asked you whether the deed
4 contained any reference to the right-of-way. Do
~5 you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you familiar with that deed?
8 Would it be helpful to look at it if I were to ask
9 you a question about it?
110
A. Yes, it would be very helpful.
111:MR BROWN: Would you mind, Blake, ifI
j 12 used your exhibits there?
113:MR ATKIN: Sure.
/14
TIIE WITNESS: I imagine I read that when it
i 15 was new.
! 16
Q. (BY MR. BROWN) Nola, you see there the
17 deed and it's obviously a legal description to the
118 property that Daniel acquired. I'd like you to
119 read this last sentence down here beginning with
! 20 the capitalized words to have and hold. Just read
I 21 the first line there as well as you can. I know
the print isn't terribly clear.
I 23
A. To have and to hold the said premises
II 24 with, and I don't know what that is.
25
MR BROWN' Would cOllnsel object to my
Page 2221
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1 started to take the bridge out there was probably
1 coaching her to the correct word that I'm trying
2 a little time then. Whether it was hours or until
2 to have her read?
3 the next day, I don't know.
3
MR. ATKIN: What word is it that she can't
4
Q. Okay.
4 read?
5
A. But there would be some time there.
5
MR. BROWN: Their appurtenances.
6
MR. SMITH: Do you understand what that
6
Q. But it was 7
A I don't know how many boards they had
7 means?
.
8
THE WITNESS: No, I don't.
8 taken off.
9
Q. But it was an extremely brief period
9
MR. SMITH: You're going to have her read
10 oftime?
110 it even though she doesn't understand it?
11
A Yes.
111
MR. BROWN: I'll have her read it and if
12
Q. At some point you were asked by Mr.
I 12 the questioning doesn't result in anything
13 Atkin whether you used the middle roadway at any )13 helpful I'll move on.
14 point. You said that you had out of respect for
114
MR. ATKIN: I don't know what good it is to
15 the desire of the Deans to have safety for their
15 read a document she doesn't understand, but go
16 children, you had used the middle roadway on
ahead.
17 occasion; is that accurate?
,17
THE WITNESS: Appurtenances to the said
18
A. That's right
1189 grantee.
19
Q. Did you at any point, either verbally
Q. (BY MR. BROWN) You can stop right
20 or by signing a legal instrument, agree to
120 there. I can see that this line of questioning
21 relinquish an interest in the northern roadway?
121 probably won't be helpful to us. I'll move on.
22
A No.
J 22
A. That is very difficult to decipher.
23
Q. SO you did it personally as a favor
23
Q. I understand.
24 for the Deans?
'24
MR SIv:l.ITH: For the attorneys too.
25
A. And the Neigums.
125
Q. (BY MR. BROWN) Okay. I want to review
(208) 345-961 I
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1 .this one issue with respect to the knowledge that
2 the Poveys had about the property they sold to

Page 22

I1
I2
I3

.MR. SMITH: Objection. Vague. I don't

understand the question.
Q. (BY MR. BROWN) Okay. Mr. Smith aske(
3 you. There's been -- you earlier testified that
4 the Poveys knew that there was a right-of-way
4 you did the Deans, the Neigums or the Viehwegs
I 5 till over the road or disturb the road. You said?
5 passing through the properties that they
I
A. No. I didn't answer that correctly,
6 ultimately conveyed to the Deans, Neigums and
6
because
they did not till the road, but Viehwegs
7 Viehwegs that allowed access to the property west
did put up a fence.
8 ofthe Twin Lakes Canal?
i 9
9
Q. That's what I wanted to make sure I
A. That's right.
10 understood. When you said no, your description of
10
Q. Okay. And how is it that Brad and
1
11 Leiza Povey knew there was a right-of-way through 111 their not being involved in the disturbance
applied only to tilling of the ground and planting
12 that property?
13 grain?
13
A. Maybe I shouldn't say they knew. It
14
A. Yes.
14 had been used for quite a number of years. They
15
Q. It did not apply to the erection of
15 bought the property off of their uncle that sold
16 the fence. And for- clarity of the record, who was
16 it to us. I think it's her uncle. The McCullochs
17 anyway.
17 responsible for the fence there at the convergence
18 ofthose two roads?
18
Q. Let me ask you this, Nola. There was
A. It's on the Viehweg property. I
19 a period of time when you owned property fonnerly 19
20 owned by the Poveys west of the Twin Lakes Canal 20 didn't see the Viehwegs putting it up, but I
21 assume they did it.
21 contemporaneous, or at the same time, when the
22
Q. That's fine. One last question here.
22 Poveys still owned property that they subsequently
·23 sold to the Deans, Neigums and Viehwegs, right?
23 Mr. McFarland, the attorney for the title company,
24
A. Yes.
24 asked you some questions about legal access and

I

!

I~
112
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1 that Danny has in property. It was established
1 access your property west of the Twin Lakes Canal
2 that Danny has at least some fractional interest
2 through the northern roadway?
3
A. Yes.
3 in property that the Rice road accesses.
4
Q. And did the Poveys know that you used
4
Could you talk to me a little bit
5 that northern roadway?
5 about the nature of the access that the Rice road
6
A. They should have.
6 provides? Let me clarifY that. The question
7
7 wasn't terribly good. What type of access does
Q. How should they have known?
8
A. Well, driving past their house.
8 the Rice road provide to you to your properties
9
Q. It was clearly openly visible to them?
9 west of the Twin Lakes Canal?
10
A. (Witness nodded her head.)
10
A. Very poor.
11
Q. Okay. I want to bring you back to a
11
Q. And what do you mean by very poor?
12 moment when Mr. Smith, the attorney for the Deans,
A. It's steep going up and it's steep
13 Neigums and Viehwegs, asked you a question about 13 falling off on both sides.
14 which parties were responsible for disturbing the
14
Q. I seem to recall testimony about the
15 ground on the northern roadway. He asked you
15 seasonal nature of the use ofthe Rice roadway_
16 whether the Deans, Neigums or Viehwegs had
16 Is there - are there some limitations with
17 anything to do with tilling over the road or
17 respect to the Rice roadway dictated by weather,
18 planting grain. You answered that they did not
18 the seasons?
19 have anything to do with that; is that right? .
19
A. Yes.
20
A. Yes.
20
Q. Describe those limitations.
21
Q. Did that answer apply to the party or .
21·
A. If there was any snow or ice you
22 parties responsible for erecting the fence at the
22 couldn't get up.
23 convergence, as we've described it today, of the
123
Q. SO would it be fair to say that in
24 northern roadway and the middle roadway?
24 wintery conditions, when there's an accumulation
/ 25 of snow, that the Rice road wouldn't provide
25
A. No.

12
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I

1 picking up milk every other day, I assume.

2

Q.

Okay. So do\Vl1 closer to Westside

3 Highway is --

4
A. Up to the hay bam is was used. And
5 cattle above that that he fed. Like I said, it
6 was a dairy operation with corrals.
7
Q. SO up to the hay bam it wasn't a
B two-track road?
9
A. Correct.
10
Q. How about beyond that?
11
A. Beyond that it was a two-track road,
12 like what you would see in the picture, or the
13 exhibit.
14
Q. Okay. And I understand that currently
15 there is a gate at the end of the road -where-16 just before it crosses Twin Lakes Canal?
17
A. Correct.
18
Q. You installed that gate?
19
A. Yes, I did.
20
Q. When did you install that gate?
21
A. Oh, how close do I need to be?
22
Q. The best of your recollection is all
23 we can ask.
24
A. Roughly two years after Neigmns

1 see that that gate there is not adequate and I've
2 talked with my mother about it. It's been hit n'1O
I 3 or three times.
4
Q. Okay.
5
A. It's not on the binges anymore.
6
Q. It was not me. I've not driven that
7 road.
B
A. I'll remember that
Q. Again, I'm not going to mark this as
I9
110 an exhibit, but I have a copy if you need to look
11 at it of the second amended complaint in this
12 matter. At the tend of the second amended
13 complaint there is what's called a verification.
14 Do you understand what that is?
15
A. I believe that to be me signing to say
16 that what's in the complaint is accurate to the
17 best of my knowledge.
i8
Q. Okay.
19
A. Is that what it is?
20
Q. That's fair enough. And that is your
21 signature on page 32 of the second amended
22 complaint?
23
A. Correct.
24
Q. Did you read the second amended

I

I
I

. ?
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1
Q. And what was your reason in installi:p.g
2 the gate?
3
A. The gate that was across there had
4 been destroyed.
5
Q. SO there had been a gate -- was there
6 a gate when you bought the property?
7
A. Yes.
8
Q. And it had been destroyed?
9
A. Yes.
10
Q. Do you know how it was destroyed?
11
A. It was barbed wire gate and had just
12 been 13
Q. Deteriorating over the years?
14
A. Yeah.
15
Q. When you installed the new gate - how
16 wide is the new gate you installed?
17
A. Hmm~ the new gates were two 12-foot
18 gates that my mother purchased. They overlap a
19 little. My rough guess would be 20 to 21 feet.
20
Q. The gate that you replaced, how wide
21 was it?
22
A. Oh, it would have been 25, 26 feet
23
Q. It was wider than the gate you
24 replaced it with?
25
A. Correct If you go up there you'll
(208) 345-9611

A. Correct.
2
Q. And the information contained in the
3 . second amended complaint was true and accurate to
4 the best of your knowledge?
5
A. Correct.
6
Q. Now let me talk to you about this
7 middle road, that is also referred to as the
8 Neigurn driveway. At the time you purchased the
9 property what was the condition of that road? Was
10 it also a gravel road?
11
A. There was no road there.
12
Q. Okay.
13
A. It was a field.
14
Q. I've seen - at least there was a
15 roadway in that same area that went up into the
16 field and ultimately converged with the northern
17 roadway, although it may not have taken the same
18 course that the Neigum driveway now takes. Do you
19 recall that?
20
A. Can you show me on a picture?
21
Q. I'm not sure I have a picture that
22 shows that. Let me ask you, based on your
23 recollection, do you recall there being a roadway
24 to the south of what -25
A. At the time that I purchased it?
M & M COlttl~RTINn SFRVTrF rnr
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A.. Right.
Q. Okay. Now, there is an allegation in
the complaint in this matter that the Poveys at
some point plowed the roadway. You're familiar
with that allegation?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you mow about that? Did you
see the Poveys plowing the roadway?
A. Which time?
Q. Well, was there more than one time
that the roadway was plowed?
A. Plowed, tilled.
Q. Well, maybe you can help me out. The
allegation in the complaint is that the roadway
was plowed. Was the roadway ever plowed?
A. Yes, SIr.
.
Q. Do you know what a plow is?
A • v1 es, SIr.
.
Q. Okay. What kind of plow was used to
plow the road?
A. A three bottom.
Q. And did you see the roadway being
plowed?
A. No.
Q How do you know it was plowed by a

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
! 9
! 10

In

112
1 13

i 14
115
1 16

1

i 17
I118

A. My father.
Q. What did you say to your father?
A. He carne and pulled me out. He told
me -- I wanted to go -- I was quite upset. He
calmed me down and told me not to worry about it.
Once the field was planted it would be accessible
again. That was the end of it. .
Q. Okay. So did you talk to anyone else
about it?
A No.
Q. So your father considered it not a big
deal, wasn't that big of a deal, you shouldn't get
upset about it?
A. I don't mow what he considered, sir.
Q. Okay. Fair enough. He told you don't
wony about it, the field will be planted and once
it's planted you'll be able to access the property
. ?
agam.

' 19
A. That's what he told me.
/20
Q. Okay. I guess the field was
I 21 eventually planted?
122
A. Yes.
i 23
Q. And after that you were able to access
124 your property again?
!25
A Yes
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1 three bottom plow?

2

·,i,.11

A. I mow what a plowed field looks like,

3 sir.

4
5
6
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Q. So you saw the roadway after it had
been plowed?
A. I got stuck in it, sir.
Q. You got stuck in it with what?
A. A green GMC pickup.
Q. Okay. When did the plowing occur?
A. Early nineties, late eighties.
Q. Okay. While the Poveys still owned
the property?
A. Correct
Q. And again, you didn't see the plowing
occurring, but you got stuck in it as you tried to
drive through it?
A. Correct. It was done and I went up to
access my property and got stuck.
Q. Okay. Do you know who did the
plowing?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever talk to anyone about the
23 plowing on the road?
24
A. Yes.
25
Q. Who did you talk to?
(208) 345-9611
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Q'?i~ you talk to anyone else about that
plowing mCldent?

~ ~d the roadway was reestablished

~e ~:~~~

after
occurred?
Q. Now, this plowing didn't occur along
the full length of the roadway?
A. No.
Q. About how much of the roadway was
plowed?
A. Hmm, from the hay barn up.
Q. All the way up to the canal?
A. Yes.
Q. And as I understand it, at that time
the ground on both sides of the roadway was being
farmed?
A. Correct.
Q. And when the field was planted do you
mow what it was planted with?
A. I don't. I went back to college, or
wherever I went.
Q. SO this was while you were still in
college?
A. Early nineties, late eighties, yes,
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Q. And then did you go back to using the
2 roadway after that?
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A. Yes.
Q. Was there anything planted on the
roadway or was it just disturbed?
A. At one time there was oats planted
across the driveway, yes.
Q. And did you have to drive across the
oats to reestablish the roadway?
A. Yes.
Q. Did anybody complain to you about
driving across the oats?
A. No.
!vIR. BROV1N: Perhaps we can break for a
moment?
MR. ATKIN: Sure. This is a good time..
(Recess.)
Q. (BY MR ATKlN) Daniel, did you ever
have a conversation with Leiza Povey about the
safety of her children and her concerns about her
childrens' safety in connection with the use of
the northern right-of-way?
A. Not that I remember.
Q. Do you recall running over their
.

1 of the Viehweg property, describing the Neigum
2 driveway or that middle access road. Are you
3 familiar with that?
4
A Yes.
5
Q. And that one specifically references
6 your use of that right-of-way to access your
7 property on the west side of Twin Lakes Canal?
8
A Yes.
9
Q. Now, before those two deeds were
10 recorded, the Dean deed and the Neigum deed that
11 described those rights of way, there weren't any
12 deeds recorded that described your access rights
13 across what had been the McCulloch property, is
14 there?
15
A. I believe that's correct.
16 .
Q. Do you know of anything filed by Brad
17 Povey or Leiza Povey that tries to deny your right
lIB of access across the property that had been owned
19 by the McCullochs?
20
A No, not to my mowledge.
21
Q. Are you aware of anything that Brad
22 Povey or Leiza Povey has ever done that tries to
/23 deny or negate the idea that you have a
24 right-of-way across the McCulloch property?

?
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1
A. No, I don't remember that.
Q. Ibat doesn't jog your memory of any
2
3 discussion with her about those concerns?
4
A. No.
5
Q. Now, as I understand it, there came a
6 point in time, and we've got a document we can
7 look at if we need to, but in connection with his
8 sale of a parcel of property Brad Pavey and Leiza
9 Povey put into one of the deeds a legal
10 description of a right-of-way across the property
11 leading to the bridge we've talked about across
12 the Twin Lakes Canal. That was a right-of-way for
13 your use to access your property on the west side
14 of the Twin Lakes Canal. Are you familiar with
15 that deed?
16
A. There's two deeds that reference it
17 Which one is it? There's one on the Dean deed and
18 it shows it on the old one.
19
Q. That's true. In the Dean deed it
20 references a right-of-way at the south 20 feet of
21 the Dean deed, I believe?
22
A. Right.
23
Q. And then there's a deed -- in the deed
24 to the Neigums there's an actual description of a
25 right-of-way coming along about the south bound~
(208) 345-9611
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1 right-of-way that we've talked about.
2
Q. Okay. Anything other than that?
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A. No.
Q. And I mow I asked you about the
plowing. Let me make sure I ask about the later
disturbance. Other than that disturbance, is
there anything that leads you to believe that that
was anything more than planting of the two fields?
In other words, is there anything that makes you
think that he was trying to -- whoever disturbed
that was trying to obliterate the right-of-way and
it wasn't just fanning?
A. Just that it's awful hard to plant
around granaries and the structures there with the
little bit of oats that you get. It seems that
you would have left it.
Q. Okay. I'm not sure I understand that
If you'll look at exhibit M again, maybe you can
describe it for me. This disturbance occurred
between tract 1 ofthe Viehweg property and tract
2 ofthe Viehweg property, across that area?
A. Correct.
Q. And where is the granary?
A. There's a couple of granaries here.
Q. Okay.
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1
Q. Show us where that is. In fact, if
2 you'll take my pen and draw a line to show \vhere
3 you think it is.
MR MCFARLAND: Counsel, for the record,
4
A. I'm allowed to do that?
Mr. Gamer was pointing to the south part of that
5
Q. Yes.
stretch of that right-of-way between tract 1 and
6
A. From this post up to here and across
tract 2?
MR ATK1N: Actually, be was pointing on
7 the road like that. You can see the change in
exhibit M to the westerly portion of the
8 color.
9
Q. How wide of an area was disturbed?
right-of-way.
10
A. I don't know. Whatever it is from -MR SIv11TH: Let's go offtbe record.
11 I don't know. I haven't measured it.
(Discussion off the record.)
Q. Okay. And was it also disturbed in
Q. (BY MR. ATKIN) Let me show you what was 12
13 the area past the grain bin?
marked exhibit 1 -- or let me show you exhibit 2.
14
A. Belovv?
That may be what we want. Are you familiar with
that photograph?
15
Q. To the west of the grain bin.
A. Yes, sir.
16
A. To the west?
17
Q. Yes.
Q. And who took the photograph?
A. My wife.
18
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Okay. And was that photograph taken
19
Q; IfI understand it correctly, this is
on or about May 28th, 2008?
20 a picture looking west?
A. Yes, sir.
21
A. No. Oh, yes, this is looking west.
Q. Because exhibit 3 shows that date, May
22
Q. Okay. And where you've marked is on
28th, 2008?
23 the east side of the grain bin, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
24
A. No. That's where it goes north to
Q All right What is that photograph -25 smrtb across the road, across the right-of-way

A .. And it seems awful funny to mess Vvith

2 t.hat comer a.Tld to plant it.

3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23

24
25
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1 you're familiar with the area where that
2 photograph was taken?
3
A. Yes, sir.
4
Q. And does that photograph accurately

Page 88

1
Q. I understand that, but where you put
2 the markings - the disturbance went north and
3 south across the roadvvay, correct?
4
A. Correct.

5 depict the area that is photographed?
5
Q. But we're on the east side of the
6
A. Yes, sir.
6 grain bin?
7
Q. And what does it show?
7
A. Yes. It was both on the east and west
8
A. It shows the northerly right-of-way
8 sides ofthe grain bin.
9 that bisects the Viehweg property. I believe he's
9
Q. SO both sides of the grain bin?
10 standing on the Dean property about halfway up.
10
A. Yes.
11 Is that what you want?
11
Q. Okay. And the field to the north of
12
Q. When you say it bisects the Viehweg
12 the roadway, was it also planted in oats?
13 property, are we looking at the westerly portion
13
A. Above the pole.
14 of segment A as shown in exhibit M?
14
Q. Beyond this pole it was planted in
15
A. Correct
15 oats?
16
Q. Okay. And where on exhibit M would
16
A. Yeah. Up in here.
17 the person taking the photograph be standing?
17
Q. Okay. The north -18
A. In here somewhere.
18
A. I know - this tract vvas planted, yes.
19
Q. Okay. Somewhere near the convergence
19
Q. Tract 1 ofthe Viehweg property on
20 ofPovey tract 2 and Povey tract I?
20 exhibit M was planted?
21
A. Probably.
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. All right. On deposition exhibit
22
Q. Was tract 2 of the Viehweg property
23 number 2 can you see the portion of ground that
23 also planted in oats?
24 your telling me was disturbed and planted?
24
A. Correct.
25
A. Yes.
25
Q. And so the disturbance would have gone
(,)OR) ~4"_Qhl1
1..,f 1', 1..,f rV.TroT DT::D~~IOlEDUTf"'1:' ThTf"'
(')no\ '> AC oon£) {C_ . . \

Page

891

across the road in the area between tract 1 and

,I

2 tract 2 of the Viehweg property?

Page 9
1
2

A. Correct.
4
Q. Missing the grain bin, basically?
5
A. Correct.
6
Q. Okay. I kind of take it that you
7 wouldn't have farmed it that way?
8
A. No.
9
Q. Other than that, is there anything
10 that leads you to believe that that planting -11 that disturbance and planting was done to
12 obliterate the roadway?
13
A. Just that that was done in close
14 proximity to the selling to Viehweg.
15
Q. Okay. Anything else?
16
A. No.
17
Q. You haven't heard anybody - nobody
18 has ever told you that that's why it was done?
19
A No.
20
Q. You never asked anybody why the
21 planting was done there?
22
A No:
23
Q. You say it was in close proximity to
24 the sale of the property to the Viehwegs?
25
A I'm not ~mre, but I believe so
3

,11

11

3

4
5
6
7

I
I 8
I9

, 10 '

111
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

A. Correct.
Q. And your memory of when this property
was disturbed and the oats were planted, you know
it was in the spring of the year sometime?
A. Yes. That's when you usually plant.
Q. Well, you got stuck sometime in the
spring of the year with your backhoe?
A. That would have been the year after it
was planted.
Q. Oh, the year after?
A. Yes.
Q. Not the same year it was planted?
A. No.
Q. Do you know what year you got stuck?
A. No.
Q. Any way that you could refresh your
recollection and try to find out what year?
A. Maybe, but I'll have to think about

it.

Q. No documents that you can refer to?
Are there documents that you could refer to that
would refresh your recollection as to w'hen you got
stuck with your backhoe?
A. Maybe.
,25
Q What would they be?
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1
Q.' Okay. Do you know when the property
1
2
2 was sold to the Viehwegs?
3
A. 2005.
3
4
4
Q. How do you know that?
5
A Thafs when the deed was recorded.
5
6
Q. When did you first learn that the
6
7 property had been sold to the Viehwegs?
7
8
A. 2008.
8
9
Q. Okay. So at the time that the
9
10 property was being sold, you were not aware ofit?
10
11
A. Correct.
11
12
Q. The Viehwegs don't live there?
12
13
A. No.
13
14
Q. And somebody farms the property for
14
15 the Viehwegs?
15
16
A. I assume.
16
17
Q. You don't know who that is?
17
18
A I don't.
18
19
Q. Somebody must because it gets at least
19
20 pastured?
20
21
A. Correct.
21
22
Q. Maybe some hay cut off of it So you
22
23 wouldn't have any reference point for knowing when 23
24 the property was sold to the Viehwegs, other than
24
25 the deed?
I 25
r')()O\ "A'" (\""11

••

n..

•

A. Calving records.
Q. Okay. How would the calving records
help you remember?
A. IfI bappened to write it in there.
Q. Describe your calving records for me.
A. I usually have the cow number, calf
number, problems that the cow had having the calf,
whether the calf was delivered live or dead.
Q. And you're A. Feed ratios.
Q. And you keep accurate records that way
of your calfs?
A. Yes.
Q. And why would those records show when
you got stuck?
A. Only ifl was upset enough that I
wrote it down when I got home, which I don't
believe I was. I don't know.
Q. You still have those calving records?
A. Yes.
Q. Going back how far?
A. Since we went organic.
Q. Which would have been?
A. '87, 188.
Q. Okay. So going basically back to --

~~y"'~ .l~~___ --------

- --

. ... . - -_... -
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1 south at some point?
2
A. It can be done by horse.
3
Q. Not by vehicle, but by horse?
4
A. Correct.
5
Q. And you've done that?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. Your property that is south and east
8 of the section 34 property, does it abut the
9 Westside Highway or is there a road you take off
10 of the Westside Highway to get on to that
11 property?
12
A. It abuts.
13
Q. SO you can literally step off the
14 Westside Highway onto your property?
15
A. Correct.
16
Q. And do you know how much frontage is
17 along the Westside Highway?
18
A. I don't know.
19
Q. Can you guess? Is it a mile?
20
A. No.
21
Q. A football field?
A. A rough guess, a quarter of a mile.
22
23
Q. Roughly a quarter mile of frontage.
24 At any point on that quarter mile offrontage you

I right-of-way by parking their cars and putting a
2 garbage truck LI1 the way of the northerly
3 right-of-way?

4
A. A garbage can.
5
Q. Okay. But it was the Deans doing
6 that?
7
A. Their vehicles.
8
Q. Okay. When you found that
9 right-of-way, that northerly right-of-way,
10 obstructed in that manner, you testified that you
11 tried to talk to the Deans about it. You knocked
12 on their door once and weren't able to get
13 contact. Did you just tum around and not tty to
14 access the property or did you access the property
15 a different way?
16
A. I accessed the property a different
17 way.
18
Q. What way was that?
19
A. I went up Neigums' driveway.
20
Q. Okay. I need a minute to look through
21 my notes. I think rm about done.
22
(Recess.)
23
Q. (BY :MR. MCFARLAND) I'm going to return
24 to this issue about your percentage ownership in
the R ice road I'm going to ask you to direct
Page 244
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1 ride a horse up to your section 34 property?
2
A. Ride a horse, yes.

3

1 your attention again to the second amended

2 complaint, paragraph 15. I'll warn you this time

Q.

3 that I do intend to interrupt you at least once.
That kind of gets to the next
4 question. I believe it was Mr. Smith that asked
4 Ifyou would read for the record paragraph 15.
5
5 you, going back to the original contract, we
A. Each personal representative's deed,
6 talked about that there was an irrigation pipe
6 each grant deed, furthering exchange, each gift
7 that you couldn't break - you couldn't
7 deed, and the grant deed to the Nola Trust
8 disassemble or move if the pump was running; is
8 conveyed the property described in paragraphs II,
9 12, and 13.
9 that right?
10
10
A. Correct.
Q. I'll stop you there. It's talking
11
11 about the property described in paragraphs 11, 12
Q. You also testified that there had been
12 times you went up there and found the pump running 12 and 13. If you'll flip back to paragraph 13, and
13 so you couldn't move the pipe?
13 you don't need to read it out loud, but the first
14
14 paragraph I asked you to read, I believe that is
A. Correct
15
15 referencing the Rice road; is that right?
Q. What did you do at those times? Did
16 you access the property some other way or just not
16
A. Yes.
17 access your property?
17
Q. Okay. Paragraph 13 is talking about
18
18 the Rice road. Back to 15 now. We left offat
A. Just not access it.
19
19 conveyed the property described in paragraphs 11,
Q. Okay. And you would just come back at
20 some future time to see if the pump was off?
20 12, and 13. If you will take it from there.
21
21
A. Less the 30-foot strip exchanged away.
A. Yeah. Wait three or four days and it
22 was usually off.
22
Q. I'll interrupt you again. That's the
23
23 gravel area that was given to the Rices?
Q. A similar question about this
24 obstruction, and I may get this a bit wrong, but I
24
A. Correct.
25 think you said that the Deans would obstruct the
25
Q. Okay.
"}At: oonn fC'... __"\
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5
6
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8
9

10
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15
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1
Q. You testified that the disttrrbance
A.. Together with all, and whatever that
2 that was done, and the oats planted across the
word is.
3 northern road at one point, that that was done in
Q. Appurtenances.
4 the spring of one year and then you got stuck the
A. Pertaining thereto, so the rights of
5 next year. Do you recall that?
Gary and Nola to use the original access road as
6
A Yes.
adapted by acquisition of the Cox property,
1
7
Q. SO the disturbance and the planting
paragraph 12 hereof, are owned by Daniel, with an
undivided interest of 44. 796 percent.
i.1 89 happened. And in the same year that the
disturbance and planting happened, later on in
Q. Okay. Stop there. As I read that
l
that year you had driven across the roadway?
paragraph, that is stating that you have a 44.796
\11
A Driven or gotten stuck?
percent - excuse me. A 44.796 percent interest
Q. Well, you got stuck the next year?
in the property in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, which 112
inCludes the Rice road.
A The next spring, right.
A. That's how I read it too.
114
Q. Okay. But in the same year that it
115 was planted -Q. SO to make it clear, having now read
paragraphs 15 and 13 of the second amended
16
A Did I drive through complain~ do you understand - is it your
117
Q. Later in that year you drove through
18 the oats?
understanding that you have a 44.796 percent
1,'19
A . Y es.
interest in the Rice road?
A. I hate to get caught up in the
20
Q. And reestablished the roadway?
percentage, but didn't you say less than five?
21
A Correct.
MR. BROWN: I'll confer with him for a
Q. And that would have been sometime in
moment.
123 June or July?
MR. MCFARLAND: Let's see ifhe can answer i 24
A. Correct. The oats were six to 10
b you can confer
I, 25'
h'
Le
___
mcheS1gb
b qllesti. on, Len
I
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1
THE WI1NESS: Having read that, I see the
1
Q. Okay. So by mid summer sometime the
2 44.796 percent I don't understand what that 2 roadway would have been reestablished and visible
3 I hope that's correct.
3 upon the ground?
4
MR. BROWN: Before he answers another
4
A. Correct.
5 questio~ can I just briefly consult with him?
5
Q. Okay. So when the Viehwegs bought
6
MR. MCFARLAND: Sure. We'll go off the
6 their property in October that roadway was
7 record.
7 reestablished?
8
(Recess.)
8
A. If they'd looked at it, correct.
9
THE WITNESS: I don't understand that
I 9
Q. Now, I probably need to do this by a
10 estate thing.
110 document request fonnally, but let me ask you, I
11
Q. (BY MR MCFARLAND) Perhaps I'm making 111 would like access to the property on the west side
12 my questions more complicated than they need to
112 of Twin Lakes Canal. Maybe the use of your disk
13 be. My questio~ to simplify it, having read that
113 to see how well I could drive it up the Neigum
14 paragraph do you understand thatyoll now own
114 driveway.
15 more - a greater than five percent interest in
.rv:tR. MCFARLAND: Are you going to be a
16 the Rice road?
116 witness, counsel?
17
A Yes.
117
MR. ATKIN: I have the right under rule 34
18
Q. Okay. And that you may own over 44 118 to examine 19 over a 44 percent interest in the Rice Road?
MR. SMITH: I'm not objecting to it.
20
A. Yes.
!20
Q. (BY MR.. ATKIN) Let me ask you, and you
21
MR MCFARLAND: I have nothing further.
and your counselor can teIl me about it later, but
22
MR ATKIN: I have some follow up. Is it
would you give me pennission to your use your disk
23 my turn? Okay.
!.23 and examine it and be able to drive it across the
24
FURTHER EXAMINATION
i 24 Neigum driveway? And I probably would want to
25 BY MR. ATKIN:
125 take it down through the Rice access, but I'm
(208) 345-9611
M & M COURT REPoFlllll~VICE. INC.
(2mn 14'i-lUWO (fuy)
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121
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Garner,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow;
and Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola
Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,
Case No. CV-08-342
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Hal 1. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as
Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigurn and
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust,
dated September 17 2004; Jeffery J.
Neigum and KathleenA. Neigum, husband
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey,
husband and wife; First American Title
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of
Authority; and First American Title
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,

RESPONSE TO MOTION TO STRIKE

THE AFFIDAVITS OF HENRY POVEY
AND DANIEL S. GARNER

. Defendants.

The plaintiffs (collectively the Garners), through counsel of record, Thatcher Beard St
Clair Gaffney PA respectfully submit this response to the Povey Defendants' Motion to Strike
Response 10 Motion to Strike the AffidaVits of Hemy Povey and Daniel S. Garner - Page 1
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the Affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel S. Garner.
I. Daniel's statements about acquiring an easement from the McCullochs are
admissible.

Daniel is competent to testify about a transaction he entered to purchase property and an
easement from the McCullochs, both of which are central issues in this matter. The doctrine of
merger does not operate to exclude relevant testimony about how Daniel acquired his interest in
the easement in which he asserts an interest in this lawsuit.

n.

There is foundation for Daniel Gamer's assertion the Poveys knew of the Garner
easement.

In both his affidavit and his deposition, Daniel testifies about how Brad Povey asked

Daniel on multiple occasions to relocate his easement from the original access road to the
replacement access road. Aff. Daniel S.

Gamer~

8; see also Depo. Daniel S. Gamer at 114:4-

122:7, attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Michael W. Brown. Clearly, evidence of Mr.
Povey's repeated requests for Daniel to relinquish his interest in the original access road is
adequate foundation for Daniel's statement in '14 of his affidavit.

m. Daniel Garner's assertion as to the width of the original access road is admissible in
the context of a motion for summary judgment.
In his affidavit, Daniel lays foundation for his sworn statement about the width of the

original access road by declaring that he is familiar with its dimensions from having frequently
uscd it for many years. See Aft: Daniel S. Garner 1f 6. This statement is adequate foundation for
statements regarding the road's width.. The Poveys contend that this statement is contradicted by
Daniel's deposition testimony. Defs.' Briefat 6. To support this claim, the Poveys then
reproduce deposition testimony in which Daniel described the road variously as a two-track road
or not a two-track road. In any event, nowhere in the quoted testimony is a reference to the
access road's having a width of a number of feet less than thirty. The fact that the Poveys argue

Response to Motion to Strike: the: Affidavit:; of He:nry Povey and Daniel S. Garner· Page 2
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the road was narrower indicates there is an issue of genuine fact preclusive of swnmary
judgment.
IV. Testimony of physical interference with the Garners' easement is admissible.

The Poveys seek to characterize the Garners' claim for interference with their easement
as a trespass claim, despite the fact the word "trespass" does not appear in the second amended
complaint. See Defs.' Brief at 8. The Poveys then assert that the statute of limitations for the
cause of action of trespass bars Daniel Gamer from testifying about physical interference with
his easement. Id.
As an initial observation, it appears the Poveys now seek to raise a statute of limitations
argument with respect to one of the Garners' claims even though they did not raise it in their
initial memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment. The court should not
consider this untimely attempt to present a statute oflimitations defense after the Garners have
already responded to the Poveys' motion for summary judgment. Moreover, regardless of any
statute of limitations defense to a claim brought by the Garners, the Poveys have not argued the
evidence contained in Daniel's affidavit is inadmissible because it is irrelevant or otherwise
excludable under the rules of evidence.
"'Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action'more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."

IDAHO R. EVID. 401.

Certainly, evidence of interference with

the Garners easement is relevant to the Garners' claims that the Poveys interfered with the
easement. Such evidence is supportive of all claims brought by the Garners against the Poveys,
including those claims not alleged to be barred by the statute oflimitations. "All relevant
evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules applicable in

Re!lponse to Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Henry Pavey and Daniel S, Garner -Page 3
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the courts of this state." IDAHO R EVID. 402. Because the Poveys have not articulated a
legitimate basis for the excluding relevant testimony, the affidavit of Daniel Garner must not be
stricken.
V. Daniel's statement about not agreeing to acquire or use the Rice road is admissible.

Daniel Garner is competent to testify from personal knowledge about his refusal to
acquire or use the Rice road at the time it was required. The Poveys' attempt to undennine
Daniel's statement by referring to the fact that Daniel now has a legal right to use the Rice road
does not render Daniel's sworn statement in ~ 11 ofbis affidavit inadmissible.
VI. The court should consider Daniel's testimony about the Rice Road under Rule 56(0).

The Poveys ask this Court to strike paragraph 11 of the affidavit of Daniel S. Garner
because Daniel's affidavit is devoid of foundation. Defs.' Brief at 10. For purposes of summary
judgment under rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court should consider
Daniel's sworn statement regarding the unsuitability of the Rice Road in winter months. First,
Daniel's affidavit lays foundation for tins statement by explaining Daniel's familiarity with the
properties involved due to his visiting them frequently for two decades. The Rice Road is one of
the roads accessing the properties with which Daniel is familiar. Thus, Daniel has laid sufficient
foundation to demonstrate familiarity with the Rice Road.
Second, even if Daniel's affidavit lacks foundation for his statement about the Rice Road,
the Court should consider this statement anyway in ruling on the Poveys' motion for summary
judgment. "As long as the non-moving party relies on statements that are based on personal
knowledge and which would be admissible as evidence at trial and does more than rest on mere
allegations or denials in his pleading, it will be considered sufficient to comply with Rule 56(e)."
McCoy v. Lyons, l20'Idaho 765, 771,820 P.2d 360, 366 (1991). A substantially similar version
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of Daniel's statement about the Rice road in wintry months is contained in paragraph 13 of the
verified second amended complaint the verified complaint. See Second Amd. Compi. ~ 13.
Moreover, Daniel testified under oath at his deposition as follows:
Q.

While I'm thinking about this, with regard to the Rice road, you mentioned that
you had slipped on it the one time. Have you ever been able to use the Rice road
in the winter time?

A.

No. I mean. all winter, throughout the whole winter?

Q.

Has there even been one time while there was [snow] on the road you were able to
use it?

A.

When the first snow falls you can still make it. But after the first track up, you
compress the [snow] and it becomes ice and you can't make it. So you have one
day.

See Depo. Daniel S. Gamer at 153:14-154:1. attached hereto as Exhibit A. ill McCoy the court
held that the non-moving party in a summary judgment "met and satisfied the requirements of
the rule [56(e)] when they relied on their depositions, in addition to, the swom contents of the
verified amended complaint and the numerous exhibits attached thereto." McCoy, 120 Idaho at
771,820 P.2d at 366. Here, in addition to this statement made in Daniel's affidavit, the Garners
are relying on their depositions and the swom contents of the verified second amended
complaint. Thus, the court should consider Daniel's statement about the Rice road's not being
usable in wintry months.
VII.

Henry Povey's affidavit contains admissible statements.

Henry Povey's affidavit lays sufficient foundation to establish that Brad Povey .
participated in farming operation on property through which the original access road passes. To
that extent, his affidavit should not be stricken.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should deny the Poveys' motion to strike the affidavits
of Hank Povey and Daniel S. Gamer.

Date: October 3, 2009

~Id~
Michael W. Brown
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I have my office in Rexburg,
Idaho, and on October 3,2009, I served a true and correct copy of RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS OF HENRY POVEY AND DANIEL S. GARNER upon the
following by the method of delivery designated:
Eric Olsen
Scott Smith
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204"1391
Fax: (208) 232-6109

C U.S. Mail IQl Hand-delivered ~acsjrnile

Ryan McFarland
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Fax: (208) 342-3829

IlJ U.S. Mail IiJ Hand-delivered

Jel(pacsimile

Blake S. Atkin

tlJ U.S. Mail lEJl Hand-delivered

~csimile

Franklin County Courthouse
39W. Oneida
Preston, ID 83263
Fax: (208) 852-2926

IClI U.S. Mail Itl Hand-delivered

~csimile

Judge Stephen S. Dunn
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. CenterlP.O. Box 4126
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (20S) 236-7012

IiJ U.S. Mail IiJ Hand-delivered

~mile

837 South 500 West
Suite 200
Bountiful, UT 84010
Fax: (801) 533-0380

~t1?f~
Michael W. Brown
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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A. Maybe two.
Q. Do you give those folks instruction on
4 which road to use?
2

3

5

A. They use - I usually - those guys

6 they just call me and I say yes, you can go.
7 Please don't cut the fences and shut the gate.
8
Q. Okay. So you don't know how they get
9 in there?
10
A. I don't.

11
Q. Maybe they snowmobile in from over the
12 mountain?
13
A. Exactly. I don't know.
14
Q. While I'm thinking about this, with
15 regard to the Rice road, you mentioned that you
16 had slipped on it the one time. Have you ever
17 been able to use the Rice road in the winter time?
18
A. No. I mean, all winter, throughout
19 the whole winter?
20
Q. Has there even been one time while
21 there was show on that road you were able to use
22 it?
23
A. When the first snow falls you can
24 still make it But after the first track up, you

Q. I also understand that you nm cattle

2 on the Gamer property; is that right?
3
A. Right.
4
. Q. Okay. Can you show me on exhibit 6,
5 jU$t use your finger for now, show me generally
6 where you nut the cattle? Where are the cattle
7 generally - where are they most ofthe time?
8
A. Okay. You want me to trace the area
9 with my finger? Tm not understanding, because
10 it's bigger than this.
.
11
Q. Okay. Just describe it to me instead
12 of using the map.
13
A. The whole place is fenced and they run
14 anywhere on there they want
15
Q. By the whole place. what do you mean?
16
A. All of the property that the Garners
17 own west of the canal has a perimeter fence arolDld
18 it and they run on the whole thing.
19
Q. Okay. So ifwe look at deposition
20 exhibit number 6 and look at the outline done in
21 the Sharpie marker, is that the whole of it or is
22 there more?
23
A. There's more.
24
Q. Connected to this?
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1 make it. So you have one day.
2
Q. I see. All right. We've heard about
3 some activities. Can you think of any other
4 activities?
5
A. We horseback ride up there. We gather
6. cows out of there.
7
Q. Okay. I'm going to group all of these
8 activities together. We've talked about hunting
9 and snowmobiling, so I don't want to cover that
10 ground again. In terms of the parties and the
11 scout camps and the horseback riding, can you give
12 me a sense on which access road you've used for
13 those, whether it was the Rice or the Neigum
14 driveway or the north road?
IS
A. Those have always been the north road
16 because the others weren't there when I was a
17 leader.
18
Q. I see. That all occurred before the
19 Rice road went in?
20
A. I believe so. I might have been
21 Webelos leader after that.
22
Q. All right. Have you had any parties
23 up there for skeet shooting, scout activities,
24 since the Rice road went in?
25
A. No.
(208) 345-9611

8
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1

1 . with your permission?

8/
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1
2

Q. And which direction, using the map?
A. South.

3

Q. South. All right. Because at the

4 bottom of this deposition exhibit 6 map I see what
5 looks to be an arrow. Is it down in that
6 direction?
7
A. Correct
8
9

10

Q. How many acres are there down there?
A. Approximately 190 or 180.
Q. Another three or four forties out that

11 way?
12
A. Correct
13
Q. Okay. But you didn't buy those other
14 acres from the McCullochs, right?
15
A No.
16
Q. How many cattle do you run out here?
17
A At one time I was up to 150 head, a
18 hundred.
19
Q. A hundred head or 150?
20
A. A hundred head there.
21
Q. And by Garner property, to be clear~
22 it's what flowed from the McCullochs and the
23 Coxes?
24
A Yes.
EXHIBIT
25
Q. All right And are those ~
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DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow;
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola
Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007,
Case No. CV-08-342
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as
Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust,
dated September 17th 2004; Jeffery J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey,
husband and wife; First American Title
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of
Authority; and First American Title
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,

STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL
WITH PREDJUDICE

Defendants.

The undersigned parties, by and through counsel of record, hereby stipulate and
agree to dismiss with prejudice all claims against Defendants, Hal J. Dean and Marlene

Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice

Cn FiGl
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CLERK

T. Dean, husband and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and
wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum
and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of the Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum
Revocable Trust, dated September 17, 2004; and First American Title Insurance
Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of Authority; and First
American Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, in the above entitled matter as the
parties have entered a settlement agreement resolving all controversies between and
among each other. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the parties fUlther agree that
each shall be responsible for their own attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter.

DATE: October

7-, 2009.

Michael W. Brown
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Daniels S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, Nola Garner, a widow,
and Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007.

Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice
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DATE: October _1_,2009.

Scott J. Smith
of Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
Attorney for Defendants, Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife; Douglas
K. Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen
A. Neigum, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of
the Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 17,
2004.

Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice
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DATE: October 13,2009.

Attorney for Defendants First American Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation and
First American Title Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho Certificate
of Authority..

Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice

Page 4

CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I have my office in Rexburg, Idaho,
and on October 7 ,2009, I served a true and correct copy of the STIPULATION FOR
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE upon the following by the method of delivery
designated:

~s. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

0

o

U.S. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

~csimile

o

U.S. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

~csimile

Ryan T. McFarland
Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Fax: (208) 342-3829

o

U.S. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

~simile

Judge Stephen S. Dunn
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
P. O. Box 4126
Pocatello, ID 83204

0

U.S. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

~imile

Franklin County Courthouse
39 W. Oneida
Preston, ID 83263
Fax: (208) 852-2926
Blake S. Atkin
837 South 500 West
Suite 200
Bountiful, UT 84010
Fax: (80l) 533-0380
Eric Olsen
Racine Olson Nye Budge &
Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello,ID 83204-1391
Fax: (208) 232-6109

Facsimile

~/1:7)~
Michael W. Brown
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow;
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola
Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,
Case No. CV-08-342
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as
Trustees ofthe Jeffery J. Neigum and
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust,
dated September 17th 2004; Jeffery 1.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey,
husband and wife; First American Title
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of
Authority; and First American Title
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,

ORDER FOR DISMISSAL
WITH PREDJUDICE

Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court by a Stipulation for Dismissal with
Prejudice executed by the parties thereto, and good cause appearing therefor,
Order for Dismissal With Prejudice

ItiDU

Page 1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled action is dismissed with
prejudice as to Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and wife; Douglas K.
Viehweg and Sharon C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
Neigum, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of
the Jeffrey J. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 17,
2004; First American Title Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation.

It is further ordered that each party shall bear their own attorney fees and costs incurred
in this matter.
Dated: October

R, 2009.

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn

Order for Dismissal With Prejudice
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Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello,ID 83204-1391
Fax: (208) 232-6109
Ryan McFarland
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Fax: (208) 342-3829
Blake S. Atkin
837 South 500 West
Suite 200
Bountiful, UT 8401 0
Fax: (801) 533-0380
Jeffrey D. Brunson
Michael W. Brown
THATCHER BEARD ST. CLAIR
GAFFNEY PA
343 E. 4th N. Suite 223
P. O. Box 216
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

~U.S. Mail IIJ Hand-delivered OJ Facsimile
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
Register No.CV-2008-342
DANIEL S. GARNER, et aI.,
Plaintiffs,
-vsHALJ. DEAN, eta!.

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

f~t"Tn'yi

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
POVEY DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJ") 1 of
Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey ("Poveys") pursuant to LR.C.P. 56. Also before the Court are
the following motions: 1) Poveys' Motion to Strike the Garner Aff. and the H. Povey Aff.; 2)
Plaintiffs,2 Motion for Enlargement of Time; 3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Second
Amended Complaint; and 4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Ron Kendall, Ivan
Jensen, Ted Rice, Lorraine Rice, Judy Phillips and Brad Povey.3 Oral argument was held on the
various motions on October 6,2009. The Court has taken all pending Motions under

I Poveys' MSJ is supported by a Memorandum in Support ("Poveys Memo"), which included Exhibits A - I (the
exhibits include the Affidavits ofIvan Jensen, Judy Phillips, Ron Kendall, Ted Rice, and Lorraine Rice and are
referred to as "Jensen Aff." etc., rather than by the Exhibit letter); a Reply Memorandum in Support ("Poveys
Reply"), which included Exhibits A-C. Plaintiffs submitted a Memorandum in Opposition ("Garner Memo"),
which included the Affidavits of Henry Povey ("H. Povey Aff.") and Daniel S. Garner ("Garner Aff."). Also
pertinent are Exhibits A- V, ("Complaint Ex. A ... V"), attached to the Verified Amended Complaint, but which are
also referenced in the Second Amended Complaint, the Complaint currently at issue in this matter.
2 Where appropriate, Plaintiffs Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, husband and wife, are collectively referred to
as "D. Gamer" and Plaintiff Nola Gamer, individually and as Trustee of the Nola Garner Living Trust, is referred to
as "N. Gamer." When appropriate, Gary Garner and Nola Garner, husband and wife, are also collectively referred
to as "N. Garner." Otherwise, Plaintiffs are collectively referred to as "Garners" or "Plaintiffs."
3 All Motions other than the MSJ were both supported and opposed by briefs filed by the parties, and, in some
instances, affidavits of parties and attorneys. More specific references will be made below as necessary.
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advisement, and having carefully considered all written submissions, the oral arguments of
counsel, and the applicable law, issues this Mem~randum Decision. 4
BACKGROUND AND FACTS
To a large extent, the facts submitted by both parties are not in material dispute, except as
otherwise noted below. On May 22, 1987 D. Garner acquired real property, by Warranty Deed,
from Ralph R. and Thelma N. McCulloch ("McCullochs,,).5 On the same day, May 22, 1987, a
Contract of Sale was entered into where McCullochs conveyed to D. Garner "a right-of-way
across Seller's adjacent property along an existing roadway.,,6 Where the "existing roadway"
was actually located on May 22, 1987 is disputed by the parties and discussed below. It is
agreed, however, that without the use of some road across the remaining McCulloch property,
beginning at the Westside Highway, D. Garner would not have had access to the property
acquired from McCullochs in 1987. 7
On May 23, 1990 Poveys acquired, by Warranty Deed, all of the rest of the property
owned by McCullochs. 8 The deed to Poveys from McCullochs does not specifically mention, in
any way, the easement allegedly granted to D. Garner by McCullochs in 1987. However, Poveys

4 Counsel for Garners advised the Court that a settlement agreement had been reached between Garners and all
Defendants other than Poveys, with a pending dismissaL The Court has received and signed an Order dismissing all
Defendants except Poveys. However, the dismissal apparently included an assignment of all claims that Defendants
Hal J. and Marlene T. Dean ("Dean"), Douglas K. and Sharon C. Viehweg ("Viehweg"), and Jeffrey J and Kathleen
A. Neigum (together with any related trusts) ("Neigum") may have against Poveys. Those assignments are the basis
for the Garner's Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint, and are discussed below.
5 See Complaint Exs. B-2, C and D. The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Franklin County Recorder twice, on
May 28, 1987 and on July 8, 1987.
6 See Complaint Ex. A. There was some limiting language not pertinent here. The Contract of Sale was recorded, at
the request ofD. Garner, with the Franklin County Recorder on July 8, 1987.
7 Although the entire "existing roadway" claimed as an easement by Garners is quite lengthy, see Complaint Exs. B2 through B-5 (on B-5 the entire roadway marked in both blue and yellow), only a small piece of the road, marked in
red on Complaint Ex. B-2 as the First Phase of the Original Access Road and starting at the Westside Highway, is at
issue here, and is referenced in various ways in the pleadings. It is referred to herein as the ''Northern Road".
Access to D. Garner's property also required the need to cross the Twin Lakes Canal, marked in dark blue on
Complaint Ex. B-2.
8 See Complaint Ex. E. The McCulloch property on the west side of the Twin Lakes Canal is identified and marked
in yellow on Complaint Ex. B-2. The McCulloch property on the east side of the Twin Lakes Canal is identified and
marked in red, blue and yellow on Complaint Ex. B-7 and is the property at issue in this case.
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concede that D. Gamer was entitled to an easement across their property when they acquired it
from McCullochs. What they dispute is the location and scope of that easement.
On June 17, 1992 Poveys conveyed, by Warranty Deed, property they owned on the west
side of Twin Lakes Canal to Gary T. and Nola S. Gamer. 9 The deed from Poveys to N. Gamer
did not mention any easement, for either N. Gamer or D. Gamer, across Poveys property on the
east side ofthe Twin Lakes Canal. Nevertheless, Poveys also agree that N. Gamer did have an
easement across their remaining property because access to the N. Gamer property was not
possible otherwise. Again, the location and scope of the N. Gamer easement is also disputed.
On August 27, 1999 Poveys conveyed a portion of their remaining property to Dean, by
Warranty Deed. IO That deed did convey the property subject to certain easements of record and
visible on the premises. II
On March 22,2001 Poveys conveyed another portion of their property to Neigurn, by
Corrected Warranty DeedY The Neigurn deed granted an easement in favor of Neigurns,
Poveys and Daniel Gamer. I3 That easement is referred to herein as the Neigurn Driveway and is
also known as the Replacement Access Road. It lies on the north boundary ofthe Neigurn

See Complaint Ex. F (Warranty Deed) and Ex. B-3 (aerial photo).
See Complaint Exs. K and L. This deed was also recorded twice, on August 30, 1999 and on December 30, 1999.
The Dean property is marked in red on Complaint Ex. B-7.
II The deed states, in pertinent part: "SUBJECT TO all easements, right of ways, ... TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the
said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said Grantee [Dean] and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever.
And the said Grantor [Poveys] does hereby covenant to and with the said Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in
fee simple of said premises, that said premises are free from all encumbrances except current years taxes, .... and
except .... easements of record, and easements visible upon the premises, and that Grantor will warrant and defend
the same from all claims whatsoever." [Emphasis added]. The Northern Road easement claimed by Garners is on
the southern east-west boundary of the Dean property. Compare Complaint Exs. B-2 and B-7.
12 See Complaint Ex. N. The Neigum property is identified and marked in blue on Complaint Ex. B-7 (see also
Complaint Ex. 0).
13 The specific language reads: "[TJogether with an easement for a roadway 20 feet in width lying adjacent to and
along the South and West side of the above-described courses 1) and 2) to be used by the Grantees [Neigum], Daniel
Gamer and the Grantors [Poveys], their heirs, successors and assigns for.general ingress and egress purposes. Said
easement shall continue in a westerly direction to a bridge located on the Twin Lakes Canal accessing the Daniel
Garner premises." It is agreed that the bridge mentioned is the same bridge D. Garner had been using to access his
property when he was using the Northern Road.
9

10
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property.14 Importantly, the Neigum property does not touch or impact in any way on the
Northern Road easement claimed by Garners.
On October 30, 1998, Helen and Edward Rice exchanged certain property they owned for
property owned by Gary and Nola Garner. 15 The effect ofthis exchange was to allow N. Garner
to acquire a road south of the Neigum Driveway by which N. Gamer could access their property
on the west side of the Twin Lakes Canal across a second bridge built in 1999. 16
On October 4,2005 Poveys conveyed the last of their property to Viehweg, by Warranty
Deed, but the deed does not describe or refer to any easement at all. 17 On May 28,2008
Viehweg constructed a fence across part of the Northern Road, allegedly depriving Garners of
their right to use that road. 18 Prior to that, on March 14, 2008, First American Title Co. notified
D. Garner that First American and Viehweg claimed that D. Garner did not have an easement for
ingress and egress on the Northern Road. 19
It should also be noted that Gary Garner died on December 1, 2005 and that D. Garner

has acquired an interest in the estate ofN. Garner. 20 Thus, any position taken by N. Gamer
herein is shared by D. Gamer.
On September 17, 2008 this lawsuit ensued. As to Poveys, the Second Amended
Complaint, filed March 13,2009, alleges that Poveys wrongfully conveyed property to Dean,
Neigum, and Viehweg without protecting Garners easement in the Northern Road, which

14 This Neigum Driveway is clearly visible on Complaint Exs. B-2 through B-6. See also Complaint Ex. M and Ex.
2 attached to Complaint Ex. W.
15 Second Amended Complaint, ,-r 13; Complaint Exs. Hand 1.
16 See Complaint Ex. B-6. The property acquired by N. Gainer is marked in red. See also Kendall and Jensen Affs.
17 See Complaint Ex. P. The language of focus here says: "TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with
their appurtenances unto the Grantees [Viehweg], their heirs and assigns·forever. And the said Grantors [Poveys] to
hereby covenant to and with the said Grantees, that they are the owners in fee simple of said premises; that they are
free from all encumbrances and that they will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever." The
Viehweg property is marked in red on Complaint Ex. B-7 (see also Complaint Ex. M.) The Northern Road is
located on the northern east-west boundary of the Viehweg property.
18 Second Amended Complaint, ,-r 25.
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required Garners to file this action to protect it. 21 It is also alleged that Poveys impaired the
easement by plowing over part of it to facilitate the sale to Dean, Neigum and Viehweg. 22
Poveys' position is that they did nothing to impair or limit the Garners' easement, either by
physical action or by conveyance.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" LR.C.P. 56(c); Northwest
Bee-Corp v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838,41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002); see also, Cox v.
Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 494, 50 P .3d 987, 989 (2002). When considering a motion for summary

judgment, a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party. Id. (citing S. Griffin Contr., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181,
185, 16 P.3d 278, 282 (2000». Normally, summary judgment must be denied where reasonable
persons could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence
presented. Id.
The moving party has the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact.
Northwest Bee-Corp, 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3d at 267. To meet this burden, the moving party

must challenge, in its motion, and establish through evidence, that no issue of material fact exists
for an element of the nonmoving party's case. Id. If the moving party challenges an element of
the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden
then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine

Complaint Ex. T.
Second Amended Complaint", 14-15.
21 I d. m)28-33; see also Prayer for Relief.
22 !d. '35.
19

20
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issue of material fact. Id. The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.
(quoting IRCP 56 (e». Summary judgment is properly granted, in favor of the moving party,
when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Smith v. Meridian Joint School
Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996).
Even if the facts are not disputed, that does not mean that summary judgment is proper.
In Riggs v. Colis, 107 Idaho 1028, 1030, 695 P.2d 413,415 (Ct.App. 1985), the Idaho Court of
Appeals stated:
[T]he Idaho Supreme Court has held that even though there are no genuine issues of
material facts between the parties a motion for summary judgment must be denied, when
the case is to be tried to a jury, if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be
drawn therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions. Riverside
Development Company v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982).
See also Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 326, 411 P.2d 768, 770 (l966)("A motion for summary
judgment must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn
therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions.") Likewise, if the record
raises questions concerning the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence, a motion
for summary judgment must be denied. Altman v. Arndt, 109 Idaho 218, 706 P.2d 107 (Ct.App.
1985)(citing Merrill v. Duffy Reed Construction Co., 82 Idaho 410,353 P.2d 657 (1960».
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Motions to Strike

Both parties have filed Motions to Strike affidavits filed by the other. These motions are
governed by LR. c.P. 56 (e), which provides: "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
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on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."
I.

Poveys' Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel S. Garner.
Henry Povey Affidavit. H. Povey's Aff. avers that he farmed with his brother, Brad

Povey, approximately 15 years ago (about 1994) and that they were farming property "adjacent
to the only access road to the Garner property lying west of the Twin Lakes canal." Attached to
his affidavit are photographs allegedly showing the access road "as it previously existed" and
also showing damage to the access road "in some manner." The affidavit is deficient in a
number of ways. First, an inadequate foundation is laid to identify the access road Henry Povey
refers to. It is vague and conclusory. The attached photographs are in black and white and
nothing meaningful can be observed in them. Since the record clearly shows that Brad Povey
owned a number ofparce1s in 1994, Henry Povey's affidavit does not identify, in any particular
way, the actual property he claims to have been farming with Brad Povey at the time.
Statements in affidavits require significantly more specificity than is found here. This affidavit
must be stricken.
Daniel Garner Affidavit. Poveys' objections to Garner's Aff. are summarized as follows:
1) there is conflict with his prior deposition testimony, 2) there is conflict with Poveys legal
positions of merger and statute of limitations, 3) his statements lack foundation. The Court has
reviewed Daniel's deposition testimony provided and finds that it is not in conflict with his
affidavit. Poveys' legal positions are not an adequate basis to object to factual assertions in an
affidavit. The Court's determination on legal issues will resolve whether factual assertions
related to those legal issues are pertinent or not. However, the affidavit suffers from a lack of
foundation of both personal knowledge or assumptions of what others know in paragraphs 4, 5,
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and 7 (with the exception that some damage occurred in the early nineties). The Court strikes
those paragraphs except for the observation that some damage occurred to the original access
road in the early nineties. The aerial photographs attached to Daniel Garner's affidavit are
admissible under LR.E. 803(8) and (24), and are considered by the Court. The Court further
notes that those portions of the Gamer Aff. that relate to the scope of the easement in question
are rendered MOOT by the settlement agreement entered into with Dean, Viehweg and Neigum
and need not be considered or ruled on herein.
Thus, Poveys Motion to Strike the H. Povey Aff. is GRANTED. The Motion to Strike
the Garner Aff is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and not ruled on in part, as more fully
stated above.
II.

Garner's Motion to Strike the Kendall, Jensen, Rice, Phillips and Povey Affidavits.
Ron Kendall Affidavit. Garners object to those portions of the Kendall Aff. where he

states that, as water master of the Twin Lakes Canal Co., he participated in a discussion with
several people, including Gary Gamer, where Gary Garner allegedly stated that he wanted to
access his property by a new crossing over the Twin Lakes canal because the right of way he was
using passed Poveys' home where little children were present. Gary Garner also allegedly stated
that if Twin Lakes Canal Co. would install a new crossing he would agree that the old crossing
could be removed. Garners claim these statements are hearsay and lack foundation. While the
time of the conversation could be identified more clearly, the foundation is adequate. The
statements of Gary Gamer, except for his alleged assertion that he had a right of way past the
Poveys' home (which is stricken as hearsay), are admissible because some parts of it are not
hearsay at all (his state of mind about the safety of children, for example) and/or because they
constitute declarations against his interest, LR.E. 804(b)(3).
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Ivan Jensen Affidavit. Mr. Jensen, an employee of Twin Lakes Canal Co., asserts
essentially the same things as Ron Kendall. It is more specific as to the time ofthe meeting.
Any objection to foundation for reference to the "Rice right of way" is not valid as all parties
have routinely referenced a second crossing of the Twin Lakes Canal as being associated with
the "Rice right of way," the "Rice easement" or the "Rice Road." Statements by Gary Garner
are either not hearsay or are a declaration against interest. Any statements by Daniel Garner, in
paragraph 7, are admissions of a party opponent and not hearsay, I.R.E. 801(d)(2). Whether any
of the statements are relevant is discussed below.
Ted and Lorraine Rice Affidavits. The pertinent portions of these two affidavits assert
that the property owned by Garners on the west side of the Twin Lakes Canal was "originally"
accessed along the Neigum driveway, not the Northern Road, which, it is asserted, ended at some
outbuildings. While this is an important factual issue in this case, the affidavits lack adequate
foundation. Ted Rice claims he has been aware of these circumstances for 82 years, which
would have been substantially before D. Garner acquired his property from McCullochs in .1987.
By using the word "originally" it is unclear whether Rice is referring to a time prior to D.
Garner's acquisition or not. Of relevance in the MSJ is what road "existed" at the time D.
Garner acquired his property, but the Rice affidavits do not speak to that issue. Thus, the Rice
affidavits lack foundation and cannot be considered.
Judy Phillips Affidavit. Judy Phillips, as the secretary of Twin Lakes Canal Co., attaches
a copy of minutes of the board of directors on March 25, 1999. There is a reference to the
meeting discussed by Kendall and Jensen concerning taking out a bridge used by "Garner."
While the document is not hearsay per I.R.E. 803(6), it is somewhat vague and deals with a
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question (bridge crossings of the Twin Lake Canal), that is not relevant to any issue before the
Court at this time. Thus, the Phillips Aff. will not be considered.
Brad Povey Affidavit. 23 At the hearing on the MSJ, Garners objected to this affidavit as
untimely. Affidavits in support of motions are to be served so as to be received no later than 14
days prior to the hearing. I.R.C.P.7(b)(3)(A). P6veys' Motion to Strike was filed on September
29,2009, less than 14 days prior to the hearing. Thus, the affidavit is untimely. However,
Garners did not object to the Motion to Strike, just the Povey Aff attached to it. More
importantly, however, the affidavit addresses the issue of the scope of the D. Garner's easement
in the Northern Road. 24 This issue has been rendered MOOT by the settlement between Garners
and Deans, Viehwegs and Neigums which establishes a permanent easement of a scope
acceptable to Garners. Therefore, Brad Povey's affidavit need not be considered herein.
The Garners' Motion to Strike the Affidavits ofthe persons referred to above is
GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and not ruled on in part for the reasons stated above.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Garners rely on three legal theories to support their claims against Poveys. First, Garners
assert that Poveys interfered with their easement by ''plowing over Segment 'A' of the Original
Access Road.,,25 Secondly, N. Garner asserts that Poveys breached a warranty to protect an
easement they allegedly acquired in the transfer of property from Poveys to N. Garner in 1992. 26
Thirdly, Garners assert that Poveys breached a duty owed to them when Poveys transferred

23 The Povey Aff was attached to the Povey Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Henry
Povey and Daniel S. Gamer, as Ex. D.
24 The Gamer Aff asserts that the Northern Road easement was 30 feet wide when he acquired it, that this width
was necessary to accommodate his needs, and that the Neigum driveway width of20 feet was "too narrow to
support my established practices .... " Gamer Aff mJ 6,9. The Povey Aff. raises a question of fact about those
assertions, attaching photographs showing grain elevators on the Northern Road and a gate at the entrance of the
original bridge across the Twin Lakes Canal which have openings of no more than 22 and 19.8 feet respectively.
25 Second Amended Complaint, ~~ 28-33, 35-36.
26 I d.
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property to Dean, Viehweg and Neigum without describing or protecting the Garners
easements. 27 Before reaching the merits ofthese contentions, threshold questions must be
addressed.

I.

What easement did D. Garner acquire and where is it located?
A.

D. Garner's Contract of Sale is merged into his deed.

D. Garner asserts that he acquired an easement in an "existing roadway" in 1987 from
McCullochs in the Contract of Sale, and also claims that this easement was physically located in
the Northern Road. He further claims that when Poveys acquired the property across which the
Northern Road ran, in 1990, they took it subject to his easement. Although Poveys acknowledge
D. Garner's easement across their property, they claim that Garner did not acquire an "easement
by purchase" because any easement described in the Contract of Sale from McCulloch to D.
Garner is "merged" into the Warranty Deed, which does not mention an easement at a11. 28
In Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82,967 P.2d 284 (1998), Barry, pursuant to a contract of

sale, sold property to Estes. The terms of the contract were a purchase price of$59,500, with
$13,900 down and an assumption by Estes of an existing mortgage in the amount of $45,600.
However, because Barry had purchased the home pursuant to a specific government loan
program that contained a recapture provision, the deed specified that the underlying indebtedness
was $47,500, subject to recapture under the FHA § 235 program. Later, Estes was required to
pay a recapture amount and sued Barry for that payment, asserting a breach of the contract of
sale. Barry claimed that the contract of sale was merged into the deed and the deed controlled.
The Idaho Supreme Court, quoting Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879
(1966), set forth the merger doctrine, as follows:

27

!d.
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It is a well established rule oflaw that prior stipulations are merged in the final and
formal contract executed by the parties, and this rule applies to a deed or a mortgage
based upon a contract to convey. When a deed is delivered and accepted as performance
of the contract to convey, the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of the
deed may vary from those contained in the contract, the deed alone must be looked to to
determine the rights of the parties ....

There is an exception to the rule stated, which is that the contract of conveyance is not
merged upon execution of a deed where under the contract the rights are conferred
collaterally and independent ofthe deed; there being no presumption that the party in
accepting the deed intends to give up the covenants of which the deed is not a
performance or satisfaction. Where the right claimed under the contract would vary,
change, or alter the agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the very subject-matter
with which the deed deals, a prior contract covering the same subject-matter cannot be
shown as against the provisions of the deed. Id. at 382-83, 414 P.2d at 884 (emphasis in
the original) (quoting Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 41 N.M. 82,64 P.2d 377,380
(1936)).
132 Idaho at 85, 967 P.2d at 287. The Court held that because the terms of the contract were in
conflict with the deed, the contract was merged and the deed controlled.
In Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704,152 P.3d 575 (2007), an
easement case, a landowner named Funk owned a large piece of property, which was sold to
various purchasers over time. In one instance, Funk entered into a real estate contract "subject to
and including an ingress egress easement over this and adjoining property ... " However, the
deed did not mention an easement. Much later, a successor in interest to one of the parcels
claimed an easement across another parcel based on the language ofthe contract of sale. The
ultimate holding of the Idaho Supreme Court was:
In determining that the sale agreement created an express easement the court focused
upon the following language in paragraph 5: "Subject to and including an ingress egress
easement over this and adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22 owned by the
grantor ... " The question is whether the parties made clear their intention to establish a
servitude over the Section 21 parcel subsequently acquired by the Lawrences for the
benefit of other unspecified property owned by the Funks in Sections 21 and 22. There is
nothing in the sale agreement that indicates an immediate grant of easement rights ....

28 The "merger" principle was first raised in Poveys' Reply, p. 2, citing Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 85, 967 P.2d
284,287 (1998) and Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawr~nce, 143 Idaho 704,152 P.3d 575 (2007).
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The sale agreement therefore does not, by itself, create any easement either by grant,
reservation or exception. The district court erred in concluding that it did. In order for an
easement to be created, there needed to be language in the 1992 warranty deed reserving
or excepting an easement. No such language is contained therein. The deed does make
reference to the sale agreement but does not purport to incorporate it and, even if it did,
the language in the sale agreement is insufficient to create an easement.
143 Idaho at 708,152 P.3d at 579. This case holds that if a contract of sale is expressly
referenced and incorporated into a deed, then any terms of that contract have continued force and
effect. However, the converse is also true. If a deed does not incorporate terms of a contract of
sale that have direct bearing on the subject matter of the sale, the contract is merged into the deed
and the deed controls. In fact, in his concurring opinion, Justice Eismann stated:
In 1975 Harold and Marlene Funk sold certain real property to Human Synergistics, Inc.,
under a real estate contract. The contract provided that the sale was:

5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and adjoining
property in said sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and including an ingress
egress easement over portions of Section 21 heretofore granted to the grantors.
The contract recited that the Funks had executed a deed conveying the property to Human
Synergistics .... That deed did not reserve or grant any easement. The district court held
that the above-quoted sentence in the real estate contract created an easement. The district
court did not explain how it could have done so.
Under the doctrine of merger, any recitals in the real estate contract were merged into the
deed .... There is no question that the deed in this case was delivered and accepted in
performance of the real estate contract. It recites that it was.
The recital does not incorporate the contract by reference, but merely excludes from the
warranties of title, quiet enjoyment, and against encumbrances any defect arising out of
the purchaser's conduct during the time from the contract of sale to the issuance of the
warranty deed. Thus, under the doctrine of merger, any purported reservation or grant of
an easement in the real estate contract would be irrelevant. The district court erred in
attempting to create an easement based upon the real estate contract.
143 Idaho at 709-10, 152 P.3d at 580-81.
In this case, the undisputed facts demonstrate that D. Garner acquired property from
McCullochs by deed, but the deed did not specify an easement and did not, by its express terms,
incorporate the contract of sale which did reference an easement in an "existing roadway." An
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easement, which is a restriction or limitation on the use of the servient estate, "inheres in the very
subject-matter with which the deed deals,,,29 and is not collateral thereto. Thus, the Court
concludes that the Contract of Sale between D. Gamer and McCulloch is merged into the deed
and no express easement by purchase was created in 1987.
B.

Poveys are not entitled to determine the location ofD. Gamer's easement.

If the Contract of Sale is merged into the deed, Poveys claim that D. Gamer's easement
was, at the time of transfer from McCulloch to D. Gamer, an "unbounded easement," and that
it's location can be established by the servient estate holder, Poveys, at their discretion, citing

Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 817 P.2d 188 (Ct.App. 1991). The Court disagrees.
In Bethel, the plaintiff acquired property from Van Stone in 1974. The deed expressly
conveyed two "easements of record" and reserved to the VanStone's an easement across the
deeded property to serve other properties they owned. The easement in question stated, in
pertinent part: "the parties ... desire to provide mutual easements for ingress and egress ... do
hereby grant unto the other. .. a perpetual sixty (60) foot easement over and across the existing
road as it traverses their respective interests in the said Government Lots 1, 2 and 3 ... " The
district court determined, and the Idaho Supreme Court agreed, that this easement was
ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence must be considered to determine the intent of the parties. 3o
The only factual dispute was where one end of the easement was located. Bethels believed that
the southern part of the easement ran through a certain meadow although it was agreed that there
was no road in the meadow at the time the easement was granted. Another access road was
available along an additional 16 foot easement as well, although Bethels claimed that easement
was inadequate. There was testimony showing that Bethels had driven through the meadow in

29 Estes, supra. In this case, the sale of the property is the subject matter of the deed and an easement would be a
restriction on the use of the deeded property.

DECISION & ORDER-14
Register No.CV-04-0113-0C

exercise of their claimed easement, although it was agreed that the meadow was closed offby the
Van Stones at times for feeding cattle. At some point there was a dispute over the continued and
expanded use of easement through the meadow and litigation ensued. The district court found
that Bethels had an express 60 foot easement through the meadow and the Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed. The case was remanded for a judicial determination of the metes and bounds
description ofthe easement. In doing so, however, the Court stated:
[T]he present owner of Chester's property [the servient estate holder of the meadow]
shall have the right in the first instance to locate the road within the meadow, and, 'if
reasonably suitable for the purpose, a selection of the place cannot be questioned' ... This
procedure is in recognition of the right of the owner of the servient property to make such
use of his property as he desires, so long as his use is consistent with the easement
granted. The owner may choose the location of minimize the impact of the road and to
prevent unreasonable interference with the rights of the owner so long as the chosen
easement is a convenient and suitable way.31
120 Idaho at 528,817 P.2d at 194. It is this statement upon which Poveys rely to support their
contention that they are entitled to put D. Garner's easement in a reasonably suited place oftheir
choosing. However, this statement ofthe Court must also be noted:
Consistent with these rights, the district court should encourage the parties to agree to the
exact location of the entire sixty-foot easement, but to the extent they are unable or
unwilling to do this, the court shall determine a reasonable location that is convenient and
suitable.
Jd.

While there are some factual similarities between Bethel and this case that may offer
guidance, the differences are paramount. First, the case involved an express easement
established by an ambiguous deed. Second, while the exact placement of the easement within
the meadow had to be determined, the presence of the easement in the meadow was established
by the deed. It was only the precise location of the easement within that meadow that was

30
31

120 Idaho at 525,817 P.2d at 191.
Quoting from Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 246-47, 270 P.2d 825,826 (1954).
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subject to the servient owner's discretion, and even that was to be detennined by agreement of
the parties ifpossible. In the instant case, this Court has detennined that D. Garner does not
have an easement by agreement, and there is no evaluation of extrinsic evidence needed to
detennine an ambiguous written easement. Based on this conclusion, Poveys' contention that
they are entitled to choose the location of an easement is inconsistent with and not a reasonable
extension of Bethel.
Poveys also make much of the fact that Daniel Garner was in college when he purchased
the 40 acres from McCulloch in 1987, that D. Garner's parents, Gary and Nola Gamer, did much
of the negotiating for him, and that Gary and Nola Garner did not want the easement to run along
the Northern Road because ofthe presence of children. 32 Poveys also assert that Gary Gamer
specifically acquired the Rice Road, including a new crossing of the Twin Lakes Canal, to allow
another access to all of Garners' property.33 However, any discussions in 1987 about where D.
Garner's easement would be, regardless of who was involved in those discussions, are also
merged into the deed, which does not reserve any easement. Thus, these discussions are
irrelevant and cannot contradict the deed. The location of Garners' easement arises by operation
oflaw, as noted below. Poveys cannot consistentiy argue that there is no express easement
pursuant to merger, and then also argue that there was an agreement to have it in a location other
than the Northern Road.
By the same token, any desire by Gary Gamer, in 1999, to persuade the Twin Lakes
Canal Co. to build another crossing on the Twin Lakes Canal so he could use the Rice Road for
access to his property is not binding on D. Gamer, there being no assertion that Gary Gamer had
authority to speak for D. Garner at that time. That desire also does not establish that N. Garner

32

Poveys Memo, p. 8; Poveys Reply, pp. 7-8, including deposition references.

33

ld.; Kendall Aff.; Jensen Aff.
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did not have an easement in the Northern Road. Rather, it confirms that he believed he did. The
fact that Gary Garner may have desired to abandon the Northern Road easement does not
establish that he accomplished it. The evidence is insufficient to conclude that N. Garner did
anything other than express an interest and make an unsuccessful attempt to move their access to
their property from the Northern Road to the Rice Road.
C.

D. Garner acquired an easement by operation oflaw in the Northern Road.

Even though Poveys acknowledge that D. Garner has an easement across their property,
questions remain as to how that easement came into being, what type of easement it is, and
where it is located.
The evidence is undisputed that D. Garner used the Northern Road as the access to his
property from 1987 to 2008 when this lawsuit commenced. 34 N. Garner openly used the
Northern Road from when they acquired their property in 1992 until 2008. 35 Poveys do not
dispute the use ofthe Northern Road, openly and obviously, for many years by Garners.36
There are two types of implied easements~ an easement by prior use and an easement by
necessity. The elements of an implied easement by prior use are:
In order to establish an implied easement by prior use, the party seeking to establish the
easement must demonstrate three essential elements: (1) unity oftitle or ownership and
subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long
enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be
permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment
of the dominant estate.

34 Poveys Memo. Ex. C, p. 65, 1. 15-17; Garner Aff. ~ 3. Poveys submitted the Rice Affs. to establish that the
Neigum Driveway was also accessible to D. Garner at some point, but those affidavits lack foundation and have
been stricken. In addition, Ex. B to the Garner Aff. clearly shows that the Northern Road was the only access
available to D. Garner in 1987.
35 Poveys Memo Ex. B, pp. 225-26; Second Amended Complaint, ~ 42.D[2].
36 Poveys Memo, pp. 3-4.
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Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 (1999).37 As applied to this case, the
first element is established because McCullochs owned the entire property, and then transferred
the dominant estate to D. Garner, retaining the servient estate across which the easement passed.
As to the second element, there is no direct evidence showing McCullochs used the Northern
Road and for what period oftime. The Court infers, however, that McCullochs, who owned the
entire property in question prior to 1987, used the Northern Road to access their property across
the Twin Lakes Canal because no other access was possible and Garner's Aff. Ex. A shows the
Northern Road as the only available access in 1987. As to the third element, an easement on the
Northern Road was reasonably necessary in 1987 to allow D. Garner access and enjoyment of his
property on the west side of the Twin Lakes Canal. An implied easement by prior use is shown.
An implied easement by necessity is similar to an easement by prior use, but there are

some differences in the elements:
One who claims an easement by necessity across another's land must prove "(1) unity of
title and subsequent separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) necessity of the
easement at the time of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." Bear
Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 (1994).
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 482-83,129 P.3d 1223, 1231-32 (2006). As applied in this
case, the first and second elements are established by the same facts that establish an easement
by prior use. Whether there is a "great present" necessity for the easement is more questionable.
Certainly, by the time D. Garner filed this lawsuit he had received an easement in the Neigum
Driveway from Poveys.38 That was an established alternate to the Northern Road. D. Garner
asserts that the Neigum Driveway is inadequate because it is only 20 feet wide. 39 However, the

See also Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196,204 (2005); Beach Lateral
Water Users Ass 'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 130 P.3d 1138 (2006).
38 See discussion at p. 3-4, infra, and fn. 12-14.
39 Gamer Aff. ~ 9.
37
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Povey Aff shows that the width necessary may only be 20 feet. 4o The Court concludes that
questions of fact exist about whether an easement by necessity is established. Thus, the Court
cannot conclude that D. Garner acquired an easement by necessity in the Northern Road.
The third type of easement that may apply here is an easement by prescription.
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription "must prove by
clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1)
open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of
right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5)
for the statutory period." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973. The statutory period
in question is five years. I.C. § 5-203; Weaver, 134 Idaho at 698,8 P.3d at 1241.. ..
Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, .continuous, uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v.
Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383,385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair, 130
Idaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). The burden then shifts to the owner ofthe
servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a
license, contract, or agreement. Wood, 131 Idaho at 703,963 P.2d at 386; Marshall, 130
Idaho at 680,946 P.2d at 980. The nature of the use is adverse if"it runs contrary to the
servient owner's claims to the property." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The
state of mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; the focus is on the
nature of their use. Id. at 231-32, 76 P .3d at 975-76.

Akers, 142 Idaho at 303, 127 P.3d at 206. In this case the undisputed evidence shows that D.
Gamer's use of the Northern Road was open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, with
the actual or imputed knowledge ofPoveys and for in excess of five years. Since Poveys
acquired the servient estate from McCulloch without any reservation of an easement for D.
Garner, D. Gamer's use of the Northern Road after 1990 was clearly adverse to Poveys.
Thus, the Court concludes, as a matter oflaw, and based on undisputed facts, that an
easement was acquired by D. Garner in the Northern Road, and was an easement by prior use
and/or an easement by prescription.

40 The Court has previously ruled that the Povey Affidavit need not be considered because the issues raised by it are
moot. However, the Court refers to it here only to establish that questions of fact exist about whether there is
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II.

What easement did N. Garner acquire and where is it located?
N. Gamer cannot point to any deed or agreement that mentions or describes an express

easement across Poveys' property. The deed from Poveys does not specifically reserve any
easement, but N. Gamer asserts that the language of the deed - "with their appurtenances" establishes an express easement. 41 They cite no authority to this effect. On the other hand:
An express easement, being an interest in real property, may only be created by a written
instrument. Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770; 773, 554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976) (citing I.e. § 9503; McReynolds v. Harrigfeld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096 (1914». ''No particular forms
or words of art are necessary [to create an express easement]; it is necessary only that the
parties make clear their intention to establish a servitude." Benninger v. Derifield, 142
Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006) (quoting Seccombe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433,
436, 767 P.2d 276, 279 (Ct.App.1989». An express easement may be created by a written
agreement between the owner of the dominant estate and the owner of the servient estate.
It may also be created by a deed from the owner of the servient estate to the owner of the
dominant estate.
Capstar, 143 Idaho at 707, 152 P.3d at 579. Thus, an express easement can only be created by a

written document which clearly expresses an intention "to establish a servitude."
N. Gamer's attempt to create an easement through the use of the language "with their
appurtenances" reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of an "appurtenant easement."
There is a difference between easements appurtenant and easements in gross. West v.
Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 556, 511 P.2d 1326, 1332 (1973). An easement appurtenant is
attached to a dominant tenement. Id. A person does not hold an easement in gross by
virtue of ownership in a particular parcel of land; rather, an easement in gross is a
personal right to use the land of another. Id. .... Contrarily, an easement appurtenant
"serves the owner of the dominant estate in a way that cannot be separated from his rights
in the land." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. When such an easement is
created, "it becomes fixed as an appurtenance to the real property, which is subject to the
prescriptive use and may be claimed by a successor in interest." Id. "In cases of doubt,
Idaho courts presume the easement is appurtenant." Id.
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876, 884 (2008).

Therefore, easement

"appurtenant" or "in gross" is simply a description of the type of easement that exists after it is

currently a "great present necessity."
Gamer Memorandum, p. 6; Second Amended Complaint, ~~ 11, 35; Complaint Ex. F.

41
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created. The use of such language in a deed does not create an easement, although it may covey
or reserve an easement that has already been created. Thus;in this case, the easement D. Garner
acquired, by prior use and/or prescription, was an easement "appurtenant" to the Poveys'
servient property, but it was not expressly created by such language in any deed.
With this understanding, N. Garner did not acquire an express easement of any kind.
There is no express reservation of a servitude by Poveys, when they conveyed property to N.
Gamer in 1992. The use of the phrase "with their appurtenances" did not create an easement in
favor ofN. Garner.
Without an express easement, the Court must determine what type of easement N. Gamer
acquired across Poveys' property. The analysis of this question is the same as determining the
type and location of D. Garners' easement. N. Gamer, after acquiring landlocked property from
Poveys in 1992, could not have accessed that property without some type of easement across
Poveys' property. Poveys do not dispute N. Garner's assertion that they used the Northern Road
under the same conditions as did D. Gamer for at least five years after 1992, and on some form
of regular basis thereafter until 2008. While Gary Garner desired to use a different easement to
protect the children of the Poveys,42 this desire confirms, rather than refutes, the fact that Gary
and Nola Garner believed they had an easement in the Northern Road.
With the same analysis stated above, this Court concludes, as a matter of law, that N.
Garner had an easement, by prescription and/or prior use, in the Northern Road. 43
The Court has gone to some lengths to review the record to determine whether, as a
matter of law, D. Garner and N. Garner acquired an easement in the Northern Road, and has

41

- Poveys Memo Ex. B, p. 27.
The elements of an easement by prior use is confirmed by the fact that both the dominant and servient estates were
held by Poveys, the Poveys used the Northern Road easement in a way that establishes its permanence, and the use
by N. Gamer was reasonably necessary for the proper e~oyment ofN. Gamer's property.
43
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concluded that they did. To what end? The duty Poveys may have had to Garners, if any, cannot
be determined until the type of easement Garners had across Poveys' property is also known.
Since the Court has concluded, as a matter of law, the nature and location of the Garners
easements across Poveys' property, the Court can now address whether Poveys breached any
duty to protect or preserve those easements.
III.

Did Povevs breach a duty to Garners relative to the Garners' easements?
A.

What is the duty of the servient property holder to protect the easement?

Garners assert that Poveys have a duty to not interfere with their easement and failed to
do so, both physically and by transfer. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to
decide. 44 The holder of the servient estate clearly has a duty not to physically interfere with the
easement in such a way as to prevent its reasonable use.
A servient owner ordinarily has no duty to do any positive act with respect to the
maintenance or repair of an easement, but he or she is required to refrain from unlawfully
interfering with or obstructing the easement. ...
The servient owner has all the rights and benefits of ownership consistent with the
easement, however. Thus, the right to use the land remains in the servient owner, without
any express reservation to that effect, so far as such right does not conflict with the
purpose and character of the easement. The servient owner may cultivate or make
improvements on the land subject to an easement of way, or use the way for any purpose,
provided that he or she does not interfere with the right of passage resting in the owner of
the easement. ... [Emphasis added].
Am. Jur. 2d, Easements, § 86. This principle of law was confirmed in Benninger v. Derifield,
142 Idaho 486, 129 P.3d 1235 (2006), where the parties shared a driveway that was in existence
when both parties acquired their homes and was the only access Benninger had to the home.
Derifield obstructed the driveway such that Benningers had to walk to their home from an
adjacent roadway.

Ultimately, the courts found that Benninger had acquired a prescriptive

easement in the driveway and that Derifield could not interfere with Benninger's reasonable use
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of the driveway. See also Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho
518,523,20 P.3d 702, 706 (2001).45
What is the duty of the servient property owner when he sells the property to another?
The Court has found no Idaho decisions which specifically identify any duty, and none have
been cited by the parties. However, the reasoning of the court in Crescent Harbor Water Co.,
Inc. v. Lyseng, 51 Wash.App. 337, 346, 753 P.2d 555,560 (Wash.App.1988), is helpful:
It is well settled that title acquired by adverse possession is not affected by the recording
statutes. In Mugaas v. Smith, 33 Wash.2d 429, 432-33, 206 P.2d 332, 9 A.LR.2d 846

(1949), the Supreme Court emphasized that if the transfer of a servient tenement to a
bona fide purchaser without notice is sufficient to extinguish title by adverse possession,
then claimants under the adverse possession statute, however they may have perfected
their rights, "must keep [their] flag flying for ever, and the statute ceases to be a statute of
limitations." (Emphasis in original.) The court concluded it was therefore appropriate that
the recording acts "relate exclusively to written titles." [Citation omitted]. ...
The courts' reasoning in these cases applies equally well to prescriptive easements. An
easement by prescription is not subject to recordation and would be of little value if it
were extinguished by a transfer of the servient estate. Thus,
[i]t is a recognized principle that a bona fide purchaser ofland without actual or
constructive notice ofthe existence of an easement in such land takes title free
from the burden of the easement. As stated, this rule is broad enough to include
all easements, ... but an examination of the cases ... will disclose that while this
principle is occasionally relied upon to support a holding that a purchaser ofland
without notice ... takes free of [an] easement [by implication], it has rarely, if
ever, been intemreted to mean that an easement by prescription once actually in
existence can be destroyed by a conveyance of the servient estate even to a
purchaser in good faith. [Citation omitted]. We therefore hold that the bona fide
purchaser doctrine does not apply to an easement by prescription. [Emphasis
added].
Several other legal principles apply as well. First, does a subsequent purchaser take the
servient estate subject to an unrecorded easement?

In Davis v. Peacock, supra, the Idaho

Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,192 P.3d 1036 (2008; Hansen v. City o/Pocatello, 145 Idaho 700,184 P.3d 206
(2008); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122,937 P.2d 434 (Ct.App.1997).

44

45 "The owner of the servient estate is entitled to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does
not materially interfere with, the use of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. See Boydstun Beach
Ass'n. v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 377, 723 P.2d 914, 921 (1986). In other words, the servient estate owner is entitled
to make uses of the property that do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate owner's erUoyment of the
easement. See Carson v. Elliott, III Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (Ct.App.l986). Thus, an easement owner is
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Supreme Court stated:
Peacock's final argument is that, even if the easement was created and passed to the
Davises, he should not be subject to the easement because it is an unrecorded interest not
contained in his chain of title. However, Peacock admitted that his deed expressly
included a provision notifying him there was a road over his land providing access to the
neighbor's property. It is undisputed, therefore, that he had actual knowledge of the
existence of the road, if not the easement. Because of this notice, Peacock had the duty to
at least inquire into the situation at the time he purchased the property. Since he failed to
do so, he cannot now claim that he had no notice of the easement.
Davis, 133 Idaho at 644,991 P.2d at 369.

Second, if a claimed easement is not recorded, what

IS

the duty of the subsequent

purchaser of the servient estate?
"One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement, or with notice, actual or
constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement, takes the land subject to the
easement." Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721,152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944).
Akers, 142 Idaho at 301, 127 P.3d at 204.
In addition, a subsequent purchaser has a duty of inquiry.

This Court has stated that when one is purchasing land, the rule of caveat emptor applies
and that "whatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence
and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a reasonable
investigation would disclose." Hill v. Federal Land Bank, 59 Idaho 136, 141, 80 P.2d
789, 791 (1938). See also, Farrell v. Brown, 111 Idaho 1027, 1033, 729 P.2d 1090, 1096
(Ct.App.1986).
Hunter, 131 Idaho at 153,953 P.2d at 593. 46

Finally, the five years needed to acquire a prescriptive easement can span the ownership
of the servient estate by more than one owner.

.

A claimant may rely on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such predecessor's
use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite five continuous years of adverse
use." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974.
entitled to relief upon a showing that he is obstructed from exercising privileges granted in the easement. See
Boydstun Beach, 111 Idaho at 377, 723 P.2d at 921."
46 See also Ponderosa Homeside Lot Owners v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc., 143 Idaho 407, 410,146 P.3d 673,676
(2006).
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Akers, 142 Idaho at 303, 127 P.3d at 206.

From these legal principles, the Court concludes that the duty of the servient estate
holder, upon sale of the servient estate, is only to expressly convey what is of record, either by
express agreement or express determination. 47 No duty arises to expressly protect implied or
prescriptive easements, particularly when the easement use is open and obvious. Subsequent
purchasers of the servient property take the property subject to easements of which the purchaser
has notice, actual or constructive, either by inquiry or what is in view, and the duty of inquiry is
on the purchaser. To hold otherwise would be to impose a duty on a servient estate holder to
convey something which may not even exist. 48
B.

Poveys did not physically interfere with Garners' easement. The material facts,

either undisputed or viewed in a light most favorable to Garners, are that once in the late 80's or
early 90's, and twice in the spring of 2005, a portion of the Northern Road was plowed over or
disturbed in a way that D. Garner became stuck, either with his pickup or with a backhoe, while
traversing the Northern Road. 49 These events occurred while Poveys owned and lived on the
property. Poveys assert that the Court may not infer that any plowing or disturbing of the
easement was at their direction. However, Nola Garner testified that she saw Poveys' nephews
"disturbing the road so it could be planted". in 2005. 50

Viewing all facts and reasonable

inferences in favor of Garners, the Court concludes that, at a minimum, any plowing or

47 For example, should a servient estate holder challenge a claimed implied or prescriptive easement and that
easement be established by judicial determination, the servient estate holder may have a higher duty to expressly
disclose that determination, to subsequent purchasers of the servient estate.
48 For example, if Viehweg and First American Title had obtained a judicial determination that Garners did not have
an easement in the Northern Road, any lack of reference to that easement in the deeds of transfer by Poveys would
simply be confrrmed by that determination. Assume there had been three more sucessors in interest between Poveys
and Viehwegs. Could Garners still assert that Poveys breached some duty to protect an implied or prescriptive
easement? Clearly not. The analysis and conclusion is the same when there is only one sale.
49 Poveys Memo Ex. C, pp. 61-63, 70-73; Garner Aff. ~~ 7,10.
50 Complaint Ex. B, p. 107; Nola Gamer Depo., p. 94.
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disturbance of the Northern Road on the two occasions mentioned were for the benefit ofPoveys
and was their responsibility.
However, the Court also concludes that these undisputed facts, and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, do not establish a breach of any duty by Poveys, as a matter of law,
for several reasons.
First, "the servient owner may cultivate or make improvements on the land subject to an
easement of way, or use the way for any purpose, provided that he or she does not interfere with
the right of passage resting in the owner of the easement. ... ,,51 Poveys were entitled to use the
servient estate for farming purposes, as reasonably necessary, as long as Garners' "right of
passage" was retained. While the plowing may have, in a very temporary way, made passage
harder, this cannot constitute a legal interference with the easement. D. Garner's testimony
confirmed that his expected access was retained after the field was planted. 52 When an easement
crosses a servient estate that is used for farming, it is reasonable to expect some minor
inconvenience in using the easement during plowing in the spring. 53 At best, any plowing was
just that, a minor inconvenience that does not constitute an unreasonable interference with the
easement.
Second, any claim for the event in the 80's or early 90's is clearly barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.

The parties dispute which statute of limitations applies54

However, the Court concludes that the four year statute of limitations applies to these claims. 55

AmJur.2d, Easements, § 86.
Poveys Memo Ex. C, pp. 63-64.
53 This is similar to the easement in Bethel v. Van Stone, supra, where gates closed off the easement in question
when cows were using the meadow, a reasonable use by the servient estate holder.
54 Poveys assert that the statute oflimitations for trespass on real property, I.e. § 5-218 applies, while Garners assert
that I.e. § 5-224 applies.
55 Actions for damage to real property, the essence of Garners claims on this point, are governed by I.C. § 5-224.
Woodland v. Lyon, 78 Idaho 79, 298 P.2d 380 (1956); Boise Dev. Co. v. Boise City, 30 Idaho 675,167 P. 1032
(1917).
5]

52
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Nevertheless, any claim for damage to property, i.e., the easement, occurring in the late 80's or
early 90's, is clearly barred. Although the claim for any damage in the spring of 2005 is not
barred by the statute of limitations, the fact that this is the only remaining claim for such damage
enhances the Court's conclusions as to the limited nature of this claim.
Third, there is nothing in this record to establish any damage experienced by D. Garner.
He asserts that he has continually used the Northern Road in the same fashion contemplated in
1987 and there is nothing to suggest that his use, in the way he expected, was substantially
interfered with during that entire period. 56 Getting stuck with a backhoe twice in 2005 does not
establish any monetary loss on his part. 57
For these reasons, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that no viable claim is made
for physical interference, by Poveys, with the Northern Road easement.
C.

Poveys did not breach any duty when they transferred portions of the servient

estate to Dean, Neigum and Viehweg. This is the final issue on whether Poveys breached a duty
owed to Garners. It is reiterated that Poveys did not take the servient estate from McCullochs
subject to any easement specifically described, reserved or mentioned in their deed. At best, as
this Court has already concluded, Poveys took their property subject to an easement in favor of
D. Garner because D. Garner acquired an implied or prescriptive easement, or began to acquire
such an easement, when he purchased from McCullochs in 1987. N. Garner did not even begin
to acquire an easement in the Northern Road until they purchased their property in 1992, and this
was also not an express easement, but implied and/or by prescription. Poveys duty was to
Second Amended Complaint, ~2.D.[l]; Garner Mf ~ 3.
Garners make much of this Court's Decision denying Poveys Motion to Dismiss, March 11, 2009, which states:
"It would be possible for Poveys to block, hinder, or obscure the access road without permanently depriving Garners
of its use, and the level of the alleged obstruction, and any resulting damage, would remain an issue for the jury to
determine. Thus, the fact that Garners used the road continuously for over 20 years does not preclude the possibility
that obstruction or interference existed during some portion of that time." However, the context of that order was
56
57
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convey what they received expressly, either by deed or by judicial determination. Each of the
transfers will be discussed in turn.
Dean transfer. Poveys conveyed a certain parcel to Dean in 1999. Garners' easement in
the Northern Road was adjacent and appurtenant to the Dean property. The deed from Poveys to
Dean specifically states that the transfer was "SUBJECT TO all easements" and "free from all
encumbrances except.. .easements of record, and easements visible on the premises ... " In short,
Poveys conveyed to Dean a property description more definitive concerning easements than any
they received. Garners claim that Poveys had a duty to be even more definitive, by describing in
the deed the exact easement claimed by Garners. While it is reasonable to infer that Poveys were
aware of Garners use and claim to an easement in the Northern Road, no such easement was
expressly conveyed or legally determined. Thus, any duty Poveys had was fulfilled with the
description provided in the deed to Dean.
Neigum transfer.

Poveys conveyed a certain parcel to Neigum in 2001. The Court

reiterates that the property acquired by Neigum does not impact or touch, in any way, the
Northern Road. Nevertheless, Poveys' deed to Neigum specifically reserved, in favor of D.
Garner, a 20 foot easement in the Neigum Driveway.58 Although it is clear that Brad Povey
attempted to persuade Daniel Garner to move his easement from the Northern Road to the
Neigum Driveway, it is also clear that Daniel Garner did not agree to this proposa1. 59 Garners
assert that this is evidence of Poveys' attempt to affirmatively extinguish, obstruct and create
doubt about the existence of Garners' easement in the Northern Road. 6o

An alternative

explanation is equally possible, i.e., that Poveys gratuitously conveyed an easement to D. Gamer

without full development of both facts and the law related to physical interference with an easement. The only issue
there was whether the Amended Complaint may state a claim for relief so as to survive a Motion to Dismiss.
58 Complaint Ex. N.
59 Garner Memo, pp. 11-14, which references D. Gamer's Depo.; Garner Aff. ~ 8.
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in the Neigum Driveway in the hope that D. Garner would voluntarily agree to use that easement
instead of the Northern Road. However, Poveys' motive is not relevant here. Poveys had no
duty to protect a non-express easement in the Northern Road when they conveyed property to
Neigum which does not even impact or touch on the Northern Road. 61
Viehweg transfer. Poveys conveyed a certain parcel, which did impact the Northern
Road, to Viehweg in 2005. The Viehweg deed is silent as to any specific easement. However, it
does covey the property "with their appurtenances.,,62 The Court has previously held that the
easement in the Northern Road is an easement "appurtenant" to the Poveys' property. Thus,
when Poveys conveyed property to Viehweg, "with their appurtenances," Viehwegs took the
property subject to any appurtenant easement. The implied or prescriptive easement Garners
have was conveyed to Viehweg by that deed. Poveys fulfilled any duty they had to Viehweg and
to Garners.

The fact that Viehweg, almost three years later, decided to challenge Garners'

easement by putting up a fence does not create a liability in Poveys. The undisputed facts in this
record show that the Northern Road was open and obvious and was being used by Garners until
Viehweg put up the fence blocking the road in 2008. Thus, at a minimum, Viehweg was on
notice, actual or constructive, of both the roadway on the ground and its use by Garners, at the
time of the purchase from Poveys and for almost three years thereafter, which imposed a duty of
inquiry on Viehweg, as the purchaser ofthe servient estate, regardless of whether Poveys advised
Viehweg of Garners use of the Northern Road or not.

Gamer Memo, pp. 6, 14.
The issue as to whether D. Garner, as a "stranger" to the deed between Poveys and Neigums, is entitled to the
easement reserved for him in the Neigum deed, is technically raised by the facts of this case, but is MOOT and need
not be decided herein because the settlement agreement represented is that Garners have acquired a permanent
easement in the Neigum Driveway and have abandoned any easement in the Northern Road. See Benninger v.
Derifield, supra, 142 Idaho at 490, 129 P.3d 1239; Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969,976 (2003);
Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 209-10,360 P.2d 403,406 (1961) for a discussion of the rights, if any, a stranger to a
deed can obtain in an easement described therein.
62 Complaint Ex. P.
60
61
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Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that D. Gamer and N. Garner acquired an
easement, implied and/or prescriptive, in the Northern Road and Poveys could not unilaterally
change the easement to another location. However, because the Garners' easement was not
express, and had not been judicially determined, Poveys. only duty was to not unreasonably
interfere physically with Garners' easement.

Poveys had no duty to protect, by express

language, Garners' easement in any conveyance of the servient estate. Nevertheless, Poveys did
convey, with appropriate language, any easement that may have been created over time in
Garners behalf, through the conveyances of portions of the servient estate to Dean and Viehweg.
Poveys attempted to created an additional easement for D. Garner in the conveyance to Neigum.
The Court further concludes that Poveys did not, as a matter of law, unreasonably physically
interfere with Garners' easement for the reasons stated above. Poveys' Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint and Motion for Enlargement of
Time

The last motions for consideration are Garners' Motion for Leave to Amend Second
Amended Complaint ("Motion to Amend") and Motion for Enlargement of Time ("Motion to
Enlarge"). Although the Motion to Enlarge asks for more time to file affidavits and take further
depositions to assist in Garners' opposition to the MSJ, the Court considers it here because of the
Court's decision on the MSJ. Poveys object to the Motion to Amend and Motion to Enlarge on
the basis that Neigum and Viehweg have never filed any cross-claims prior to this time, under
LR.C.P. 13(g), and also assert that Garners have failed to comply with the requirements of
LR.C.P. 56(f). Dealing with the objections first, the Court, in its discretion, concludes that a
sufficient basis has been shown to permit consideration of both the Motion to Amend and the
Motion to Enlarge. Ample justification has been given for any delays in asserting the claims
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sought to be added by the Motion to Amend and in not submitted additional affidavits or
conducting further discovery to assist in responding to the MSJ. 63 The Court will consider the
Motion to Amend and the Motion to Enlarge on their merits:
The determination of a motion to amend a complaint is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 43, 122 P.3d 300,302 (2005).
In considering a proposed amendment to a Complaint, the Court may consider "whether the
amended pleading sets out a valid claim, whether the opposing party would be prejudiced by any
undue delay, or whether the opposing party has an available defense to the newly added claim."
Id. at 44, 122 P.3d at 303. As a general rule, requests to amend are to be "freely given" absent

undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, or the futility of the amendment.

Carl Christensen

Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999); Suitts v. First
Security Bank

0/ Idaho, 110 Idaho 15, 24-25, 713 P.2d 1374, 1383-84 (1985). On the other

hand, the proposed amendment must adequately state a cause of action. If it does not, a denial of
the request to amend is not an abuse of discretion. See Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v.
Idaho First Nat'! Bank, 119 Idaho 160, 804 P.2d 900 (1991); Wells v. United States Life Ins. Co.,

119 Idaho 160,804 P.2d 333 (Ct.App. 1991).
The sole basis for the Motion to Amend is that a settlement has been reached between
Garners on the one hand and Dean, Neigum and Viehweg on the other hand, by which Neigum
and Viehweg, only, "assign to Garners causes of action against the Poveys.,,64 The only
document before the Court that explains the nature of any claims Neigum and Viehweg may
have against Poveys is the proposed Third Amended Complaint ("3 rd Complaint"), attached to
the Second Affidavit of Michael Brown, Ex. E. In essence, the 3rd Complaint alleges only: 1)

63

See Michael Brown Aff. and Second Aft
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that Poveys sold real property to Neigum and Viehweg, 2) that the deeds from Poveys to Neigum
and Viehweg warrant that Poveys were "the owners in fee simple of said premises; that they are
free from all encumbrances and that they will warrant and defend the same from all lawful
claims whatsoever," 3) that the properties conveyed were not free of encumbrances because they
were subject to the easement interests of the Garners, and 4) that the existence of these
encumbrances caused loss to Neigum and Viehweg, primarily in the costs of defending this
lawsuit. The question is whether these allegations adequately state a cause of action.
The basis for the Motion to Enlarge is to permit Garners to file additional affidavits
and/or conduct additional discovery that would assist Garners in pursuing these additional claims
assigned to them by Neigum and Viehweg, and in more fully responding to the MSJ. 65
The Court's legal determinations herein are relevant to the consideration of the Motion to
Amend. The Court has held that the deed by which Poveys conveyed property to Neigum
specifically reserved an easement in the Neigum Driveway in favor of Daniel Garner. The
undisputed evidence also shows that the Neigum property does not touch or relate in any way to
the Northern Road. Interference with the Garners' easement in the Northern Road is the only
basis for the claims by Garners against Neigum in the Second Amended Complaint. Since the
Court has concluded there was no basis for that claim against Poveys, related to the conveyance
to Neigum, it follows, as a matter of law, that there would be no basis for any claim by Neigum
against Poveys related to that same deed. The Court concludes that the 3rd Complaint does not
state an adequate claim of any kind related to the Neigum property.
The Court has held that the deed by which Poveys conveyed property to Viehweg also
conveyed, by operation of law through the use of the word "appurtenance," any easement

64

65

Motion to Amend, p. 2; Michael Brown Aff ~ 9.
The Court does not have before it the settlement agreement which defines the nature of the assignment.
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Garners may have acquired, by implication or prescription, to use the Northern Road. While
Viehweg, and First American Title, may have used the lack of any express description of an
easement in the Viehweg deed as a basis to contest Garners' easement in the Northern Road, the
Court has concluded that Poveys had no duty to more specifically describe the Garners'
easement in the deed to Viehweg. Poveys acquired their property from McCullochs without any
specific mention of Garners' easement and they conveyed a portion of the property to Viehweg
without any specific mention of Garner's easement. The Northern Road was open and obvious
and was used by Garners for almost three years prior to Viehweg's attempt to interfere with it.
Thus, it was Viehweg's duty to inquire, with actual or constructive notice of the use, about the
presence of the Garners' easement. Viehweg's failure to do so, or to contest Garners' easement
even if they did know, cannot be imputed to Poveys. If Poveys have no duty to Garners under
these circumstances, they also have no duty to Viehweg. Therefore, based on the allegations of
the 3rd Complaint, i.e., that Poveys breached some duty to Viehweg by failing to provide notice
of Garners' easement in the deed to Viehweg, the Court concludes that an adequate claim is not
stated.
The Court cannot envision any additional facts, obtained in discovery, or provided by
affidavit, that would alter the legal duty Poveys had to Garners, Neigum and/or Viehweg when
the transfer by deed from Poveys to Neigum and Viehweg occurred. The Court has concluded
that Poveys had no duty to do other than they did, and that they are not liable to Garners for their
actions. Likewise, Poveys are not liable to Neigum or Viehweg for the same actions. The fact
that litigation ensued is unfortunate, but that litigation was precipitated by Viehweg's
determination to contest Garners' easement, an action for which Poveys are not responsible.
Therefore, the Motion to Amend and the Motion to Enlarge are DENIED.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, the Court GRANTS in part, DENIES in
part, and declines to rule in part on Poveys' Motion to Strike. The Court GRANTS in part,
DENIES in part, and declines to rule in part on Garners' Motion to Strike. The Court GRANTS
Poveys' Motion for Summary Judgment in full. The Court DENIES Garners' Motion to Amend
and Motion to Extend Time. Poveys shall submit a Judgment to the Court consistent with this
decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED October 27,2009.

District Judge
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837 South 500 West, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (80l) 533-0300
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Attorneys for the Povey Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Garner, husband
and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and Nola
Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner Living
Trust, dated July 19, 2007,

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES
Case No. CV-08-342

Plaintiffs,
Judge Dunn
v.

Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and
wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C.
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J. Neigum
and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees of the
Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A Neigum
Revocable Trust, dated September 17, 2004;
Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum,
husband and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey,
husband and \\1fe; First American Title
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title Insurer
with an Idaho Certificate of Authority; and First
American Title Company, Inc., an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendants.
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Defendants, Brad and Leiza Povey, as the prevailing parties in this matter, submit the
following Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney Fees pursuant to Rule 54( d), Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. To the best of these parties' knowledge and belief the items are correct and the
costs claimed are in compliance with Rule 54.
The Povey Defendants ask that costs in the amount of$47, 099.85 identified and summarized
in the accompanying Affidavit of Blake S. in Support of Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney
Fees dated November 9, 2009, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated into this
memorandum by reverence, be taxed as costs against the Plaintiffs and in favor of the Povey
Defendants.

I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES PURSUANT
TO IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 54(d) AND IDAHO CODE § 12120(3) AND IDAHO CODE § 12-121.
In this case, Plaintiffs sued these Defendants claiming breach of warranty of title and
interference with easement. In addition to the action being based on a commercial transaction, for
which attorney fees are available under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), this action was brought and pursued
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.

Therefore under Idaho Code § 12-121, as

interpreted by Rule 54(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, these Defendants are entitled to recover all
their attorney fees incurred in defending this action.

A.

Plaintiffs' claims arose out of a commercial ~ransaction, therefore fees are
recoverable under Idaho Code Annotated § 12-120(3).

Idaho Code Annotated § 12-120(3) provides:
2
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(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable
instrument guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court,
to be taxed and collected as costs. (emphasis added)
Plaintiffs took the position in this litigation that the commercial transaction by which the
Poveys conveyed real estate to the Garners and their successors by warranty deed underlay all their
claims. After pointing out to the Court that all the Plaintiffs, pursuant to mesne conveyances, were
successors to the property interests that Gary and Nola Gamer obtained from Brad and Leiza Povey
by warranty deed, Plaintiffs went on to allege in their Second Amended Complaint:
The purchase of the real estate by Gary and Nola from Povey Defendants was a
commercial transaction under Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3) so Plaintiffs, as successors
to Gary and Nola, should be entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees from
Defendants Brad Pavey and Leiza Pavey. Second amended complaint at paragraph
37.

In their memorandum in opposition to these Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiffs again tied all their claims back to the commercial transaction between Gary and Nola Garner
and went on to argue that all the arguments made by them apply to their claims under the warranty
deed. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 18. Clearly then, the
Poveys are entitled to recover all the fees they have expended defending the Garners' claims under
Idaho Code § 12-120 as they all arise out of and relate to the failed commercial transaction claim.

B.

Plaintiffs' claims were brought and pursued frivolously and for a purpose for
which the judicial process was not designed. Therefore Poveys are entitled to
recover their attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Annotated § 12-121 and
Rule S4(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
3

Shortly after this case was filed, in November 2008, counsel for the Povey Defendants worked
out a stand down agreement with Plaintiffs' counsel so that unnecessary attorney fees would not be
incurred. Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Opposition to Motion for Enlargement of Time dated
September 29, 2009, attached hereto as Exhibit "s." Sadly, that stand down agreement was short
lived and the Plaintiffs demanded that the litigation proceed in January 2009. Defendants repeated
settlement attempts met a blank wall from the Plaintiffs. Id. Until a recent interview with former
Defendant Jeffrey Neigum, these Defendants were at a loss to explain the reason for Plaintiffs
litigation tactics in this case. The reason is now clear.
Plaintiffs' claims against the Povey Defendants were brought for purposes other than for
resolution of the dispute alleged in the Complaint. This is a use for which our courts were not
designed. In response to the motion of the Plaintiffs to amend the Second Amended Complaint and
assert claims assigned from, among others, the Neigums, these Defendants contacted the Neigums to
inquire into the assigned claims. Surprisingly, these Defendants learned in that interview that this
action was brought by the Garners to avenge a perceived slight by Brad Povey against his niece,
Plaintiff Sherri-Jo Gamer, and her husband, Plaintiff Daniel Gamer. Affidavit of Jeffrey 1. Neigum
dated October 24, 2009, attached hereto as Exhibit

"c." Such use of the judicial process is

universally condemned and results in liability even in the absence of a statute. But in Idaho, the
legislature has specifically authorized recovery by litigants who are the victims of abuse of process.
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides in pertinent part:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party
4

or parties ...
Rule 54( e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure clarifies:
attorney fees under
may be ayvarded by the court only
when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation ....
The motivation behind the Garners' decision to pursue these claims against the Poveys in the
first instance, and then to require the Poveys to respond to the Complaint rather than continue with
the stand down agreement while issues related to the easement were worked out with the owners of
the property has been a mystery to the Povey Defendants-until now. Given Daniel Garner's
revelation to the Neigums of the true motivation for this action, the Plaintiffs' conduct in this case
makes perfect sense. This court should not condone the use of its processes for such purposes,
however.

An award to the Povey Defendants of all their attorney fees would send an appropriate

message to these Plaintiffs and others who might be tempted, not to trifle with the jurisdiction of the
Court.

C.

Povey Defendants are Entitled to Costs as a Matter of Right.

LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) provides that certain costs must be awarded to a prevailing party as a
matter of right. Because these costs are awarded as a matter of course to the prevailing party, the
Court should award Defendant those costs as outlined in the Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Support of
Motion for Costs Including Attorneys' Fees (Exhibit "A").
Costs as a matter of right LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C):

Jun 19/2009

Court Reporter - Deposition of Nola Garner
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$1,057.25

Jun 24/2009

Court Reporter - Deposition of Daniel S. Garner

$1,057.00

Jun 24/2009

Court Reporter - Deposition of Sherri-Jo Garner

$245.50
2,359.75

Total depositions

D.

Defendants are Entitled to an Award of their Discretionary Costs.

Defendants are entitled to an award of their discretionary costs under I.R.c.P. 54(d)(l)(D)
because those costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred during the course of
this litigation and should, in the interest of justice, be assessed against the Plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court ofIdaho has found that a party seeking discretionaIY costs under I.R. c.P.
Rule 54( d)(l)(D) must make an affirmative "adequate initial showing that these costs were necessary
and exceptional and reasonably incurred."

1

Taking the costs by category, Defendants' legal research

costs were incurred while researching the unique and complex legal issues in this case including
whether a party can be liable for breach of warranty in relation to an easement that had never
appeared in any deed. In addition, the copying costs and facsimile costs are costs that are necessruy
to practice law in this day and age. Therefore, these costs should be deemed necessary.
The second part of the discretionary costs analysis requires the Court to find that these costs

1 Automobile Club Insurance Company v. G. Jackson, 865 P.2d 965, 971 (Idaho 1993); See also, Richard J and Esther E.
Wooley v. Debest Plumbing. Inc., 983 P.2d 834, 841 (Idaho 1999)( Justice Silak dissent); See also, Fuller v. Wolters, 807
P.2d 633, 643 (Idaho 1991 )(set aside trial court's award of discretionary costs for failure on the part of prevailing party to
show that the costs were exceptional, necessary, or reasonable, and for failure on the part of the trial court for not making an
express fmding v.rith regard to each specific cost item).
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were reasonably incurred. Defendants' legal research costs were reasonably and prudently incurred.
In addition, it was necessary to make copies ofthe pleadings and exhibits. Thus, because Defendants'
discretionary costs were reasonably incurred under these uncommon, exceptional circumstances, the
Court should make an express finding and award these costs to the Defendants.
Pursuant to the above-stated rules, Defendants pray that the costs identified and summarized
in the affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Support of Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney Fees dated
November 9, 2009 (Exhibit "A") be taxed as costs against the Plaintiffs in favor of Defendants.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Court should grant all the fees and costs incurred in this case.
DATED THIS 9th day of November, 2009.

ATKIN LAW OFFICS, P.C

Blake S. Atkin
Attorney for the Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that he caused to be served a true and correct copy of
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MEMORANDUM OF COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES upon the following by the
method of delivery designated:

Gordon S. Thatcher
Michael Brown
Thatcher, Beard, St. Clair, Gaflhey
116 S. Center
P.O. Box 216
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

U.S. Mail _Hand delivery
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U.S. Mail _Hand delivery

DATED this 9th day of November, 2009.

Blake S. Atkin
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EXHIBIT A

Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e.
837 South 500 West, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner,
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow and
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,

AFFIDA VIT OF BLAKE S. ATKIN IN
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES
Case No. CV-08-342

Plaintiffs,

Judge Dunn

v.

Hal 1. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon e.
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First
American Title Insurance Company, a
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.
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ST ATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

)
SS:
)

Blake S. Atkin, having been first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

I am attorney of record for the Povey Defendants in the above entitled matter.

2. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
3. Attached hereto is a printout of the Costs and attorney fees incurred by the Povey
defendants in this matter.
4. My normal hourly rate is $450.00 per hour, but in this matter I billed only $200.00
per hour. As the court can see from perusal of the attachment, I am careful not to bill
for any work that is not absolutely necessary, and given my number of years litigating
cases I am able to reduce the number of hours billed by pinpointing the work that
actually needs to be done.
5. I am familiar with the rates charged in this community for attorney fees and given the
nature of this litigation and the level of skill involved and considering the other
factors set out in rule 54, Idaho rules of civil procedure it is my opinion that the rates
charged by me and my staff are reasonable.
6. These costs and attorney fees were all reasonably and necessarily incurred in the
defense of this matter.
th

DATED this 9

day of November, 2009.

Attorney for the Pavey Defendants

1"

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this 9'" day of Novem~~

N ry Public
My Commission expires:

ot//O/!tJ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on the _

day of September, 2009, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE S. ATKIN IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM

OF COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES upon the following by the method of delivery
designated:
Gordon S. Thatcher
Michael Brown
Thatcher, Beard, S1. Clair, Gaffney
116 S. Center
P.O. Box 216
Rexburg, Idaho 83440

US. Mail _Hand delivery

Fax

Eric Olsen
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391

US. Mail _Hand delivery

Fax

Ryan McFarland
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

US. Mail _Hand delivery

Fax

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

US. Mail

Fax

Hand delivery

GARNER V. POVEY
FEESUSTING
Working
Lawyer

Hours

Amount

Rate

Date

Explanation

Nov 5/2008

Meeting in Clifton

BSA

6.00

200.00

$

1,200.00

Jan 29/2009

Research on motion to dismiss standards;

JVM

5.50

175.00

$

962.50

BSA

6.00

200.00

$

1,200.00

MlS

0.80

90.00

$

72.00

MlS

0.30

90.00

$

27.00

MlS

0.60

90.00

$

54.00

research on pleadings facts that act as bar
to complaint
Feb 2/2009

Reviewing complaint; meeting with client;
preparing motion to dismiss

Feb 4/2009

preparing notice of appearance and motion
and memo to dismiss; mailing and copying
docs.

Feb 4/2009

preparing notice of hearing on defendants'
motion to dismiss amended complaint

Feb 4/2009

faxing notice of hearing to opposing counsel
and court

Feb 21/2009

Reply to motion to dismiss

BSA

6.00

200.00

$

1,200.00

Feb 23/2009

Prep for hearing

BSA

3.00

200.00

$

600.00

Feb 23/2009

Reply in supp of M to Dismiss legal research

JHP

3.10

150.00

$

465.00

Feb 24/2009

editing and preparing reply in support of
motion to dismiss; faxing and mailing to

Ml5

1.00

90.00

$

90.00

opposing counsel and court
Feb 25/2009

Prep for hearing on motion to dismiss

BSA

5.00

200.00

$

1,000.00

Feb 26/2009

Hearing on motion to dismiss

BSA

4.00

200.00

$

800.00

Mar 3/2009

Affidavits of Ivan Jensen and Ron Kendall

BSA

2.00

200.00

S

400.00

Mar 4/2009

Affidavit of twin lakes

BSA

1.00

200.00

$

200.00

Mar 4/2009

legal research on hearsay in idaho for case

JHP

0.40

150.00

$

60.00

Mar 6/2009

Working on affidavits of Ron Kendall and
Ivan Jensen

BSA

1.00

200.00

$

200.00

Mar 11/2009

Affidavits

BSA

1.00

200.00

$

200.00

research legal issues in case relating to answer

BSA

4.00

200.00

$

800.00

MlS

2.00

90.00

$

1~0.00

BSA

8.00

200.00

$

1,600.00

Mar 30/2009

to second amended complaint
Mar 31/2009

reviewing amended complaint and second
amended complaint for differences

Mar 31/2009

Research re: warranty of title where not

specific easement listed. Answer to second
amended complaint.
Apr 1/2009

Answer to second amended complaint

BSA

8.00

200.00

$

1,600.00

Apr 3/2009

scanning and emailing copy of Thatcher

MlS

0.30

90.00

$

27.00

affidavit (100 plus pages) to Blake

Apr 3/2009

Answer to second amended complaint and
affidavits

BSA

4.00

200.00

$

800.00

Apr 6/2009

Answer to a2d amended complaint

BSA

2.00

200.00

$

400.00

Apr 13/2009

Preparation of discovery requests

BSA

3.00

200.00

$

600.00

Apr 18/2009

Discovery requests

BSA

2.00

200.00

$

400.00

Apr 21/2009

drafting and preparing discovery requests
and interrogatories for mailing to opposing
counsel; researching Idaho rules of civil
procedure for definitions and instructions
to discovery requests; phone call and email
to Blake re issues with discovery

MLS

1.80

90.00

$

162.00

Apr 22/2009

Discovery requests research re: warranty of
title re: easement not described

BSA

5.00

200.00

$

1,000.00

Apr 24/2009

editing, scanning, copying and preparing
discovery (interrogs and req. for
admissions) for mailingto opposing counsel
and cert of service to court

MlS

0.40

90.00

$

36.00

Apr 28/2009

Research re upcoming depos

BSA

1.00

200.00

$

200.00

Apr 29/2009

calling court to confirm room for
depositions; drafting and preparing notice
of depositions; call to court reporter to
reserve

MlS

0.40

90.00

$

36.00

Apr 29/2009

copying, scanning, faxing and mailing out
notice of depositions to opposing counsel,
court, judge and court reporter

MlS

0.60

90.00

$

54.00

May 22/2009

Depos prep

BSA

1.00

200.00

$

200.00

May 25/2009

Preparing for depositions

BSA

2.00

200.00

$

400.00

May 26/2009

Prep for depositions

BSA

2.00

200.00

$

400.00

May 27/2009

Prep for depos call to counsel re: documents

BSA

1.00

200.00

$

200.00

May 29/2009

Prep for depos

BSA

3.00

200.00

$

600.00

Jun 1/2009

Prep for depos

BSA

6.00

200.00

$

1,200.00

Jun 2/2009

Deposition of Nola Garner

BSA

8.00

200.00

$

1,600.00

Jun 3/2009

Deposition of Dan Garner

BSA

8.00

200.00

$

1,600.00

Jun 8/2009

Drafting motion for summary judgment

BSA

3.00

200.00

$

600.00

Jun 10/2009

Research re: Summary judgment motion

BSA

3.00

200.00

$

600.00

Jun 11/2009

Research re: Summary judgment motion

BSA

4.00

200.00

$

800.00

lib

Jun 16/2009

Research re: Summary judgment motion

BSA

1.00

200.00

$

200.00

Jun17/2009

Motion for Summary Judgment

BSA

2.00

200.00

$

400.00

Jun 27/2009

Summary judgment motion

BSA

4.00

200.00

$

800.00

1n

Jun 30/2009

editing and reviewing the mm in support of
motion for summary judgment

MlS

0.40

90.00

$

36.00

Jul 7/2009

editing and reviewing the mm in supp of MSJ

MlS

0.60

90.00

$

54.00

Jul 7/2009

drafting motion in support of motion for
summary judgment; editing and formatting mm
in supp of motion for summary judgment

MlS

0.50

90.00

$

45.00

Jull0/2009

reading through deposition testimony for
citations to be used in MSJ; inputing
citations from depositions and west law
research into MSJ.

MlS

0.50

90.00

$

45.00

Aug 3/2009

working on placing deposition citations into
motion and memorandum for summary judgment;
researching case law on breach of warranty;

MlS

0.70

90.00

$

63.00

Aug 18/2009

editing and reviewing final draft of motion
for summary judgment; comparing deposition
changes to citations In msj; phone calf with
Blake re same

MlS

2.20

90.00

$

198.00

Aug 24/2009

call to clients re MSJ

MlS

0.10

90.00

$

9.00

Aug 25/2009

phone call with client re msj

MlS

0.40

90.00

$

36.00

Aug 26/2009

phone call with client re MSJ changes

MlS

0.30

90.00

$

27.00

Aug 29/2009

Review of last draft of sjm

BSA

3.00

200.00

$

600.00

Aug 31/2009

editing and reviewing final draft of MSJ
with new additions

MLS

4.60

90.00

$

414.00

Sep 1/2009

editing and adding in final changes to
MSJ; scanning, copying and preparing same
for mailing

MlS

3.10

90.00

$

279.00

Sep 3/2009

drafting notice of hearing; 5 min; preparing
fax cover sheets; faxing to all opp counsel,
court and judge; drafting letter to clients
re settlement agreement (5 min);

MLS

0.30

90.00

$

27.00

Sep 15/2009

Stipulation for court - discussions with
oPPosing counsel

BSA

2.00

200.00

$

400.00

Sep 16/2009

Drafting settlement letter

BSA

2.00

200.00

$

400.00

Sep 21/2009

Motion to strike affidavits, opposition to
motion to strike affidavits

BSA

8.00

200.00

$

1,600.00

Sep 22/2009

Opposition to motion to amend, opposition to
motion to strike affidavits

BSA

6.00

200.00

$

1,200.00

Sep 23/2009

reply sjm

BSA

6.00

200.00

$

1,200.00

Sep 24/2009

adding deposition citations to motion to
strike affidavits (30minj; formatting and

MLS

0.70

90.00

$

63.00

adding deposition citations to opp to mot
for enlargement of time

Sep24/2009

motion to strike affidavits

JHP

4.60

150.00

$

690.00

Sep24/2009

replysjm

BSA

6.00

200.00

$

1,200.00

Sep25/2009

adding citations from depositions to mm in
opp to motion to strike affidavits; adding
citations to reply msj

MLS

1.40

90.00

$

126.00

Sep25/2009

worked on motions and reply's to their 56(f)

JHP

6.80

150.00

$

1,020.00

motion, motion to amend, reply in supp of
our MSJ all in preparation for MSJ hearing
that is coming up beginning of October.
Sep25/2009

preliminary work on response to interrogatorie

AG

1.00

90.00

$

90.00

Sep28/2009

reading through depositions for citations

MlS

2.60

90.00

$

234.00

JHP

5.00

150.00

$

750.00

for mm in opp to motion to strike, mm in opp
to motion for leave to amend; editing and
formatting aff of Brad Povey (10 min);
editing and formatting aff of BSA (15min);
Sep 28/2009

worked on motions and reply's to their 56(f)
motion, motion to amend, reply in supp of
our MSJ all in preparation for MSJ hearing
that Is coming up beginning of October.

Sep28/2009

replysjm

BSA

4.00

200.00

$

800.00

Sep29/2009

editing and reviewing final drafts of mm in
supp of mot to strike aff of garner and

MlS

2.00

90.00

$

180.00

JHP

3.50

150.00

$

525.00

MlS

2.50

90.00

$

225.00

Supervising finalization of citations

BSA

1.00

200.00

$

200.00

preparing argument folder for hearing on

MLS

3.20

90.00

$

288.00

povey, motion re same; editing and reviewing
final draft of mm in opp to mot for
enlargement of time (15 min); editing and
reviewing final draft of mm in opp to mot to
amend 2nd amended complaint (20min)
Sep 29/2009

reply MM in supp of MSJ plus finalize other
Povey docs to be filed today

Sep 30/2009

adding citations to reply mm in supp of msj;
editing and reviewing same

Sep 30/2009
Oct 1/2009

10/6; printing cases from west law, all
pleadings related to 5 motions, etc.
Oct 1/2009

final research for Reply in Supp of MSJ and
finalize for filing.

JHP

1.00

150.00

$

150.00

Oct 2/2009

preparing argument folder for 10/6 hearing
on msj and other motions; printing cases

MlS

1.70

90.00

$

153.00

Prep for and attend hearing on msj

BSA

6.00

200.00

$

1,200.00

editing and reviewing letter to opp counsel;

MlS

0.10

90.00

$

9.00

JHP

2.00

150.00

$

300.00

from west law, etc.
Oct 6/2009
Oct 7/2009

scanning, copying and preparing same for
mailing
Oct 20/2009

discovery responses- doc requests and

interrogs
Oct 20/2009

editing and reviewing second request for
production of documents, adding in
definitions re same; editing and reviewing
responses to first interrogs from
plaintiffs, adding in general objections;
preparing certs of service re discovery above

MLS

,21

1.20

90.00

$

108.00

Oct 20/2009

inserting dictation into letterhead for opp
counsel re stipulated statement; copying,
scanning and preparing same for mailing

MlS

0.20

90.00

Oct 24/2009

meet with and prep Niegum affidavits

BSA

4

200

Nov 6/2009

prep proposed judgment and cost memo

3

200

BSA
Totals:

241.40

DISBURSEMENTS
Other
Jun 19/2009
Jun 24/2009
Jun 24/2009

Faxes
Feb 2/2009
Feb 24/2009
Apr 29/2009
5ep 29/2009
Oct 1/2009
Oct 20/2009

Postage
Feb 5/2009
Feb 24/2009
Apr 7/2009
Apr 24/2009
Apr 29/2009
Sep 1/2009
Sep 21/2009
Sep 28/2009
5ep 29/2009
Oct 1/2009
Oct 7/2009
Oct 12/2009
Oct 20/2009
Oct 20/2009

long distance
Sep 19/2009

Photoco[!ies
Feb 5/2009

Court Reporter - Deposition of Nola Garner
Court Reporter - Deposition of Daniel S. Garner
Court Reporter - Deposition of SherrHo Garner

$
$
$

1,057.25
1,057.00
24550

Total Other

$

2,359.75

$

Faxes 16 @ 050
Faxes 8 @050
Faxes 10 @ 0.50
Faxes 207 @ 0.50
Faxes 87 @050
Faxes 20 @ 0.50

$
$
$
$

8.00
4.00
5.00
103.50
43.50
10.00

Total Faxes

$

174.00

Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage
Postage

$

$

351
5.34
4.66
4.52
6.34
26.30
0.44
0.61
8.76
4.68
0.44
0.44
0.44
3.66

Total Postage

$

70.14

long distance 2.70 @ 0.20

$

0.54

Total Long distance

$

0.54

Photocopies 45 @ 0.20

$

9.00

$

$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$

$

$

18.00

$800.00
$600.00

$

42,587.50

Feb 6/2009
Feb 24/2009
Apr 7/2009
Apr 24/2009
Apr 29/2009
Sep 1/2009
Sep21/2009
Sep 28/2009
Sep 29/2009
Oct 1/2009
Oct 7/2009
Oct 12/2009
Oct 20/2009
Oct 20/2009

On-Une Research
Feb 20/2009
Mar 20/2009
Apr 20/2009
May 20/2009
Jun 20/2009
Aug 20/2009
Oct 20/2009

Photocopies 3 @ 0.20
Photocopies 42 @ 0.20
Photocopies 24 @ 0.20
Photocopies 50 @ 0.20
Photocopies 54 @ 0.20
Photocopies 940 @ 0.20
Photocopies 4 @ 0.20
Photocopies 9 @ 0.20
Photocopies 312 @ 0.20
Photocopies 174 @ 0.20
Photocopies 1 @ 0.20
Photocopies 1 @ 0.20
Photocopies 1 @ 0.20
Photocopies 34 @ 0.20

$
$
$
$

0.60
8.40
4.80
10.00
10.80
188.00
0.80
1.80
62.40
34.80
0.20
0.20
0.20
6.80

Total Photocopies

$

338.80

On-line Research
On-line Research
On-line Research
On-line Research
On-line Research
On-line Research
On-Line Research

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

285.14
195.22
73.95
19.60
39.08
252.80
660.91

Total On-line Research

$

1,526.70

$
$

19.96
21.46

Total Overnight 5hipping

$

41.42

Disbursements Total

$

4,511.35

Fees Total
Disbursements Total
Grant Total

'5
$

42,587.50
4,511.35
47,098.85

Overnight ShiQQing
Overnight Shipping
Oct 20/2009
Overnight Shipping
Oct 20/2009

$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$

EXHIBIT B

Blake s. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414

ATKIN LAW OFFICES.. P.C.
837 South 500 West, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (80l) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants

IN THE SIXfH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

Danie1 S. Gamer and Sherri·Jo Gamer.
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a "Widow and
Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola
Living Trust, dated July 19~ 2007,

Gamer

Pla.int.iffil.

v.

OPPOSmON TO MOTION FOR
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
Case No. CV..()8..342
JudgcDtmn

Hal 1. Dean and Marlene T. Dean. husband
and wife, DougJas K.. Viehweg and Sharon C.
Viehweg, husband and wi.f.e, Je.ffi:ey J.

Neigum and Kathleen A Neigum, as Trustees
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A
Neigum Revocable Trust,. dated September
17" 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
Neigurn, husband and wife; Brad Povey and
Leiza Povey. husband and \1V-ue; First
American TItle Insurance Company. a
Foreign TItle Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American
Trtle Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,

Defendants.

I ·d

AFFIDAwr OF BLAKE S. ATKIN IN

STATE OF IDAHO .

)

COUNTYOF~

)

ss:

Blake S. Atkin, having been first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

I am attorney of record for the PoveyDefendants-in the above entitledma:trer_-- -----

2. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.

3. My clients have not owned property in the vicinity of this dispute since October 4.

2005.
4. In early November I made a sett1~ offer, to .the Garners on behalf ofllie poveys. I
got no respoose to that settlement offer.
5. Sometime later that year. I orally renewed my settlement proposal Again I got no
response.

6. In November 2008, I urged Plainti:f&· CQuosel to agree to a stand stitl between his

clients and mine so that his clients could attempt to resolve the dispute with people
who did own the servient estate without nmning up unnecessary fees be.t\'\I-een two
parties who could not settle the dispute over the right of way.
7. Plai.ntiffi;' counsel agreed with the proYiso that When notified, the Poveys would
answer the complaint within 20 days.

8. In January, I was informed that the Garners insisted on an answer to the Complaint by
the Poveys.
9. I again made a settlement offer for which

r

got no response.

I suggested that

settlement needed to be accomplished with dispatch because of the growing attorney
fees bill being faced by both the Garners and the Poveys.

2

vHE-£.v£.-B02

10. On April 2, 2009 I made a wri~n settlement offer to the Garners and stated that if
settlement had not occurred by A,prillS, 2~. the Poyeys would have no choice but

to move fof'\i\la!d to protect their interests. I got no response.
~_,'

1 L On April 29, 2009, I noticed the depositions of Nola Gamer. D~~I_~f,__ ~4

••••• _ ....... _ •• , •• _ .• _. __ ~~_''>.

.....

_"

...... "' _

->

• • ~·n

-< •• ~.~.

._ • • • " ' •• ' .

_

, . • • • • • • _ - " ' - - - ,_ . . . " . , " . . .

•

.... "

".,-

•• , '

•

-

Sherri-Jo Gamer.
12 I received no communication from the Garners about settlement or otherwise..

13. On the eve of the depositions" I received a phone call from counsel for one of the
other Defendants.

14. He told me that the dates of fue depositions was not 'convenient and asked if I 'WOuld
reschedule ~
J5_ I normally like to accommodate such requ~ but iliis one coming so soon before 1he
deposition~

I did not feel it was fair to the witnesses., the court :reporter, or to my cHent

to reschedule the deposition so I refused.

16• .Based on the results of my discovery, 1 filed a motion for summary judgment on
,

September 1, 2009.
17. Two days later I received the first settlement offer the Plaintiffs ever made in this

case.
1it We countered 1hat o.ffi:r, OOt the parties have not been able to settle the matter.
DATED this

2!

day ofSeprember, 2009.

ftt£.f;~-

lake S. Atkin
Attorneyfor the Povey Defendants

3

______ _

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this.d?1. day of September.. 2009.

~

Notary blic
·'MyCommission expires:/oJ:7&7'~ -_."_...

4

gtRTMCATE OF §lRVICE
I hereby certify that on the _

day of September. 2009, I caused to he served. a true and

correct ropy of AFFIDAvrr OF BLAKE S. ATKIN IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR

ENLARGEMENT OF TIME upon the following by the method of delivery designated:
Gordon S. Thatcher
Thatch~ Beard,. 81. Clair. Gaffuey
116 S. Center

U.S. Mail _Hand delivery

Fax

U.S. Mail _Hand 'delivery

Fax

U.S. Mail _Hand delivery

Fax.

U.s. Mail

Fax

P.O. Box 216
Rexburg. Idaho 83440
Eric Olsen
Racine, Olson Nyc Budge & Bailey
P_O_ Box 1391

Pocatello. Idaho 83204-1391
Ryan McFarland
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P_O. Box 1617
B~Idaho 83701~1617

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263

5

_Hand delivery

EXHIBIT C

Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e.
837 South 500 West, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorneys for the Pavey Defendants

IN mE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLlN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner
Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Hal J. Dean and Marlene 1. Dean., husband
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C.
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J.
Neigum and Kathleen A Neigum, as Trustees
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First
American Title Insurance Company, a
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY J. NEIGUM
Case No. CV-08-342
Judge Dunn

ST ATE OF IDAHO

)
SS:
)

COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

Jeffrey 1. Neigum, having been first duly sworn deposes and says:
1. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
2. In the deed given us by Brad Pavey, a right of way was created for Dan Garner to
access his property on the west side of the canaL Had Brad not created this roadway,
we would have created our own road because we felt it would be rude to go so closely
to the Dean home and we did not feel it was safe to go so closely to the Dean's home
where small children migpt be h~.I.4
A pprox i ,no te "f Y€(.I.{"S
It
3. For ~n years after we bought our property, the Garners never used either the

y

tiff

northern road that goes past the Dean home, nor the new road created in our deed.
4. Suddenly, Dan Gamer started to use both roadways on a frequent basis. When I
asked him why he had started using the roads, he told me that he had a personal
vendetta against Brad Pavey and was hoping to make us mad at Brad so that we
would sue him.
5. He even told me some of the details about the trouble between him and Brad Povey.

He told me that Brad had intervened with Brad's father (the grandfather of Dan
Garner"s wife, Sherri-Jo,) to keep

~im

from selling to Dan and Sherri-Jo the Troy

Grave's dairy. That intervention by. Brad had. made Dan and Sherri-Jo very angry
with Brad and that is why Dan wanted to make us mad so that we would sue Brad.
6. I do not feel that Brad Povey did anything wrong in selling us the property, nor did he
do anything that resulted in us being sued by Dan Gamer. I feel we were embroiled

2

1~

in this lawsuit because Dan Garner wanted to get even with Brad Povey for a
completely unrelated event.

7. About one month after Doug Viehweg bought his property I installed a couple of steel
posts on the boundary between our property and the Viehweg property. Putting in
these posts mad$nan angry because he said it made it hard for him to maneuver farm
equipment up the new road. I removed the posts about a month ago as part of the
settlement with the Garners.
8. I remember the day Dan Gamer got stuck with the backhoe on the new roadway. It

occurred after Viehwegs had bought their property because I took pictures that I
forwarded to the Viehwegs of the damage Dan had done.
DATED this 4 Lf day of October, 2009.

.
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this .;.. t

.

~

Of:.-<{-'" '" fu f"day of S~et', 2009.

Notary Public
ELVA K. ATKINSON
NOTARY PUBUC
STATE OF IDAHO

My Commission expires: {( _
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I :RA~KL1N COUN~ CLERK!
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner,
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,
Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

Case No. CV-08-342
Judge Dunn

v.

Hal 1. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C.
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees
of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A.
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First
American Title Insurance Company, a
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho
Certificate of Authority; and First American
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

Judgment is hereby entered against Plaintiffs and in favor of Defendants Brad and Leiza
Povey, no cause of action.
DATED this

13 day of November, 2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of November, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of Defendant Brad and Leiza Poveys' proposed Judgment upon the following by the
method of delivery designated:
Gordon S. Thatcher
Thatcher, Beard, S1. Clair, Gaffney
116 S. Center
P.O. Box 216
Rexburg, Idaho 83440
Facsimile: (208) 359-5888

_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

X Fax

Eric Olsen
Racine, Olson Nye Budge & Bailey
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
Facsimile: (208) 232-6109

_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

X Fax

Ryan McFarland
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Facsimile: (208) 954-5236

_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

X Fax

Franklin County Court
39 West Oneida
Preston, Idaho 83263
Facsimile: (208) 852-2926

_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

X Fax

Judge Stephen S. Dunn
624 E. Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Facsimile: (208) 236-7208

X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery

Blake S. Atkin

X Fax

Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
Michael W. Brown, ISB No. 8017
343 E. 4th N. Suite 223
P.O. Box 216
Rexburg, ID 83440
Tel: (208) 359-5885
Fax: (208) 359-5888
jeff@beardstclair.com
mbrown@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO
Daniel S. Garner and Sheni-Jo Garner,
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow;
and Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola
Garner Living Trust, dated July 19,2007,
Case No. CV-08-342
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as
Trustees of the Jeffery 1. Neigum and
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust,
dated September 172004; Jeffery J.
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey,
husband and wife; First American Title
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of
Authority; and First American Title
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation,

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL S.
GARNER

Defendants.

Second Affidavit of Daniel S. Garner - Page 1

STATE OF IDAHO
ss.
County of Franklin

I, DANIEL S. GARNER, having first been sworn, depose and state:
1. I am over the age of eighteen, am competent to testify, and do so from personal
knowledge.
2. From 1987 to the commencement of this lawsuit, I regularly and consistently used the
Northern Roadway to access my property on the Westside of the Twin Lakes Canal for a variety
of purposes, including, but not limited to, hauling gravel and transporting equipment related to
agricultural endeavors.
3. When the Troy Graves dairy went up for sale, I had no interest in becoming dairyman.
The dairy was in poor condition and not economically appealing to me. Also, my physician
advised me not to participate in the type of physical labor required on a dairy. This advice from
my physician further reinforced my decision not to purchase the dairy.
4. I have never suggested to Mr. Neiguim that my use of the road was for the purpose of
provoking him to sue Brad Povey, nor did I suggest explicitly or implicitly to Mr. Neiguim that I
had a score to settle with Brad Povey.
5. I filed the above captioned lawsuit because I was facing the possibility of losing yearround access to my property. I named the Poveys as defendants in this lawsuit because their
actions led to my access being in jeopardy. I did not sue the Poveys for any vengeful or
vindictive purpose.
6. I have regularly used the original access road throughout my ownership of property lying
west of the Twin Lakes Canal. I did not "suddenly" begin to use the road on a more frequent
basis based on a personal vendetta I held against Brad Povey with the intent to cause the
Second Affidavit of Daniel S. Garner - Page 2

..,11

Neigums to become angry with him. I did not believe my use of the Neigum driveway would
anger the Neigums because their deed contained a description of an easement for me in it.
7. The episode in which I became stuck with my backhoe occurred on the Northern
Roadway.

Subscribed and sworn to before me on NovemberJ:i, 2009.

I'

•

Notary Public for State of Idah
Residing at rr-c·ulKl.u~ J))
My Commission Expires: I / O~ \1 D
(SEAL)

,

~(//////////'~'''///'//'/'.. F / / / / / / ' / / / / / / / / (

~

~(

LINDA W HAMPTON
NOfary Public

)(

State of Idaho

~

~

)~

~<
,<
~

)" F.!'.!'.!'.'.!'.!'''~· F.!' .I'.I.I'.!' "'..-j.> /'.>.!'".!' .1''''''", j.l'''..!'>~

Second Affidavit of Daniel S. Gamer - Page 3

1"'"

CERTRIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I have my office in Rexburg,
Idaho, and on November __ ,2009, I served a true and correct copy of SECOND AFFIDAVIT
OF DANIEL S. GARNER upon the following by the method of delivery designated:
Blake S. Atkin
837 South 500 West
Suite 200
Bountiful, UT 84010
Fax: (801) 533-0380

ICJ U.S. Mail ICJ Hand-delivered ID1 Facsimile

Franklin County Courthouse
39 W. Oneida
Preston, ID 83263
Fax: (208) 852-2926

ICJ U.S. Mail ICJ Hand-delivered ICJ Facsimile

Judge Stephen S. Dunn
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center/P.O. Box 4126
Pocatello, ID 83204
Fax: (208)236-7012

ICJ U.S. Mail ICJ Hand-delivered ICJ Facsimile

Michael W. Brown
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney, Attorneys
Attomey for Plaintiffs

Second Affidavit of Daniel S. Gamer - Page 4

